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FOREWORD
In August, 1992, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
was formally and legally constituted into the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). Its mandate has been broadened and deepened much in line with the desire 
of member states to establish an African Economic Community as enshrined in the 
Abuja Treaty of June, 1991. Success or failure on the path towards regional economic 
integration will depend on the degree of commitment of policy-makers in implementing 
the decisions of the SADC’s Heads of State and Governments. The way forward to the 
Southern African regionalism does not only rest with political leadership but, even more 
important, it depends on a commitment that permeates through government bureaucracy 
and business leadership to the grassroots.
It is hoped that the integration of the SADC economies will bring about a growth- 
stimulating environment and institutions. If SADC economies will have to be 
successfully integrated, it will be imperative that stumbling blocks be turned into building 
blocks through freer movement of capital, goods, and labour, and through improving 
various supportive infrastructure such as information flows, transport systems, and others. 
With the passage of time, new dimensions in regional cooperation and integration will 
have to be explored.
The papers in this volume are a contribution to the on-going debate on regional 
cooperation and integration. The scope of the subject is broad. Attempting to cover all 
the issues, in a field fraught with controversy, could have been futile, hence a selective 
approach has been adopted - the papers focus on selected topics.
The journey towards fully integrated economies will be long and difficult, and special 
measures will need to be formulated to accelerate the pace of integrating the SADC 
economies. The major task ahead is putting in place policies that would accelerate 
development such that sooner, not later, all the countries in the region could reach the 
same stage of development. The levels of income per capita among SADC countries, 
instead of widening, should be narrowing.
There is great urgency to integrate SADC economies. Regionalism is one of the 
instruments for achieving sustainable development and growth. Through easy access to 
regional markets, which are larger than domestic markets, domestic production could be 
expanded, trade could grow faster, and more investment flows, both domestic and 
foreign, could be attracted.'
The urgency to integrate SADC economies emanates also from a global perspective. 
The world economy is being partitioned into trade blocs. These are the North America 
Free Trade Area, the European Community, the Free Trade Area of Europe, and the 
Association of South East Asia Nations. Combined, these groups account for about 70 
percent of total world exports. In view of SADC’s low level of development, its share 
in world exports is less than 0.2 percent. The challenge, therefore, is to bring about 
greater dynamism in the SADC economies to broaden their productive bases and export 
capacities.
xvn
The donor community’s support to IDM’s quest to deepen and broaden the human 
resources in the SADC region will continue to be important. In this regard, IDM will 
endeavour to strengthen its capacity to carry out policy analysis on regional cooperation 
and economic integration. The future of all Southern African states does not rest on 
marginalization of the small nations but rather on collectively strengthening the regional 
economy to improve the welfare of the citizenry.
DR. MUSA P. DLAMINI 
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, IDM (BLS) 
FEBRUARY, 1993
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WELCOMING ADDRESS
HONOURABLE MINISTER, BEN AMATHILA 
MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY NAMIBIA
Distinguished Guests,
Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
Distinguished Representatives of International and Regional Organisations, 
Distinguished Delegates from SADCC Member States,
Ladies and Gentlemen
In the first place, let me take this opportunity to welcome you, on behalf of the 
Government and the people of Namibia, to Namibia, and, in particular, to Windhoek. 
As we are a young nation, for many of you, this may be your first time to come and visit 
our beautiful country. I can assure you that there are a lot of attractions for you to 
discover. Even for those of you who have been here before, I am certain there will be 
new discoveries to be made. We are pleased to play host to this important executive 
seminar on SADCC and at this very important time in the political and economic history 
of the Southern African region.
t
Mr. Chairman, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
is reaching a major turning point. In over 10 years of its existence, SADCCs struggle 
to achieve economic liberation assumed great predominance. Besides efforts to reduce 
economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on South Africa, SADCC member states 
set out to forge links to create regional integration, to mobilize resources to promote 
national, interstate, and regional policies programmes, and to act collectively to secure 
assistance from cooperating partners in executing the strategy to be developed for 
economic liberation. At all the fronts commendable progress has been made.
SADCC’s strategy in the early 1980s focused on rehabilitation and development of 
infrastructure - with emphasis placed on transport, communications, civil aviation, and 
energy sectors. However, over the last four years, there has been a shift. Priority has 
increasingly been accorded to issues relating to promotion of trade, investment, and 
production. And hence, the strategy for the second decade, and the chosen theme for 
the 1990 Consultative Conference was to give priority to creation of an enabling 
environment for the development of enterprise, acquisition of skills, and improvement 
of productivity.
2In response to the new emerging realities and in line with one of its original objectives, 
SADCCs theme for the 1992 Consultative Meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique, was 
'Towards Economic Integration" with a thrust on deepening cooperation and integration 
on the basis of balance, equity, and mutual benefits. In the 1990s and beyond, the quest 
for SADCC will be to achieve greater economic integration through integration of the 
structures of production.
Mr Chairman, as SADCC enters the last decade of the 20th century into the 21st 
century, there are many fundamental economic, social, and political changes taking place 
in the global and regional economies, and within the SADCC member states economies. 
There are many challenges which lie ahead. But these challenges - global drive towards 
regional trade blocs, competition for global resources, the integration of post-apartheid 
South Africa into the regional economy, the wave for democratization in Africa, sluggish 
domestic economic performance in SADCC, and others, should not weaken the resolve 
of SADCC to move forward with strength. It is imperative that these challenges should 
be turned into opportunities: to cement a solidarity for collective purpose among SADCC 
members, which should be reflected in a sense of community and common interest for 
the region; to re-define SADCCs role in anticipation of global and regional reforms; and 
to deepen a vision for SADCCs future.
Mr. Chairman, we are witnessing the dawn of the post-apartheid era on the horizon. It 
is my hope that within a short period, a new democratic and non-racial South Africa will 
emerge and will become part of our family of nations.
The Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) is a major step forward in the 
process for change. As a SADCC community, we shall lend our fullest support. The 
process dare not fail. For that would be a great tragedy. Already, it is well known that 
apartheid has been both a human tragedy and an economic disaster.
Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, with these few remarks, I wish you a 
pleasant and enjoyable stay in Windhoek. And now, it is my distinguished pleasure and 
honour to declare this seminar officially open.
I thank you.
3INTRODUCTION 
Gladson K. Kayira, Amy G. Luhanga and Ponny N.L. Walakira
NEW DIMENSIONS TO REGIONALISM
The EDM seminar on Regional Cooperation and Integration Among SADCC1 
Countries, which was held in Windhoek, Namibia 10 - 15 May, 1992 brought together 
high level participants from governments, non-governmental organisations, international 
organisations, private and parastatal sectors in the SADCC region. The quality of 
discussions and deliberations was enriched by the wealth of experience of the 
participants, drawn from a broad spectrum of professional backgrounds. The intent of 
the seminar was to stimulate thinking about the future of SADCC in rapidly changing 
regional and global contexts.
There were five specific objectives of the seminar. First, to evaluate the project and 
programme approach pursued by SADCC so far, and to examine the implications for 
moving towards policy coordination and harmonization. Second, to review the 
experience of regional cooperation and integration in Africa and the world, and to draw 
relevant experience for SADCC. Third, to review the legal framework of SADCC per 
se, and in relationship with Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Preferential 
Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) and the Treaty for Establishing an 
African Economic Community. Fourth, to assess and evaluate the implications of post­
apartheid South Africa on SADCC and its quest towards economic integration. Fifth, 
to consolidate the seminar discussions into suggestions which could make a contribution 
to the on-going debate on how best to forge SADCC’s future.
«*-
The seminar was convened against a background of renewed interests about prospects 
of regionalism (i.e. preferential trade liberalization), viewed as a solution to major 
international and regional economic problems. The Abuja Treaty, June, 1991, was a 
major landmark in Africa’s reflection on regionalism. It divides the African continent 
into five building trade blocks. Over time, the member states of each block are expected 
to liberalize and open their economies to allow freer movement of capital, goods, and 
labour. Progressively, the African continent is expected to achieve economic, monetary, 
and political integration over a period of three decades.
Even more, the seminar was also convened against a background of increasing concerns 
that Africa may be further marginalised in the 1990s. It is a concern that emanates from 
the emerging pattern of world trade system. There has been slow progress at the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) negotiations, designed to liberalise 
trade so that the global welfare could be maximized. In the 1990s, the world economy 
wi 11 be driven by three trading blocs - Europe, the Americas, and East Asia. It is argued
Through the sections SADCC and SADC are used 
interchangeably depending on the context.
4that negotiations for free trade among three parties has a better chance of success than 
through GATT with 154 members. Moreover, the proliferation of non-tariff barriers in 
developed countries has made regional economic integration not only an attractive policy 
option but also an imperative.
Africa’s strength in the 1990s and beyond will not depend on its political voice, which has 
been waning, but on building strong economies. Regional integration, implemented 
within a framework of outward oriented, market-friendly policies, offers prospects for 
renewed growth in Africa. This would also entail efforts to achieve competitiveness over 
time by global standards.
The quest for regionalism as an instrument of development can be divided into two 
phases - pre 1980s and post 1980s. The drive for regionalism is not new. Inspired by the 
creation of the European Community (EC) in 1957, many developing countries 
experimented with regionalism. For instance, in Africa the Economic Community West 
African States (ECOWAS) was created in 1975, the now defunct East African 
Community (EAC) was created in 1967, SACU in 1969, SADCC in 1980, PTA in 1981, 
just to mention a few. Similarly in Asia, the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) was established in 1967. In the Caribbean, the Caribbean Community was 
created in 1973 (formerly it was Caribbean Free Trade Area created in 1968). In Latin 
America, the Andean Group was created in 1969, Central America Common Market in 
1960 (CACM), and the Latin African Integration Association in 1980 (formerly the 
Latin America Free Trade Area in 1960).
Despite high expectations, the first phase on regionalism floundered except for the 
European Community (EC). Particularly in Africa,the primary motive for attempting to 
integrate the economies was the desire to achieve rapid industrialization through regional 
import substitution. It was thought that exposing the infant industries to the rigours of 
world competition would be too severe - they need first to export within the protected 
market before facing competition by world standards. That did not work. Import 
substitution strategies failed at regional level, and for the same reasons they failed at 
national level.
The importance of regionalism in the post 1980s phase is that practically all major 
economies in the world are affiliated to a regional trading bloc. Even the USA, which 
used to be staunch supporter of multilateral approach and a strong opponent of 
regionalism in the 1960s, has become a convert to regionalism. The result has been the 
conclusion of the Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), and negotiations for 
a North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to include Mexico. Even more, the 
Enterprise of Americas Initiative envisages a broader free trade area (FTA) to include 
South American countries.
Economists are divided on the merits of regional integration. There are essentially two 
schools of thought. At one extreme, trading blocs are perceived as detrimental to the 
multilateral process. At the other, trading blocs are perceived as essential building blocs 
towards a free world trading system.
5From a pragmatic view point, achieving a complete free trade system has proved difficult, 
although it may be an optimal option. The world has to settle for the second best 
option. In the 1990s and beyond there will be increasing inter-dependants and strategic 
interactions among trade blocs.
As Bhagwati,2 observes, the issues on regionalism are anchored on two broad aspects. 
First, the static impacts which focus on whether the immediate effects of regional 
integration on the welfare of the world or regional economy are positive or negative. 
Second, the dynamic impacts (i.e. time path issues) whether, irrespective of the static 
impacts, regionalism lead to freer multilateral trading system through emerging regional 
blocs into a single trading bloc.
As illustrated in Figure 1 below, the central issue is whether regionalism would place 
the world economy on a higher welfare (path 1) or on a lower welfare (path 2). The 
dynamic time path issue is whether trade blocs will converge (path 3) or the world 
economy would be fragmented, resulting in a lower welfare (path 4). Furthermore, will 
the multilateral process leave the world economy at a lower level of welfare along path 
6 or bring about greater welfare along path 5? The outcome will not be simple and 
straight forward.
Jadgish Bhagwati, "Regionalism and Multilateralism: An 
Overview," paper presented at the World Bank CEPR 
conference on New Dimensions in Regional Integration, 
April 2-3, 1992, Washington, D.C.
6FIGURE 1: WORLD WELFARE UNDER MULTILATERALISM
AND REGIONALISM
Figure 1 World welfare under multilateralism and regionalism
A d a p t e d  f rom Jagd ish  Bhagwat i ,  "Re g io n a l is m  a n d  M ul t i la te ra l i sm:  A n  Ov erv iew. "
In Free-Trade Areas (FTAs) or Custom Unions (Cus) there are two essential 
aspects: that trade among member states tend to be liberalized, while protection 
against outsiders tend to be maintained. The central question is whether a FTA 
or CU is trade creating or trade diverting. (See Box 1). It has been argued that 
if trade creation is more dominant than trade diversion, then economic welfare 
is increased.Or if trade diversion is dominant, then welfare is decreased. But in 
the face of increasing non-tariff barriers, this criterion is no longer clear cut.
It is important to note that many African countries are undertaking trade reforms 
to create liberal trade environment. Under such conditions, incremental benefits 
from FTAs through trade creation may not be significant. Unilateral trade 
liberalization with the rest of the world may offer attractive options.
7BOX 1 TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION
It is strange that there are deep divisions among the economists and 
policy-makers on the desirability of regional integration. These divisions are 
paradoxical since there was near unanimity on the subject four decades ago. 
Writing in 1950, Jacob Viner opened the key chapter of his celebrated treatise, 
The Customs Union Issue, as follows:
"The literature on customs union is general, whether written by economists or 
non-economists, by free traders or protectionists, is almost universally 
favourable to them, and only here and there is a sceptical note to be 
encountered, usually by an economist with free trade tendencies. It is a 
strange phenomenon which unites free traders and protectionists in the field of 
commercial policy, and its strangeness suggests that there is something 
peculiar in the apparent economics of the customs unions."
To explain the source of this peculiarity, Viner introduced the seminal concept 
of "trade creation" and "trade diversion." These concepts proved central to the 
subsequent thinking on regionalism and have been taken at the heart of the 
policy debate raging today.
To explain these concepts, suppose South Africa and Malawi, starting from 
non-discriminatory tariffs, decide to form a FTA. As part of the arrangement, 
the two countries eliminate all trade restrictions between themselves, but 
maintain tariffs on imports from the rest of the world. Assume that the unit 
production costs are constant everywhere and that as a result of the FTA 
South Africa begins importing shoes from Malawi. Is this for the better? 
Viner showed that the answer depends on the pattern of production before the 
FTA. If South Africa produces shoes before the FTA, it must produce shoes 
at a higher cost than Malawi. This means that the FTA shifts production from 
a higher cost to a lower cost source. There is trade creation and welfare 
improves. If shoes were imported initially from a country elsewhere in the 
world (such as Hong Kong), that country must produce shoes at lower cost 
than both Malawi and South Africa. In this case, the discrimination 
introduced by the FTA shifts production from lower cost to higher cost source. 
There is trade diversion, and welfare declines.
From the view point of multilateral trading system, trade-creating FTA does 
not reduce trade between the union and the rest of the world, and it expands 
trade between the partners. This FTA constitutes a movement towards freer 
world trade. By contrast, a trade diverting FTA expands trade between 
partners at expense of the trade between the union and the rest of the world. 
This change extends protection from the national to the regional level and 
mo es away from a freer world. Purely on economic grounds, those who 
2 that FTAs are largely trade-creating support regionalism, while those 
believe the reverse oppose it. The debate remains unsettled.
Ada| id from "The World Bank Policy Research Bulletin," May - July, 1992
8SCOPE OF THE SEMINAR
Against this new dimension on regionalism, a set of papers were presented to stimulate 
thinking about the future of the SADCC in rapidly changing regional and global contexts. 
In editing these papers, deliberate efforts were made to retain the substance and flavour 
of the original papers and the general discussions. No attempt was made by EDM or the 
editors to seek prior uniformity on the issues or problems to be addressed. The findings, 
interpretations and conclusions expressed in the papers are entirely of the authors. They 
should not be attributed in any way to EDM or the institutions and organisations wher s 
the authors are currently employed.
The papers have been organised under four specific sections:
(a) Historical Perspectives;
(b) Emerging Sectoral Issues;
(c) Prospects for Regionalism in Southern Africa; and
(d) Overall Observations and conclusions.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The key note address, prepared by EDM and delivered by Dominic Mulaisho, sets the
tone, direction, and substance of the seminar. It is a thought provoking paper. It starts
by reviewing global mega-trends towards regionalism. It examines Africa’s response to 
these trends, and draws their implications for Africa in general, and SADCC in 
particular. SADCC has been aid driven, and it may be marginalised because of 
prospects for reduction in external financial resource flows. Performance of the SADCC 
economies and the region’s resource endowment are reviewed. A number of soul 
searching questions are raised. It concludes that there are difficult challenges for 
SADCC in the 1990s.
Under the same rubric on historical perspectives, Gladson K. Kayira surveys, from a 
comparative view point, approaches to regional economic cooperation and integration 
in Africa. He notes that poor performance on regionalism must be seen from a broader 
context - the economic crisis that Africa has suffered. Many African economies were 
worse on in 1980s than at independence in the 1960s. The orthodox arguments for 
market integration are examined. SADCC’s quest for a new approach to integration 
called"development integration" is evaluated. Based on the experiences with regionalism 
in Africa and the other parts of the world, Kayira concludes that Africa’s performance 
has fallen short of expectations. The task of integrating African economies remain 
daunting but not insurmountable.
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EMERGING SECTORAL ISSUES
Under this heading, Chinyamata Chipeta’s paper starts by examining the classical 
problems of economic integration. Structural and institutional features of the Southern 
African economies are reviewed. The creation of an enabling macroeconomic 
environment is underscored. Issues on capacity for policy analysis and formulation under 
structural adjustment programmes are discussed for both the SADCC and PTA regions.
Chipeta explores the underlying issues on harmonization of macro-economic and sectoral 
policies. Emphasis is placed on regional and national investment policies. The impact 
of competitive trade and devaluation policies is highlighted. Monetary union is 
considered an essential element for attaining a full fledged economic integration. 
Chipeta examines the hurdles to be overcome to reach monetary union with specific 
reference to PTA. The paper concludes by suggesting the broadening of policy reforms 
to take a regional dimension to improve competitiveness.
Gladson K. Kayira’s paper analyses a triple nexus of promoting intra-SADCC trade, 
encouraging technological advancement, and promoting food security. It is noted that 
despite the efforts to increase intra-SADCC trade, it has remained dismally low, not 
exceeding 5 percent of the total external trade. A large proportion of this intra-SADCC 
trade is attributable to Zimbabwe, which has a relatively broader industrial base 
compared with other SADCC countries. While formal trade statistics indicate that trade 
among SADCC countries is very low, in response to policy distortions, qualitative 
observations would suggest that unrecorded transborder trade (UTT) is vibrant and 
probably modestly high. Constraints to increasing intra-SADCC trade are discussed. 
Kayira observes that trade between South Africa and the SADCC economies has been 
increasing. Prospects for expansion of trade look promising in the post-apartheid era.
Kayira develops a simple model that links technology, production, trade and market 
signals. Investment in research and development as an important determinant in 
technological progress is discussed. Factors behind technological transfer and absorption 
are examined. For a selected SADCC countries patterns of exports and imports based 
on technological intensities are analysed.
Increasing SADCC’s capacity to feed itself has been one of the highest priorities. It is 
noted that yet the crisis in SADCC’s agricultural production continues. In many SADCC 
countries food production has either stagnated or declined, resulting in large cereal 
imports. For many SADCC countries cereal imports have increased by more than four 
fold between 1974 and 1989. This has contributed to diversion of valuable foreign 
exchange from investment and other expenditures which are critical for long-term 
development.
The current drought has placed food security and food security coordination on top 
priority. It has put the SADCC early warning system to an acid test. There is an open 
policy question on the effectiveness of this early warning system. According to UN Food 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates, the region’s total food input
10
requirements could exceed 8 million tonnes of grain over the coming year, which is four 
times than normal. In view of the limited financial capabilities of most countries, they 
will be forced to appeal to donors for more food aid. This is coming at the time when 
traditional sources of aid are overburdened by commitments to other regions such as the 
Horn of Africa and the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by suggesting policies 
required to increase agricultural production and improve food security.
The role of women in development has received increasing attention. The paper by Amy 
G. Luhanga and Gladson K. Kayira points out that the increase of interest in women’s 
affairs is partly owing to Africa’s problems of the deepening economic crisis. Women 
in SADC economies make significant contribution towards the process of socio­
economic transformation and development. In many SADCC countries over 60 percent 
of households are headed by women. Women are involved in the mainstream of 
agricultural production, commerce, industry and services activities. The traditional status 
of women in society and the changes that have taken place are reviewed.
Problems that women face to have access to financial and other resources are identified. 
The inequality in access of women to employment opportunities have hampered the 
realization of productive potential of women. There are several indicators used to 
illustrate sharp divides between females and males in the SADCC society in terms of life 
expectancy, overall literacy and education achievements. The paper notes with concern 
that there are no special or specific programmes within SADCC designed to target 
women. The paper concludes by outlining the challenges to be faced to enhance the 
productive capacity of women in the SADCC society.
PROSPECTS FOR REGIONALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Dominic Mulaisho’s paper explores the creation of SADCC from a historical perspective. 
It is pointed out that there is no need for a new grand blueprint for economic integration 
rather than a pragmatic step by step approach to regionalism. Setting of ambitious and 
unrealistic targets is counter-productive. Mulaisho points out that there are important 
lessons to be learned from the experience of the European Community. Perhaps the 
most important is that success in integration can be achieved against the background of 
rising prosperity, and not deepening poverty. Convergence, rather than divergence, of 
economic management policies matters.
Furthermore, Mulaisho suggests that the current PTA with 19 members is too large and 
underdeveloped. It could benefit from breaking up into two - one organization 
combining the present SADC and South Africa, and the other one constituting the rest 
of the members of PTA  On implications of post-apartheid South Africa on SADC, 
Mulaisho notes that already four members of SADCC are also members SACU, and 
hence strong economic links already exist. It is underscored that although the South 
African economy is much larger than the entire SADCC economy, the quality of life of 
many South Africans is not much better than that of most SADCC citizens. To redress 
the internal imbalances created by the apartheid system, South Africa will have to spend 
a lot of resources internally. Therefore, Mulaisho concludes that it should not be
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expected that South Africa will play an over dominant role in shaping regionalism in the 
Southern Africa region.
David M. Zamchiya’s paper examines the legal evolution of SADCC. It is asserted that 
SADCC has operated without a proper legal framework since its creation. The loose 
and decentralised structure with a small secretariat and sectoral coordinating units at 
national level may have been a deliberate effort to avoid creation of a supra-national 
organization.
As SADCC moves from coordination of projects and programmes to economic 
integration, Zamchiya proposes some new and focused ideas on institutional mechanisms 
needed to make SADCC an effective vehicle for economic integration. The need for 
performance criteria rather than automatic membership to a regional grouping because 
of geographic proximity is raised. Zamchiya raises important questions regarding 
internal management procedures and systems which SADCC should undertake if it has 
to become effective in its new mandate - integrating the SADCC economies.
SADCC: FROM RESOLUTION TO ACTION
This concluding section summarises the major issues which emanated from the seminar 
papers, discussions and suggestions of the delegates. The issues and observations are 
divided into four sub-sections:
(a) Balanced and Equitable Development of the Community;
(b) Modalities for Affecting Integration;
(c) Mechanism for Financing the Programmes of the Community; and
(d) The Legal Framework of the Community.
It is noteworthy that on substantive issues, there was large degree of consensus. This 
could provide a sold basis for formulating and implementing policies and programmes 
for strengthening regional cooperation and integration.
It is hoped that with the publication of these proceedings, there will be sufficient interest 
generated to carry out workshops or seminars at national level. For regional integration 
to become a reality,it will require the participation of ordinary SADC citizens. Initiatives 
to create a SADC identity, comparable to the EC identity, will require that attending to 
\ CC issues should not be the preserve of only government officials, but increasingly, 
s private sector should take an active lead. If the SADCC resolutions have to be 
mslated into action, it will be imperative that what SADCC stands for, its future and 
sion should be shared by a broad base of the populace. SADCC future rests on a 
shared vision.
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The resolution to formalize SADCC into a legal entity marks an important historical 
development. It will drive SADCC into a new and better charted direction towards an 
economic development community. However, the major challenge that lies ahead will 
be determining a pragmatic and realistic timetable for attaining such a community. The 
success of SADC will be judged by meeting its targets in the process of integrating its 
economies. This will be the acid test - to translate resolution about creating a 
community into concrete action.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
KEY NOTE ADDRESS
SADC Responding To Rapid Global and Regional Changes 
EDM, delivered by Dominic Mulaisho
INTRODUCTION
There are rapid economic and political changes sweeping the Southern Africa region and 
the world at large. It is imperative for the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) to respond effectively if it has to grow into an effective regional 
integration organization. Indeed, the road ahead will be fraught with difficulties and 
challenges. The nature of the difficulties and challenges can be examined at three levels: 
global, regional, and national. Therefore, my key note address is organized under the 
following rubrics:
(a) SADCC within the context of the global economy;
(b) SADCC within the context of the regional economy;
(c) the performances of SADCC economies and their prospects in the medium term; 
and
(d) some perspective about SADCC’s future.
SADCC IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY
Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the world economy is undergoing momentous 
changes. These are occurring in Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet
Union, which are undergoing major transformation. In Europe, the European
Community (EC) is moving forward with the creation of a single market in 1992; in 
North America Canada, United States of America (USA) and Mexico have established 
free trade area; and in the Caribbean, Latin America, the Pacific, and Asia regions, there 
are concerted efforts to strengthen regional trading blocs. In Africa, the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) has called for the creation of an African Economic Community 
by the year 2035. In South Africa apartheid is falling apart. At a national level, 
practically all SADCC countries are undertaking policy reforms to place their economies 
on a sustainable long term development and growth path. The content, form, and shape 
that SADCC will take in the 1990s will be influenced by both endogenous and exogenous 
factors.
The size of the SADCC economy is by global standards negligible. With a total GDP 
of US$27.2 billion, less than that of General Motors Corporation’s turnover, SADCC 
economy is only about 0.1 per cent of the world economy. (See Table 1) Even more 
striking, the economy of Hong Kong, with a population of less than 10 percent that of 
SADCC, is twice as large as that of SADCC. SADCC’s population of 79.6 million
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represents only 1.5 percent of world’s population. The standard of living in the 
industrialized Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries, measured by Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, is about 50 times 
higher than the average quality of life in SADCC. It is worth noting that there is a high 
concentration of wealth among the OECD countries. While these countries account for 
only 15 percent of the world population, they produce about 72 percent of the world’s 
output. Global distribution of income is heavily skewed towards the North. The relative 
insignificance of the SADCC economy by world standards calls for greater efforts for 
SADCC’s economic expansion in the 1990s and beyond.
In the Southern Africa region, the South African economy is dominant. It is about three 
times that of SADCC with a broad based manufacturing sector and infrastructure 
services. By Sub-Saharan African (SSA) criterion, South Africa and SADCC combined 
could be powerful regional economy with large potential for expansion. Combined 
SADCC and South Africa account for close to 70 percent of SSA’s total production.
TABLE 1: SOME BASIC INDICATORS. 1989
GDP 
($ BIL.)
POP
(MIL.)
GNP PER 
CAPITA 
($)
SADCC 27.210 79.6 363
SOUTH AFRICA 80.370 35.0 2,470
SSA 161.820 480.4 340
HONG KONG 52.540 5.7 10,350
OECD 14,292.220 772.6 19,090
WORLD 19,981.540 5,206.1 3,980
Notes
1. SSA means sub-Saharan Africa.
2. Data on SSA excludes South Africa.
3. OECD means the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and 
United States).
Source: World Bank, World Development Report. 1991. Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 1991.
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Mr Chairman, it should be noted that the changes in Eastern Europe and the republics 
of the former Soviet Union have been at a much faster pace than many global strategists 
could have expected. They have created enormous demand for resources - financial and 
technical. Conditionality for resource transfer from the West to Eastern Europe has 
been on further economic and political reforms. Although it may be difficult to estimate 
the magnitudes accurately, resource flows to the region in the 1990s are bound to be 
large. Moreover, from a historical perspective, Western Europe and North America have 
a closer affinity with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union than with Africa. In 
fact, some strategists have a vision of greater Europe that could encompass the whole 
of Eastern Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the 
former Soviet Union in the near future, which could form a pillar of the New World 
Order.
In 1992, the European Community will be unified into a single market. Its total 
population is more than that of the USA. The EC is the second largest economic power 
next to the USA. However, compared to the USA, the EC is a more open economy and 
is emerging as a formidable trading bloc, accounting for about 40 percent of world trade. 
Intra-EC trade has substantially increased over the last 30 years. While in 1958, intra-EC 
trade was only 35 percent of the total trade, by the late 1980 it rose to close to 60 
percent. It seems intra-EC trade will grow even more rapidly in the 1990s.
Mr Chairman, even the supposedly largest free market economy in the world, the USA, 
is trying to protect its self-interests through creation of a regional trading bloc. USA and 
Canada along with Mexico have ratified a treaty designed to dismantle the trade barriers 
between them and have formed the North American Free Trade Agreement. While 
Canada, USA, and Mexico are already major trading partners, it appears their treaty is 
designed in part as a response to the potential for a "Fortress Europe." The USA, 
Canada and Mexico, as a free trade area, will have a major influence on the patterns of 
world trade.
In Latin America there is a strong renewed interest in economic integration, although 
it has been observed that schemes with bright economic prospects, such as the Central 
American Common Market (CACM), have not worked well. Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay, which account for more than half of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of Latin America, signed a treaty to establish the Southern Cone Common 
Market by 1994 (The Economist. 30 March-5 April, 1991). If it works, it has the 
potential of attracting foreign investments and achieving economies of scale in 
production. And the Caribbean Economic Community is also attempting to make
forward strides towards greater integration.
*
Despite trade liberalization policies pursued by the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), it has had little increase in intra-regional trade in the 1980s. 
However, resulting from an increase in external regional trade, the economies of ASEAN 
have experienced rapid growth. In the 1990s, ASEAN stands a chance of emerging 
stronger in the world trading patterns than in the 1980s. Similarly, Australia and New 
Zealand have decided to create a single market to promote the flow of trade, services 
and commercial dealings. They are also poised to be an important trading bloc in the 
1990s.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SADCC
Mr Chairman, against this background of global trends, what are the implications for 
SADCC?
The global trends towards regional integration give rise to concerns about a new wave 
of protectionism and stiff competition among trading blocs. The patterns of trade will 
be largely influenced by the negotiating strength of these blocs. For instance, the 
Common Agricultural Policy for the EC, designed to subsidize farmers, has adverse 
effects on agricultural production in developing countries. Because of subsidies, EC 
farmers produce large surplus food and this has a depressing effect on world commodity 
prices. A large proportion of EC food surplus has been donated as food aid.
There is another concern which is under a euphemism of "SADCC-pessimism" - the 
marginalization of SADCC economies because of reduction in external resource flows. 
This is a legitimate concern. Funding of SADCC projects and programmes has been 
heavily dependent on external sources. Global savings are scarce, and with the opening 
up of Eastern Europe, CIS, and the re-unification of Germany, there is likely to be a 
shift of resources to these areas at the expense of Africa, in general, and at the expense 
of SADCC, in particular. Even much closer to home, in the post-apartheid era, there 
is a danger of a shift of resources from SADCC to South Africa. The international 
community is likely to be sympathetic to the new South Africa than to SADCC. SADCC 
will have to learn greater negotiation skills for it to have a reasonable audience for its 
voice in the international community.
However, there is some optimism. As some policy analysts argue, if rapid growth within 
the global regional groupings could be achieved, particularly in the EC, which is 
SADCC’s major trading partner, prospects for SADCC could be favourable. Rapid 
growth in these groupings could spur increased demand for SADCC products. This, in 
turn, could contribute to growth in SADCC economies. However, the challenge of the 
global regional groupings is to ensure that they complement, rather than weaken, the 
world trading system. To achieve this, these groupings should promote regional trade 
liberalization - not to erect higher barriers against other countries. And in line with the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles, they should pursue 
multilateral trade liberalization to expand access to foreign markets. Failure to do this 
will provide excuses for regional groups around the world - Asia, North America, South 
America, Europe, and even in Africa - to adopt restrictive trade and investment 
measures.
There are also some pessimists. These policy analysts argue that the EC after 1992 could 
become a "Fortress Europe". By imposing new rules and conditions, strict specifications 
and standards on products, which could amount to a new form of protectionism, access 
; the EC market could be limited. Since the EC is a traditional and major trading 
partner of SADCC, this development could hamper SADCC’s exports to the EC market 
dampen SADCC’s growth prospects. I am sure that our colleagues with experience 
EC, attending this seminar will be able to share with us the latest reflections on 
and non-tariff barriers to trading with EC.
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Moreover, Mr Chairman, it is quite evident that the former West Germany will have to 
spend increasingly more resources on economic restructuring of the former East German. 
The USA and European powers will spend increasingly more resources to economic 
restructuring of Eastern Europe and the CIS to ensure that these economies do not 
decay into anarchy. Moreover, to help restructure the Eastern European economies, a 
bank - the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - has been established. 
And after the Gulf War, Western powers will probably spend large resources in the 
Middle East countries in an effort to achieve a regional balance. Furthermore, there is 
a general business perception that the rate of return on investment in SADCC (and 
indeed Africa) is lower than other parts of the World, particularly Eastern Europe now. 
In the absence of fundamental changes, attracting direct foreign investment into SADCC 
will prove difficult.
Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, taking into consideration all the implications 
outlined above, I am persuaded to conclude that there will be difficult challenges for 
SADCC in the 1990s. The global environment will not be hospitable to SADCC. 
Resources flows - foreign aid and direct foreign investments - to SADCC, instead of 
increasing, they may decline. This raises a fundamental question:
Does SADCC have sufficient capacity to mobilise domestic resources for its projects and 
programmes? If it does not, what is the future of SADCCs financing requirements? 
What contingency plans are in place to cater for such eventualities?
I hope in your discussions and deliberations you will touch on these issues.
SADCC IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING REGIONAL ECONOMY
Let me now turn to SADCC within the regional context. By regional context, I mean the 
Southern Africa region - SADCC plus South Africa.
Mr Chairman, it should be pointed out that there cannot be sustainable economic 
cooperation and economic integration if there is no peace and stability in the region. 
In the 1980s, in both Angola and Mozambique, there have been civil wars which have 
caused incalculable human suffering and immense economic devastation. Even our host 
country, Namibia, fought hard battles of liberation which culminated into political 
independence on 21 March, 1990. Destabilization in the 1980s is estimated to have 
destroyed property and infrastructure worth US$60 billion, and caused heavy human 
suffering and loss of life'. Military expenditures by both SADCC, particularly the Front­
line States, and South Africa escalated. In the 1990s, it is my hope that we can see 
peace dividends - shift of resources from military to civilian use to build schools, 
hospitals, roads and other infrastructure to accelerate development. It is my hope that 
the initiatives in Angola and Mozambique would lead to durable peace.
Mr Chairman, experience around the world suggests that changes in South Africa will 
be accompanied by uncertainties which may have important implications for SADCC. 
Many scenarios can be developed about the new South Africa. But for many of us in 
this region and for all the progressive forces around the world there can be only one 
desirable scenario or outcome: that there will be a smooth and peaceful transition to the 
new South Africa.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SADCC
Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, what are the implications for the new South 
Africa on SADCC? It is my humble submission that there are no ready-made answers 
to this question. Changes in South Africa are so rapid that even the architects of these 
changes may be overtaken by these very changes.
At the outset, let me point out that it our assumption that the new South Africa will join 
SADCC and become its eleventh member. The region - SADCC plus South Africa - 
forms a homogenous group with a long history of economic relations. In fact, within the 
framework of the proposed establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) 
by the year 2035, this region has great potential to move forward with strength.
The Southern Africa region is rich in minerals, fertile soils and well endowed with a 
diversity of human skills and labour. Extensive minerals available include chromate, 
coal, copper, diamonds, gold manganese, platinum and others. In fact, SADCC produces 
a significant proportion of the world total output of a range of minerals, For instance, 
1988, SADCC’s total mineral output accounted for 18.7 per cent of the world’s output; 
cobalt for 15.0 per cent; ferro-chrome for 7.2 per cent asbestos for 4.8 per cent, chromate 
for 4.6 percent and nickel for 4.0 percent. Even more, of the world’s known reserves, 
South Africa accounts for 82 percent of manganese, 69 percent of platinum, 55 per cent 
of chromium ore, 47 per cent of gold, 33 per cent of vanadium, 24 percent of diamonds 
and 16 per cent of zirconium, and 8 percent of coal. There is also large potential for 
hydro-power and agriculture. There are already in place reasonably good transport and 
communications systems. With apartheid falling apart, the Southern Africa region will 
at last be in a position to fully tap its vast resources for the benefit of its people. 
However, it will be important that new instruments are established to mitigate the 
impacts of the wide disparities in. the levels of economic development among the 
members of the region.
Still a larger question remains:
What should be the nature of regional economic cooperation and integration 
arrangements that SADCC should enter with the new South Africa?
This is a very important question. I hope you will devote sufficient time to it in your 
discussions.
SADCC PERFORMANCE
Chairman, let me know turn to SADCC performance briefly. At the outset it may 
be insightful to re-visit the objectives of SADCC, when it was founded in 1980 in 
M ungushi Hall in Lusaka, Zambia. The Lusaka Declaration, "Southern Africa: 
owards Economic Liberation," set out four development objectives for SADCC:
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(a) reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on South Africa;
(b) forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
(c) mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate, 
and regional policies; and
(d) concerted action to secure international cooperation within a framework of 
economic liberation.
To be realistic, reducing dependence on South Africa proved difficult for several reasons. 
First, due to destabilization of the 1980s which resulted in the destruction of 
infrastructure, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, reducing dependence on South 
Africa transport system became virtually impossible. This was reinforced by the inherited 
colonial rail and road alignments which started in the hinterlands and ended on the coast 
with little lateral inter-connections.
Second, several SADCC member countries, especially those who are members of the 
Southern Africa Customs Union, had strong trade links with South Africa that it was 
practically impossible to de-link.
Third, many export and import clearing houses in SADCC are either subsidiaries of 
South African companies or controlled from South Africa. Hence, diverting traffic away 
from South Africa proved infeasible in many cases.
Mr Chairman, some observers contend that SADCC failed to achieve the second 
objective, i.e, forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration. 
I disagree with them. Creating a genuine economic integration is a long term effort - it 
cannot be achieve over night. Twelve years that SADCC has been in existence are too 
short. SADCC has just started laying the foundation for economic integration. For 
instance, look at the EC - it started in 1956 and at that time its economies were already 
at a high level of development with few disparities among them. After 36 years, the EC 
is creating a single market. There are useful lessons to learn from the EC experience.
On objectives (c) and (d), it is well recognised that SADCC made great progress on 
mobilising external financial resources and securing international co-operation.
Mr Chairman, having said that, with new realities emerging in Southern Africa, it may 
be wise for SADCC Heads of State and Governments to go back to Mulungushi Hall and 
draft new objectives.
Let me now turn to the actual performance of SADCC. From an economic view point, 
SADCC’s performance can be characterized as "fragile success." The economies have 
been subjected to vicissitudes of drought causing famine and food insecurity, declining 
terms of trade resulting in unsustainable balance of payments, and declining foreign 
exchange inflows culminating into worsening debt situation.
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During most of the past two decades, economic performance of the region has been 
disappointing. As Table 2 shows, compared to 1965-80 period, real GDP growth rates 
declined during the 1980s both in SADCC and South Africa. Even more worrisome, 
except for Botswana and Lesotho, for the rest of SADCC real GDP growths were less 
than population growths, which translate into declines in per capita terms.
TART F. 2: REAL GDP AND POPULATION GROWTH. PER CENT
Real GDP Growth Population Growth
Country 1965 - 80 1980 - 89 1965 -80 1980 - 89
Botswana 13.9 11.3 3.5 3.4
Lesotho 6.8 3.7 2.3 2.7
Malawi 5.5 2.7 2.9 3.4
Mozambique - - 1.4 2.5 2.7
Namibia - 0.4 2.4 3.1
Tanzania 3.9 2.6 2.9 3.1
Zambia 2.0 0.8 3.0 3.7
Zimbabwe 5.0 2.7 3.1 3.5
South Africa 4.1 1.5 2.4 2.4
Source:
World Bank, World Development Report. 1991. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991.
It is encouraging that in recent years performance of the SADCC economies has 
continued to improve (see Table 3). Most of the member states experienced positive 
economic growth rates. Unfortunately, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia 
have been saddled with heavy debt service burden. To place the economies on 
sustainable growth paths, practically all the member states implemented policy reform 
programmes.
In the 1990s, sustainable performance could be linked to deepening and broadening of 
the policy reform measures, and in particular, to trade liberalization. As the 1991 
C Annual Report 1991 observes,
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"The lessons to be derived from the performance of the economies of the member states 
is that, those countries which have stayed the longest with economic adjustment 
programmes and improved their national economic policies are beginning to reap the 
benefits in growth. The resulting improvements in non-traditional exports as a result of 
these policy changes more than compensated for the poor performance of the export of 
primary products."3
TABLE 3: GDP GROWTH RATES
Country 1989 1990
Angola 0.6 -
Botswana 6.3 8.3
Lesotho -2.1 4.1
Malawi 4.1 4.8
Mozambique 5.3 1.5
Namibia 0.6 2.7
Swaziland 4.6 4.0
Tanzania 3.3 3.0
Zambia 0.1 -1.9
Zimbabwe 4.5 2.0
South Africa 2.1 -1.0
Source:
SADCC, SADCC Annual Progress Report 1990-1991. Gaborone, 1992. 
EIU, World Outlook 1991. London, EIU, 1991.
With policy reforms providing a solid foundation to increase competitiveness of SADCC 
economies, medium term prospects look optimistic.
A BRIEF PERSPECTIVE OF SADCCS FUTURE
Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the theme document for January, 1992 
Consultative Conference held in Maputo, SADCC attempted to re-define its role in 
response to the emerging regional and global realities. An approach appropriate for 
SADCC was proposed and it is termed, "development integration." It is asserted,
"This approach, accordingly stresses the need for close political cooperation at an early 
stage of the integration process, in contrast to the market integration approach, under 
which this only emerges at later stage. The development integration approach also 
stresses the need for equity and balance in relations (between South Africa and
3 SADCC Annual Report 1991, p.9
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SADCC). It thus argues for trade liberalization to be complemented by compensatory 
and corrective measures, oriented particularly towards the least developed member 
countries. It also sees the need for market integration to be predicated on coordinated 
regional industrial development, for regional resource mobilization fund or banks to give 
priority to the least developed members. Provision should be made for some 
coordination of macro policies at an early stage, particularly in relation to general 
conditions and incentives for investment. Promoting trade integration as a simple linear 
process in which all the elements of a preferential trade area, free trade area, customs 
union, common market, etc are put in place before moving to the next stage is 
inappropriate for the SADCC region at this stage of its development."4
These in essence are the elements of the new SADCC strategy: to promote close political 
cooperation at an early stage of the integration process; to stress the need for equity and 
balance in relations between South Africa and SADCC; to encourage trade liberalization, 
complemented by compensatory and corrective measures, oriented particularly towards 
the least developed member states; and to encourage coordination of macro-economic 
policies at an early stage, particularly on general conditions and incentives for 
investment.
Mr Chairman, now, the central questions are:
Does this strategy have a bold vision to carry SADCC into the 21st century? Does this 
strategy take sufficient recognition of the future evolution of SACU and PTA?
Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like you to devote some time to these questions.
STRENGTHENING OF POLITICAL WELL
t
Mr Chairman, unless the political will and perseverance are strengthened, SADCC’s 
momentum towards economic integration will not be sustained. Judged by the numbers 
of resolutions adopted by the Heads of State and the Council of Ministers, it can be 
concluded that political will exists. It needs to be broadened and deepened. There is 
a need to achieve broad commitment by the civil servants and the private sector to 
economic integration. A deeper sense of identity and solidarity for SADCC should not 
reside only with the political leadership, but it must permeate through the government 
bureaucracies to the peoples of SADCC. For SADCC to succeed, efforts towards 
economic integration must be centred around common interests of the people within the 
region, who progressively acquire a regional identity. Unless there is wide spread 
popular support, based on rational expectations of the net benefits to be gained by
member states, SADCC’s impetus towards economic integration stands the risk of losing
steam.
SADCC, SADCC Theme Document, January, 1992 p.22.
CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR INDUSTRY AND 
TRADE
Trade among SADCC member states is disappointingly very low (less than 5 percent of 
total trade), and the structures of production are narrow and undiversified, producing a 
'lim ited range of products. For SADCC’s industrial and trade development to be 
sustainable, creating an enabling environment for the growth of industry and trade will 
be absolutely critical. Manufacturers and traders will have to respond to opportunities 
offered by access to wider SADCC market. Within SADCC, it will be essential to 
implement bold programmes of trade liberalization and rationalization of distortions in 
order to enhance competitiveness. Industrial policies across SADCC will need to be 
harmonized to encourage investments.
CONCLUSION
Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, SADCC is at cross-roads. It has to define its new 
role in the face of overlapping mandates between itself, PTA and SACU. In view of 
unprecedented economic and political reforms taking place in Southern African and in 
the world at large, SADCC member states will need to break new grounds to be in 
tandem with these path-breaking changes. First, there is a need to evaluate the 
objectives of SADCC to reflect the new realities; and second, there is a need to refine 
the new strategy - to conceptualize it more solidly - so that it carries an appropriate bold 
vision into the 21st century and it can permit broad based participation of all the people 
in the region.
Before I conclude, I would like you to reflect on some critical questions: If the new 
South Africa joins SADCC, what will be the nature of the relationship? Since South 
Africa is an industrial giant relative to the SADCC economies, will the industrial 
development of the SADCC member states be stifled or will new complementarities 
emerge? At present the balance of trade is in favour of South Africa. Will this worsen 
in the post-apartheid era? What will be legal framework of post-apartheid SADCC? 
Will the SACU still be relevant? Are there complementarities between SADCC and 
PTA such that they can develop separately but at the same time be mutually reinforcing? 
A large proportion of the financing of the SADCC projects and programmes have been 
from external sources. Will this goodwill continue in the 1990s, and if not, will SADCC 
be able to mobilize resources internally? Will the private sector investors - both 
domestic and foreign - play important roles in integrating the SADCC economies? What 
options and strategies should SADCC pursue in the 1990s to ensure sustainable 
development?
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I leave these questions for your deliberations and 
discussions.
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THANK YOU
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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES TO 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
INTEGRATION - THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
Gladson K. Kayira
INTRODUCnON
Kwame Nkrumah said, "In the process of obtaining economic unity there is bound to be 
much hard bargaining between the various states. Integration of different aspects of 
economic policy will proceed at different rates, and there may be disappointing delays 
and compromises to be worked out. But given the will to succeed, difficulties can be 
resolved."5 This vision of Kwame Nkrumah still remains valid today as it was at the 
dawn of political independence in the 1960s. There have been many resolutions about 
integrating the African economies. They reflected and still reflect the aspirations of the 
African leadership to integrate the economies.
Although a lot of efforts have been made to forge regional cooperation and integration, 
the results have not been encouraging. This shortcoming should not be perceived in 
isolation, but rather as a reflection of the economic crisis that Africa plunged into. It is 
generally recognised that many African economies were poorer in the late 1980s than at 
independence in the 1960s (World Bank, 1989). Regional integration as a strategy for 
development has not yet yielded results. Resolutions have yet to be fully translated into 
concrete action to make rapid progress towards integration.
Despite the general disappointment with economic cooperation and integration 
initiatives, the African leaders appear to be committed to move progressively towards 
an integrated single market by the year 20256. However, several questions need to be 
asked. What lessons can be learned from experience? Can regionalism be a vehicle for 
promoting industrial development and growth? What has been the progress towards 
industrial cooperation? What are the economic, institutional, and political obstacles to 
be faced? What is the outlook for 1990s and beyond? These are difficult questions for 
which there are no easy answers.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the Africa’s experience with regional cooperation 
and integration from a SADCC perspective. It examines SADCC’s quest for a new 
approach in response to global, pan-African, and regional forces of change. Finally, the 
paper draws out some lessons from experience and evaluates prospects for regional 
cooperation and integration.
Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah, Freedom Fighters Edition, 
London: Panaf Books Ltd, 1967, p.57
It is worth noting that in the Lagos Plan of Action, 
1980, the target of achieving the pan-African Economic 
Community was the year 2000.
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PAN-AFRICAN RESPONSE TO GLOBAL REGIONALISM
In June, 1991, the African Heads of State and Governments signed a Treaty, in Abuja, 
Nigeria, for the establishment of the Africa Economic Community in phases (see Box 1). 
A linear development approach towards a pan-African economic community, to a large 
extent based on neo-classical approach to integration, was proposed. Africa was divided 
into five regions: North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern 
Africa. For the Southern Africa region, SADCC combined with South Africa forms a 
homogeneous and natural regional entity.
Each region would be expected to grow in stages from a preferential trade area through 
a free trade area into a customs union. With more experience gained, each region would 
graduate further into a common market, and then, an economic community. Each region 
would determine its own pace of integration in parallel with collectively achieving a pan- 
African economic community by the year 20257. It is envisaged that by year 2025 the 
three markets - capital, labour, and goods - will be integrated through allowing free 
movements. This would be achieved in parallel with strengthening cooperation in fields 
such as energy, transport and communication, centres of excellence and others.
The main features of a preferential trade area are the progressive reduction of customs 
tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other non-tariff barriers to trade among member 
states. At the same time, each member country is permitted to maintain different levels 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers with the rest of the world. In a free trade area, there 
are no duties on goods produced by the member states, but each member country 
determines its own tariff policy with respect to the third countries. A customs union 
moves a step further - all member states agree to impose a common external tariff. A 
common market would be achieved through adopting common policies in a number of 
sectors such as agriculture, industry, energy, transport, communications, research and 
development. This could be in parallel with harmonization of monetary, financial and 
fiscal policies, and allowing free movement of capital, labour, goods and services, and the 
right of residence.
It is worth noting that in the Laaos Plan of Action, 
1980, the target of achieving the pan-African Economic 
Community, was the year 2000.
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Box 1.
TIMETABLE TOWARDS UNITY
The process of establishing the African Economic 
Community begin within 30 days of the treaty’s ratification 
by two thirds of the OAU member states. The process is 
to unfold over a period of 34 years, at most, passing 
through six stages.
1. Strengthening existing regional economic 
communities and establishing new ones. 5 years
2. Stabilizing tariffs, customs duties, and other non­
tariff barriers to intra-community trade; 
strengthening sectoral integration in agriculture, 
industry, transport, and others; coordinating and 
harmonizing activities of the regional communities. 8 years
3. Setting up of free trade areas within each regional 
community through removal of trade barriers and 
establishing customs unions. 10 years
4. Establishing an Africa-wide customs union, with a 
common external tariff, by harmonizing regional 
tariffs and non-tariff systems. 2 years
5. Establishing an African Common Market, through 
among other steps, the adoption of common policies 
on agriculture, transport, industry, and other sectors. 4 years
6. Finalizing the African Economic Community 
through the consolidation of the common market 
structure; the establishment of a monetary union, 
African Central Bank, and a single currency; 
creation of a pan African parliament, elected by 
continent suffrage. 5 years
Source: UN, "Africa Recovery", June, 1991, P12.
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Establishing the African Economic Community would be the final stage. It would evolve 
from consolidating the instruments in place for establishing the common markets. In the 
final stage, a single market would be created. Furthermore, an African monetary union, 
an African central bank, an African single currency, and a pan-African parliament with 
its members elected by continental universal suffrage would be established.
These stages of integration are a continuous process. There are no rigid lines separating 
them. In fact, reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (trade integration) can easily 
be accompanied by freer movement of capital and labour (factor integration). Even 
more, these stages cannot be readily attainable if the basic, efficient physical 
infrastructure facilities are not in place. For instance, lack of cooperation in transport, 
communications and port facilities could make even the simpler forms of economic 
integration unattainable. Thus, cooperation in various fields reinforces the efforts 
towards economic integration, and together they form integral parts of the same 
continuum.
For The 1990s and into the 21st century, the major motivation for promoting African 
cooperation and integration is the global threat of regionalism. The "IMF Survey" of 13 
April, 1992 observes, "While regional trading arrangements are hardly a new 
phenomenon, they are a newly resurgent one, and the current focus on regionalism may 
be qualitatively different from the past efforts and may carry greater risks of becoming 
a substitute for, rather than a complement to, multilateralism". Negotiations in GATT 
and others efforts to liberalise world trade may be torpedoed by the interests of powerful 
regional groups.
In the global terms, the regional arrangements in the industrialised countries are 
economically powerful. The European Community (EC) share in total world trade 
increased from 25 percent in 1960 41 percent in 1990. For the same period, EC’s intra- 
regional exports increased from 35 percent to 60 percent (see Table 1). Similarly, intra- 
regional exports in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) increased from 21 percent 
in 1960 to 28 percent 1990, while its share in total world exports declined from 14 
percent in 1960 to 7 percent in 1990. In the Canada-USA Free Trade Area (CUSTA) 
intra-regional exports increased from 27 percent in 1960 to 34 percent in 1990, while its 
share in total world exports declined from 22 percent in 1960 to 16 percent in 1990. 
Combined, CUSTA, EC and EFTA account for about 60 percent of the world output and 
for close to 70 percent of the total world exports.
In sharp contrast, the two largest regional integration organizations - Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Preferential Trade Area for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (PTA) - account for less than 1 percent of the share in total world 
trade. Intra-regional trade in ECOWAS increased from 3 percent in 1970 to 6 percent 
in 1990, while in PTA it increased only marginally about 8 percent in 1970 to about 9 
percent in 1990. Moreover, Africa’s share in total world exports is about 2 percent. 
Through strengthening of regional economies, the challenge is for Africa broaden its 
productive capacity and diversify its export base.
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T a r t  P I -  REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: INTRA-REGIONAL EXPORTS AND 
SHARE IN WORLD EXPORTS fPERCENTi
Founded 1960 1970 1980 1990
ANZCERTA 1983 5.7 6.1 6.4 7.6
(2-4)b (2.1) (1.4) (1.5)
EC 1957 34.5 51.0 54.0 60.4
(24.9) (39.0) (34.9) (41.4)
EFTA 1960 21.1 28.0 32.6 28.2
(14.9) (14.9) (6.1) (6.8)
Canada-US-FrA 1989 26.5 32.8 26.5 34.0
(21.9) (20.5) (15.1) (15.8)
ASEAN 1967 4.4 20.7 16.9 18.4
(2.6) (2.1) (3.7) (4.3)
Andean Pact 1969 0.7 2.0 3.8 4.6
(2.9) (1.6) (1.6) (0.9)
CACM 1961 7.0 25.7 (24.1) 14.8
(0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1)
LAFTA/LAIA 1960/80 7.9 9.9 13.7 10.6
(6.0) (4.4) (4.2) (3.4)
ECOWAS 1975 n.a. 3.0 3.5 6.0
n.a. (1.0) (1.7) (0.6)
PTA 1987 n.a. 8.4 8.9 8.5
n.a. (1.1) (0.4) (0.2)
s Definitions of regional schemes are ANZCERTA - Australia-New Zealand Closer 
a Economic Relations Trade Agreement; EC - European Community; EFTA - European 
2 Free Trade Area; ASEAN -Association of South East Asian Nations; CAM -Central 
i‘ American Common Market; LAFTA/LAIA -Latin American Integration Association; 
1 ECOWAS -Economic Community of West African States; PTA -Preferential Trade Area 
t( for Eastern and Southern Africa.
0,
ic (a) Intra-regional trade measured by share of intra-regional exports in total exports,
(b) Share of regional integration scheme in total world exports in parentheses.
ic
n n.a. - Not available
H Source: Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, 
The New Regionalism in Trade Policy.
he World Bank, September 21, 1992, pp 18-19.
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BENEFITS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
The motivation to cooperate and integrate African economies is based on expected net 
benefits. Africa’s emphasis on integration has been driven by the need to promote 
industrialization and to reduce external dependence. Berg (1988) points out five 
benefits that could be derived from the regional cooperation and integration in the short 
- or medium term. First, from the formal market integration scheme, expanded trade. 
This arises from trade enhancing policies or programmes designed to remove specific 
barriers such as reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to achieve economies of scale and 
specialization.
Second, net benefits could be derived from joint facilities to serve the regional market. 
Integrated industries in manufacturing, joint services such as regional airlines (SADCC 
is pursuing at the moment), insurance services and others, illustrate the nature of 
benefits to be derived.
Third, regional cooperation could yield advantages from better management of resources. 
Development of hydro-resources potential such as the Cabora Bassa or Kariba Dam 
schemes, locust control, and others.
Fourth, short term benefits could be derived from better, cheaper services and cost 
effectiveness based on regional research and training centres, provision of regional 
technical services such regional standards for products, regional patents and copyright 
regulations and others.
Fifth, the potential source of benefits is from collective bargaining power in negotiations 
with bilateral and multi-lateral agencies. Joint dialogue should increase better 
understanding among African countries, and better articulation of their position.
There are several orthodox arguments for market integration. Smallness of the domestic 
market can be a constraint to growth and industrialization. Many internal markets in 
most African countries are too small, both in terms of population and incomes. In many 
cases domestic markets are no larger than many small American or European cities. 
Production for such small markets is difficult in branches of industry where achieving 
economies of scale is important. Even more, it can be difficult to encourage competition, 
especially amongst intermediate and capital goods industries. In the long run, relying on 
the domestic market for industrial development could be futile. Expanding of the 
markets, through regional integration, can potentially be a useful vehicle for promoting 
economic development.
Expanding of markets through regional integration can assist industries to produce goods 
more efficiently and allow specialization. Easy access to the regional markets can 
provide an outlet for under utilized capacity. Increasing trade links 
within the regional markets could be a useful learning experience for breaking into 
sophisticated overseas markets.
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For many industries a critical mass of population -10 million -with effective purchasing 
power is considered a threshold. Many countries - Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mali, Niger, Togo, Zambia and others - have relatively small populations. Only 
Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zaire have 
populations of over 20 million. Even then, many are poverty stricken with low purchasing 
capacity. The urgency to integrate economically non-viable economic entities becomes 
increasingly compelling.
Arguably, fragmentation of Africa has been a major constraint to its development. 
Achieving political independence was just a step in the direction of realizing a pan- 
African vision - the United States of Africa. Reversing the balkanization of Africa 
through cooperation in various fields (transport and communications, education and 
training, energy, natural resources development and management, and others) and 
through integrating economies has all along been accorded high priority by African 
leaders.
SADCCS QUEST FOR A NEW APPROACH
SADCC, as a regional cooperation organization, is reaching a major turning point.8 It 
is entering into a crisis. The nature of the crisis rests on a re-definition of its new role 
and shaping its new image and vision in response to rapid regional and global changes. 
SADCC will have to evolve from a regional cooperation into a regional integration 
organization. The new Republic of South Africa (RSA) is expected to be integral part 
of this new arrangement. The challenge for SADCC will be to design strategies to 
respond and adjust to the potential over-dominance, in economic terms and, perhaps, 
even in political terms, of the new RSA Meeting this challenge will require SADCC to 
formulate new approaches.
To date, SADCCs operations do not fit neatly in traditional neo-classical economic 
integration theory as outlined above. Its focus has been on coordination of regional 
projects and programmes. Its role has primarily been to promote regional cooperation. 
It is widely recognised that SADCC has made remarkable progress in promoting infra­
structural development.9 Improvements of the road and railway systems, cooperation 
among SADCC airlines, and rehabilitation of the Beira, Dar es Salaam, and Nacala 
corridors, among others, represent major progress in the direction of reducing 
dependence on South Africa.
In August, 1992, SADCC was legally formalized into the 
Southern Africa Development Community with a major 
shift from cooperation to integration.
See for instance, Reginard H. Green, "Economic 
Integration/Cooperation in Africa: The Dream Lives but 
How Can it be Lived?" in James Pickett and Hans Singer 
(editors), Towards Economic Recovery in Africa, 1990.
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In the past, SADCC avoided a market integration approach, and instead adopted an 
incremental, project-oriented regional cooperation approach. SADCC’s success, to a large 
extent, has been due to its focus on actions through governments taking responsibilities 
over the sectoral projects and programmes allocated to them. A large proportion of 
funding of the projects and programmes has been by the cooperating partners. Most of 
the projects and programmes have had immediate and tangible benefits to the member 
states. Cooperation in the development of regional projects and programmes has been 
catalytic to promoting regional economic integration.
To reinforce this view, Michael Camdessus, the Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) observes,
"In retrospect, the experience of Africa with regional cooperation offers some useful 
lessons. First, it may be helpful to start with modest but feasible programs of 
cooperation, by focusing on selected areas where prospects for mutual benefits are 
largest. Cooperation along this line, as exemplified by SADCC, can concentrate on 
specific areas such as transportation, energy, industry, and banking. Second, efforts at 
economic integration stand a better chance of succeeding if they are also outward 
looking. Economic integration at regional level and in the world economy are not 
incompatible."10
Although SADCC has been considered relatively successful, there is a growing self- 
evaluation to enable it to meet the challenges in the 1990s. In the SADCC Annual 
Report 1991, some of the central issues of debate are:
(a) "examination of the original mandate of the Organization, as encapsulated in the 
four primary objectives of the Lusaka Declaration of 1980;
(b) adjustment of the SADCC Programme of Action away from the discrete project- 
by-project approach to a coordinated sectoral and macro policy analysis and 
planning;
(c) concern that the Programme of Action has been growing too fast, outstripping the 
Organization’s capacity to mobilize resources required for its implementation and 
to manage it effectively;
(d) SADCC sectors have been directed to work out appropriate long-term financing 
plans for the projects, including provision of phasing out of cooperating partners’ 
contribution to core operational costs, and gradually increasing regional 
contributions to programme costs; and
10 M. Camdessus, speech to Joint Fund/African Association 
of Central Bank Symposium, Gaborone, February, 1991/ 
p. 4.
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(e) SADCC and member states have always accepted that a democratic South Africa 
would be welcome to join the Organisation, and would participate in its activities 
on the basis of equity, balance and mutual benefit.11"
In the quest to position itself with respect to the new South Africa and to emerge as an 
effective trading bloc for the pan-African economic community, SADCC is proposing 
a new approach to regional economic integration. It is termed "development integration." 
Emphasis is placed on the need for:
(a) close political cooperation at an early stage of the integration process than at 
rather later stage;
(b) trade liberalization to be complemented by compensatory and corrective 
measures, oriented particularly towards the least developed member countries;
(c) coordinated efforts on promoting regional industrial development cooperation;
(d) coordinated efforts to promote freer movement of capital, goods and labour to 
foster the creation of a Southern African Community of nations based on the 
principles of equity and balance;
(e) mobilization of regional resources through the establishment of a development 
bank; and
(f) coordination of macro policies at an early stage, particularly in relation to general 
economic conditions and incentives for investment.12
SADCC quest for a new approach should be viewed as strategic rather than expedient , 
response to the challenges and opportunities that will be posed by the new South Africa. 
Its strategy, so far, is not sufficiently far reaching. To a large extent, the "development 
integration" approach draws on various aspects of market integration. It does not contain 
nmdamental points of departure from the neo-classical market integration process.
Since four members of SADCC are concurrently members of SACU with South Africa, 
SADCC should be putting in place strategies to move boldly towards a common market 
with practical urgency. It becomes imperative that modalities of achieving this objective 
should be expeditiously worked out. Consideration should be given toward creating 
competitive regional market in parallel with an export-oriented strategy to be integrated 
with the global economy.
SADCC Annual Report 1991, p. 25-26.
SADCC, SADCC: Towards Economic Integration Theme
document for the consultative conference held in 
Maputo, 29-31 January, 1992.
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AFRICA’S EXPERIENCE WITH COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION 
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION
The main economic groupings in this region are the SADCC, the Preferential Trade 
Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), the Southern Africa Customs Union 
(SACU), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Combined they cover a large area 
from the Horn of Africa to the Atlantic Ocean in Namibia and the islands in the Indian 
ocean. It has a total population of around 135 million, excluding South Africa. With a 
GDP of about US$35 billion (excluding South Africa), the region is comparable to New 
Zealand among industrial countries or to Hong Kong among developing countries. 
Based on its enormous mineral resources and hydro-power, the region has a potential 
for rapid industrial development.
Membership in these organizations over-laps (See Table 2). Proliferation and 
duplication of functions together with over-lapping membership for SACU, SADCC, and 
PTA give rise to conflicts over mandates and to divided loyalty among governments. The 
future of SACU will not be determined until a democratic and representative 
government in South Africa is in place. With SADCC also moving towards an integrated 
common market, there is a convergence of purpose with PTA Already 8 out of the 10 
members of SADCC are also members of PTA It is quite evident that there is urgency 
to rationalize the structural operations of PTA and SADCC. At a recent PTA Heads of 
State summit in Lusaka, Zambia, it was unanimously resolved to merge the two 
institutions.13 It would be economic as well as political expedience to rationalize the 
operations of PTA and SADCC before the new South Africa emerges. If there will be 
delays in this rationalization, changes in South Africa will probably be instrumental in 
shaping the pattern of economic integration in the PTA-SADCC region.
SADCC
In its almost 12 years of operations, SADCC has made remarkable progress. Created 
in 1980, its primary objectives were to:
(a) coordinate collective efforts among member states towards a rapid socio-economic
development, leading to reducing dependence on South Africa, in particular14, 
and the rest of the world, in general; and
See "The Times of Zambia" 2nd February, 1992 p. 1.
In post-apartheid era, this objective will no longer 
be relevant. New arrangements will have to be worked 
out. These will need to be based on mutual economic 
inter-dependence, and not on the concept of 
constellation of states around a dominant economic 
force - South Africa.
foster an equitable economic integration.
SADCC developed a different approach to integration. With each country assigned 
responsibility over a specific sector, emphasis was placed on coordination of sectoral 
regional projects and programmes. For instance, Tanzania coordinated industry and 
trade development. SADCC adopted an incremental, project-oriented regional 
cooperation approach which could eventually lead to market integration.
In the late 1980s, it became apparent that a project oriented approach was not sufficient 
to address the task of promoting economic development. It was evident that many 
SADCC member states experienced economic distortions resulting from inappropriate 
policies and structural weaknesses. To complement the project approach, policy 
coordination at both sectoral and macro-economic levels were introduced (SADCC, 
1990).
TABLE 2 : MEMBERSHIP IN THE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
REGION
36
Country PTA SADCC SACU IOC EAC
Angola X X
Botswana X X
Burundi X
Comoros X X
Djibouti X
Ethiopia X
Kenya X X
Lesotho X X X
Madagascar X X
Malawi X X X
Mauritius X
Mozambique X X
Namibia X X X
Rwanda X
Seychelles X
South Africa X
Somalia X
Swaziland X X
Tanzania X X
Uganda X X
Zambia X X
Zimbabwe X X
Total 19 10 5 4 3
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Among the SADCC countries, there has been a widening disparity in the level of 
income and a divergence in economic performance (see Table 3). The poorest country, 
Mozambique, has a GNP per capita of only US$80, while the richest country, Botswana 
a much higher GNP of US$2,040. In the 1980-90 period, the Botswana grew at an 
annual average rate of 11.3 percent, while the performances of Lesotho, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe were modest, and the rest of SADCC countries their performance were poor.
T A R T  F. 3: SADCCiSOME BASIC INDICATORS, 1990
Country
Pop 
(mil. )
GNP
per
Capita
US$
GDP 
US$ 
mil.
GDP 
Ave. 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
1980-90 
<%)
Angola 10 • • 7,700 • •
Botswana 1 2,040 2,700 11.3
Lesotho 2 530 340 3.1
Malawi 9 200 1,660 2.0
Mozambique 16 80 1,320 0.7
Namibia 2 • • • • 0.4
Swaziland 0.8 810 • • • •
Tanzania 25 110 2,060 2.8
Zambia 8 420 3,120 0.8
Z imbabwe 10 640 5,310 2.9
South Africa 36 2,530 90,720 1.3
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1992, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992.
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During the latter part of the 1980s, SADCCs economic crisis deepened. The key 
features of this have been under-utilised industrial capacity (in many cases as low as 25 
percent), declining and low efficiency of investment, low production and productivity in 
the agricultural sector, poor export performance, and mounting external debt. 
Furthermore, South Africa’s destabilization and military aggression on the front-line 
states dislocated some of the economies and caused incalculable human losses and 
suffering15.
Reversing these declining trends and placing the economies on a sustainable growth path 
became a priority. Many SADCC countries have responded to this economic crisis by 
introducing policy reforms. There have been signs of improvements. So far the reforms 
have focused on public finance and monetary policies. There has been lack of macro- 
economic policy coordination at a regional level. To have far-reaching results, 
fundamental structure problems will need to be addressed. Impediments to industrial 
and agricultural growth will require serious attention.
Furthermore, SADCC business councils have been established to address issues and 
options within a regional consultative mechanism. Non-availability of foreign exchange 
has been identified as a major constraint to growth of industry and trade. To overcome 
this constraint, members began work on establishing an Export Pre-financing Revolving 
Fund. In addition, a Nordic-SADCC fund has been created to make foreign exchange 
available for joint ventures between Nordic and SADCC countries. Consideration has 
also been given to harmonization of investment codes, which could pave way for the 
better industrial development cooperation.
To encourage industrial development, coordination of policies and identification of 
selected priority areas were considered important. Towards the end of the 1980 decade, 
a new strategy outlining priorities for industrialization was set in motion. To facilitate 
investment across borders, a cross-border investment facility was established.
PTA
PTA, created in 1982, is a large heterogenous group with unbalanced level of 
development, undiversified economic structures, and disparate economic performance 
among member states (see Table 4). Except for Kenya and Zimbabwe, which are 
relatively diversified economies, the rest are poor and heavily dependent on one or two 
commodities for their export earnings. PTA’s primary mandate is to liberalize trade and 
to develop payments mechanisms as instrument for enhancing growth of the regional 
economy. To carry out this mandate, there was need to create supportive institutions. 
This led to the creation of the PTA Bank, the PTA Clearing House, the Federation of 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and the African Joint Air Services.
The United Nations estimated that the cost of South 
Africa's military and destabilization on its 
neighbours cost over $60 billion and 1.5 million lives 
in the first 9 years of the 1980s.
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T a b t  f  4: PTArSOME BASIC INDICATORS, 1990
Country
Pop 
(mil. )
GNP per
Capita
US$
GDP 
US$ 
mil.
GDP 
Ave. 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
1980-90 
<%)
Angola 10 • • 7,700 • •
Burundi 5 210 1,000 3.9
Comoros 0.5 480 • • • •
Djibouti 0.4 • • • • • •
Ethiopia 51 120 5,490 1.8
Kenya 24 370 7,540 4.2
Lesotho 2 530 340 3.1
Madagascar 12 230 2,750 1.1
Malawi 9 200 1,660 2.0
Mauritius 1 2,250 2,090 6.0
Mozambique 16 80 1,320 0.7
Rwanda 7 310 2,130 1.0
Seychelles 0.07 4,670 • • • •
Somalia 8 120 890 2.4
Sudan 25 • • • • • •
Swaziland 0.8 810 • • • •
Tanzania 25 110 2,060 2.8
Uganda 16 220 2,820 2.8
Zambia 8 420 3,120 0.8
Zimbabwe 10 640 5,310 2.9
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1992, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992.
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PTA has achieved significant progress, especially in trade liberalization and trade 
financing. A common list of commodities to be granted preferential access to the PTA 
markets has been agreed on. A progressive reduction of tariff rates is already 
operational. There have been improvement in intra-PTA trade; it now stands at about 
8 percent of total trade. Simplification of trade documents and procedures, and removal 
of non-physical barriers to free movement of cross-border traffic have facilitated the flow 
of trade. To facilitate transactions among the members, a unit of account - UAPTA - 
which is pegged to IM Fs Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was introduced.
The PTA Clearing house has achieved considerable progress in increasing the volume 
of intra-PTA trade. The amount of intra-trade it handled increased from about US$85 
million in 1984 to around US$290 million in 1989. The ratio of intra-PTA trade 
handled rose sharply from 9 percent in 1984 to 57 percent in 1988. Correspondingly, 
the percentage of transactions settled in hard currency decreased from 88 percent to 48 
percent over the same period (World Bank, 1989a). All this had an important bearing 
on increasing productive capacity utilization in response to increases in regional demand.
The member states of PTA have initiated mutual cooperation for industrial development. 
At the ninth summit of the PTA in 1990, a Charter for Multinational Industrial 
Enterprises was adopted. Its main purpose has been the promotion of joint ventures in 
member states. To this end, a programme of rationalization and gradual harmonization 
of investment codes has been launched.
SACU
SACU, established in 1910, and its agreement re-negotiated in 1969, has been a well- 
functioning customs union in Africa to-day. It represents a long standing arrangement 
among Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. Provisions in the 
agreement embody a common external tariff, arrangements for sharing revenue derived 
from tariffs, compensatory mechanisms to deal with the disparities in costs and benefits 
arising from the loss of fiscal discretion. Furthermore, it includes the polarization of 
development effects, the price raising effects of South Africa’s protective tariffs and 
import control measures, and finally, the provisions which enable the less developed 
members to protect their infant industries from competition from their more advanced 
neighbours.
The main feature of SACU is the over dominance of South Africa over the other 
member states which are exceedingly small relative to South Africa (see Table 3). 
Goods and factor markets are well integrated, and all members of SACU, except 
Botswana, are members of the Rand Monetary Area with the central bank of South 
Africa performing as the central bank for SACU.
With the winds of change in South Africa, there are strong perceptions that SACU would 
be restructured. At the same time, with both SADCC and PTA expecting South Africa 
to join their organization, it is quite conceivable that the new South Africa may exert 
great influence in shaping regionalism in the Southern Africa region.
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IOC
IOC, founded in 1982, consists of the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, 
and France (representing the overseas department of Reunion). Its main objective is to 
promote cooperation, particularly in economic development among members. It has 
placed greater emphasis on the role of the private sector in fostering regional economic 
activity. IOC has made efforts to promote industrial cooperation that would centre on 
encouraging cross-border investments. Considerations have been given to: reducing 
tariffs; establishing a petroleum factory in Madagascar to service the region; forming a 
regional shipping line; setting up a clearing house; and improving sea, air and 
telecommunication links.
EAC
The now defunct East African Community, comprising Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, 
was considered at one time as one of the most promising arrangements in Africa It came 
into existence with a common currency, a shared regionally coordinated infrastructure 
(railways and harbours, air transport and others), harmonized economic policies, a system 
of common institutions, and relatively free labour mobility. It fell apart in the late 1970s, 
after less than ten years of existence, over inability to achieve balanced development 
among member states, widening political and ideological differences, and overall conflict 
of interests among members. The East Africa Development Bank survived the collapse 
of EAC, although it is devoid of any integration functions. There are important lessons 
to be drawn from the EAC experience. It now appears there is renewed interest to 
revive the EAC.
WEST AFRICA REGION
i
The West African Economic Community (ECOWAS), the West African Economic 
Community (CEAO), and the Mano River Union (MRU) are the main organizations 
created to promote market integration in the West Africa region. The organizations have 
overlapping functions, memberships and jurisdictions (See Table 5).
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TABLE 5: MEMBERSHIP IN THE WEST AFRICA REGION
Country ECOWAS CEAO MRU
Benin X X
Burkina Faso X X
Cape Verde X
Cote d’ Voire X X
Gambia X
Ghana X
Guinea X X
Guinea Bissau X
Liberia X X
Mali X
Mauritania X X
Niger X X
Nigeria X X
Senegal X
Sierra Leone X X X
Togo X
16 7 3
ECOWAS
ECOWAS, which was established in 1975, envisaged the creation of a common market 
in phases. First, the reduction and eventual removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers on 
all categories products of ECOWAS origin by 1989. Second, the establishment of a 
common external tariff by 1994, in addition to fiscal and monetary harmonization. Its 
declared objectives are " to promote cooperation and development in all the areas of 
economic activity but particularly in industry, transportation, telecommunications, power, 
agriculture, natural resources, trade, the monetary and financial areas, and social and 
cultural affairs, in the interests of improving the standards of living, increasing and 
maintaining their economic stability, strengthening relations among them, and 
contributing to the progress and development of the African continent." If these 
objectives had been achieved, the economic landscape of the region could have been 
vastly improved.
Progress in ECOWAS has been slow. Trade liberalization and the establishment of a 
common external tariff have not ben implemented. There have been hardly any efforts 
towards industrial sector cooperation. Industrial joint projects have failed. For instance, 
because of economic and technical reasons, a joint project sponsored by Cote d’ Voire, 
Ghana, and Togo, with some financial support from the World Bank, to produce cement 
for the regional market, was a disaster.
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ECOWAS, with 16 members, embraces all the countries in West Africa. It has an 
estimated total GDP of US$70 billion and a population of 201 million in 1990 (see 
Table 6). The average GNP per capita is around US$350, and most of the economic 
activity concentrates on extractive industry and agriculture for exports. The region is rich 
in mineral resources and has a vast range of agricultural products. The over dominance 
of Nigeria is apparent, accounting for close to 60 percent of the region’s total population 
and about 50 percent of the region’s total GDP. Among ECOWAS member states, 
economic differences have been aggravated by cultural, historical and political factors. 
Britain, France and Portugal colonized the region, and hence three official languages - 
English, French and Portuguese, different currencies, fiscal and public administration 
practices. Furthermore, relationships between some countries have marred by political 
rivalries and territorial disputes. Political instability caused by frequent and violent 
changes in political leadership has also hampered progress towards regionalism.
TABLE 6: ECOWAS: SOME BASIC INDICATORS
Country Pop GNP GDP GDP(mil.) per Capita 
US$
US$ mil Growth
Rate
<%)
Benin 5 360 1,810 2.8
Burkina Faso 9 330 3,060 4.3
Cape Verde 0.4 890 • • • •
Cote d' Voire 12 750 7,610 0.5
Gambia 0.9 330 • • • •Ghana 15 390 6,270 3.0
Guinea 6 440 2,820 • •
Guinea Bissau 1 180 • • • •
Liberia 3 • • • • • •Mali 9 270 2,450 4.0
Mauritania 2 500 950 1.4
Niger 8 310 2,520 -1.3Nigeria 115 290 34,760 1.4
Senegal 7 710 5,840 3.0
Sierra Leone 4 240 840 1.5Togo 4 410 1,220 1.5
S o u rce; World Bank, World Development Report, 1992, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992.
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Experience in the trade sector has been particularly discouraging. In 1979, Heads of 
State agreed to consolidate customs tariffs, but that has not been implemented. Intra- 
ECOWAS trade has not exceeded more 6 percent of all trade. Even more, the pattern 
of trade has not changed. Nigeria and Cote d’ Voire remain the dominant exporters of 
manufactures. ECOWAS rules of origin also hamper trade flows. To qualify for 
preferential access to the ECOWAS market, a product must be manufactured by a firm 
whose ownership is 51 percent local. While the rule intends to promote indigenous 
manufacturing, it discourages foreign investment to take advantage of a potentially large 
market. It has also been a source of discord among members with a dominant foreign 
presence such as Cote d’ Voire and Senegal.
Within ECOWAS, expansion of trade also has been hampered by non-convertibility of 
currencies. To mitigate this problem, the West Africa Clearing House (WACH) was 
created in 1977. It has experienced many operational problems, including long delays in 
settlement of payments. By the mid 1980s, delays in settlements have exceeded US$50 
million (Frimpong-Ansah,1990). Telecommunications links amoug members have been 
inefficient, and economic agents lacked information on how the system operated. Even 
more important, when countries have been hard pressed to earn foreign currency, trading 
through the WACH proved a less attractive option, and the sheer long delays in 
settlements became a major deterrent.
While the protocols allow for freer labour movement, in
practice, there have been major setbacks. For instance, during its economic boom, 
Nigeria attracted many Ghanaian workers. However, in 1981 and 1983, when Nigeria 
suffered recessions, over a million Ghanaians were expelled. And there is hardly any 
capital movement within ECOWAS, to a large extent, because of foreign exchange 
controls and because the capital markets remained under-developed.
ECOWAS has clearly recognized these shortcomings. In its annual report of 1985-86, 
it candidly states, "despite the impressive number of agreements reached and decisions 
taken regarding the harmonization of the customs documents, the adoption of common 
procedures, and the programme for the deregulating non-manufactured crude goods, 
traditional handicrafts, and industrial products, the ECOWAS has not made tangible 
progress in practical terms." (ADB 1989).
CEAO
• #
CEAO’s main objective is to promote the harmonious and balanced economic 
development of the member states with a view to improving the living standards. 
Achieving this objective has proved to be difficult. CEAO has operated mainly as a 
preferential trade area, focusing on trade liberalization supported by fiscal compensation 
for losses arising from tariff reduction. Each member has control over the protection of 
its new industries.
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Progress has been made towards reducing trade barriers and a satisfactory fiscal 
mechanism for compensation has been established. This resulted in a significant 
expansion of intra-CEAO trade, which was around 10 percent of total trade in the 
1980s. About 95 percent of total trade was accounted for by two countries - Cote 
d’Ivoire and Senegal. These are relatively more advanced, and thus, commanded strong 
balance of trade positions with their neighbours. The relative prosperity of Cote d’ 
Ivoire and Senegal has attracted the flow of labour from the poor Sahelian countries 
(particularly Burkina Faso and Mali), thus achieving a modicum of factor integration. 
However, the gap in GDP per capita between the rich and the poor member states has 
virtually stagnated and, in some cases, even declined.
Except for Mauritania, all the members share a common currency -CFA franc - which 
is pegged to the French franc. They are also members of the West African Monetary 
Union and have a common central bank. Currency convertibility has facilitated trade 
among members.
CEAO places great emphasis on expanding trade amongst members, particularly in 
agricultural and industrial products. It also provides joint promotion of agricultural and 
industrial development, and cooperation of transport and communications systems. To 
minimize the polarization effects of intra-CEAO trade on its less developed members, 
a transfer tax was designed. In the treaty, CEAO provides for the establishment of a 
development fund to compensate members for losses of revenue resulting from 
substituting of CEAO made products for imports from the third country. Flexibility is 
built in to allow members a degree of discretion regarding the extent of market 
integration with others.
A common policy on foreign investment has yet to be worked out. Unless agreement is 
reached on a broad development strategy to be pursued, it will be difficult to adopt a 
CEAO-wide industrial development policy and to harmonize a system of investment 
incentives. Balanced industrial development will require more efforts to be made to 
resolve these issues.
Industrial development has been based on national development programmes. Little 
efforts have been made towards coordinating industrial development. There has been 
wide spread duplication of plants (mostly in the light industries) by transnational 
corporations in different member states. The potential benefits from industrial 
specialization and economies of scale have, to a large extent, not been realized (ADB, 
1989).
CEAO has made commendable progress in building indigenous capacity. It has created 
the African Centre for Higher Management Studies, the Institute of Advanced Fisheries 
e and Technology, the School of Mines and Geology, and the Regional Centre for 
mergy. These regional centres have played important roles in developing skills
hi these fields.
46
The CEAO members have a lot in common.They share a common historical experience, 
use a common language, and belong to a single monetary zone. These have helped to 
sustain the momentum towards integration. But they have not been sufficient. The 
disparities between the poor and rich members, rather than narrowing down, have 
increased. Despite the mechanism to deal with the problems of the least developed 
countries, conflicts of interests still exist between the relatively rich coastal states and the 
impoverished, semi-desert, and land-locked countries. It should, however, be pointed out 
that the cohesion of CEAO is to a large extent a reflection of the French intent to 
maintain its influence in the region and to counteract the dominance of Nigeria in the 
region.
MRU
Liberia and Sierra Leone were the founding members of the Mano River Union, which 
was created in 1973, and Guinea joined later in 1981. Its objectives are to: (a) expand 
reciprocal trade by removing existing barriers; (b) promote cooperation in order to 
expand international trade; (c) create favourable conditions for the expansion of 
productive capacity, progressively implement a common protecting policy; and (d) 
promote equitable distribution of benefits.
MRU strategy is different from that of ECOWAS and CEAO. It avoided promotion of 
trade before reaching agreement on external common tariff. The level of a common 
external tariff has important implications for resource allocation and the development 
strategies to be pursued. For the MRU, the question of distribution of benefits and the 
problems of the least developed members has not been a serious issue. The members are 
not only at about the same level of development, but they also face similar economic 
problems - low level of industrial development, small populations with low levels of 
incomes, and with mining and agricultural sectors dominant in their economies. 
Economic disparities among them are narrow. The need to make provisions for any 
compensatory mechanism did not arise.
Although export-import duties and administration have been harmonized, intra-union 
trade did not exceed 1 percent of the official trade. However, estimates indicate that 
there is a vibrant and large volume of unrecorded trade between Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, especially in diamonds. MRU does not have a common investment code with 
incentives to be offered to private sector investors. To avoid concentration of industries 
in select members, establishing a common investment code will be useful (Ezenwe, 1990).
CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION
Similar to West Africa region, there are three main organizations created to promote 
regional integration in the Central African region. These are the Central African 
Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), the Economic Community of Great Lakes 
(ECGL), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and PTA 
(See Table 7). It should be noted that Burundi and Rwanda also members of PTA  Just 
as in the West Africa region, duplication of functions and membership is prevalent in the 
Central African region.
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TART ,K 7: CENTRAL AFRICA
Country ECCAS ECGL UDEAC
Cameroon X X
Burundi X
CAR X X
Chad X X
Congo X X
Eq. Guinea X
Gabon X
SAG Tome and X X
Principe
Rwanda X X
Zaire
Total 7 3 5
Notes : CAR - Central African Republic
There are sharp differences among the countries in this region (See Table 8). 
Cameroon, with a relatively broad manufacturing base, Congo and Gabon, heavily 
dependent petroleum extraction, have high levels of per capita incomes. Zaire, rich in 
agricultural, forestry, hydro power and mineral resources, ranks amongst the poorest 
countries in Africa. It is a nation that has been plundered by the political leadership. 
As Ali A. Mazrui observes this plundering took the form of "privatization of the state’s 
economic resources" by the political leadership.16 Burundi, CAR, Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea and Rwanda are heavily dependent on agriculture and are relatively poor 
countries.
Ali A. Mazrui, "Is Africa Decaying? The View from 
Uganda," in H.B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (Editors) 
Uganda Now, Nairobi: Heinemann, 1988 p.350.
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TABLE 8: CENTRAL AFRICA: SOME BASIC INDICATORS. 1990
Country Pop.
(miL)
GNP per
capita
US$
GDP
US$
mil.
GDP Average 
Growth Rate 
1980-90
Burundi 5 210 1,000 3.9
Cameroon 12 960 11,130 23
CAR 3 390 1,220 1.5
Chad 8 190 1,100 5.9
Congo 2 1,010 2,870 . .
Eq. Guinea 0.4 330 •• . .
Gabon 1 3,330 4,720 23
SAO Tome and Principe 0.1 400 •• ••
Rwanda 7 310 2,130 -13
Zaire 37 220 7,540 1.8
Notes : CAR - Central African Republic
Source: World Bank, World Development Report. 1992. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992.
Created in 1964, UDEAC is the oldest institution for economic integration in the 
region. It is a disparate grouping. As noted above, while Cameroon, Congo and Gabon 
are well endowed in oil the rest are much poorer. All the members belong to a common 
currency zone -CFA franc. However, having a convertible currency has not promoted 
trade among them. Trade among members declined, while it has increased with non­
members. Close to 50 percent of UDEAC’s trade within Africa is with members of 
ECOWAS (World Bank, 1989a). The original Treaty of Brazzaville envisaged the 
creation of a customs and monetary union with complete elimination of tariffs and non­
tariff barriers to trade, the structure of tariffs has proven to distortionary, and thus it has 
acted as an impediment to growth of regional trade.
Faced with financial problems, the Economic Community of Great Lakes (CEPGL) has 
not made much progress to liberalize trade among members. Although they share a 
common colonial legacy - Belgian rule - there is not much economic justification for their 
integration. Burundi and Rwanda have much closer affinity to East Africa and thus are 
members of PTA. They have had traditional transport links to the Indian Ocean through 
East Africa rather than through the North East of Zaire.
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The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is a grouping for the 
Central African region within the framework of the Lagos Plan of Action. It took a long 
tune for ECCAS to become operational. Although a treaty to establish it was signed in 
1983, ECCAS’ secretariat was not established until 1986. Its aim is to move 
progressively from a preferential trade area into a full-fledged economic community.
The level of development among members is unbalanced. The inherent problems in 
unequal distribution of costs and benefits was recognized in the treaty, and the need to 
accelerate development in the poor and landlocked member states was stressed. The 
treaty makes provisions for creating a cooperation and development fund to provide 
financial and technical assistance to promote development of the least developed 
member states. On all these fronts, progress has been slow.
Emphasis was placed on promoting cooperation in major sectors of the regional 
economy. In the industrial sector, priorities were identified in the fight and heavy 
industries, and they were supposed to be implemented through establishing community 
enterprises. Similarly, in the agricultural sector, priority projects were identified to 
encourage food self-sufficiency and use of locally produced farm implements. Again, the 
pace of implementing projects in these sectors has been fraught with difficulties.
ECCAS faces enormous difficulties. Its membership is heterogenous and the distances 
separating the countries are long. While UDEAC members use a common currency, 
other five use their own currencies which are not convertible. In broad terms, the main 
objective of ECCAS, ECGL, and UDEAC is the same - market integration. 
Proliferation of these institutions results in duplication of functions, which contribute to 
conflicts over mandates and to divided loyalty among governments. Increasingly, many 
governments find it difficult to meet their financial obligations.
THE NORTH AFRICA REGION
Within the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) planning framework, the North Africa region 
comprises Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco. Sudan, and Tunisia. Progress towards market 
integration has been sluggish. It was only in February 1989 that the Arab Union of 
Maghreb (UMA) consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia was 
established. Its treaty calls for "the strengthening of relations between member countries 
through the establishment of appropriate mechanism which could lead to progressive 
integration of their economy, as well as the formulation of common regulations to 
establish an effective inter-Maghreb solidarity to promote the economic and social 
development of member countries".
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• 11Egypt is a member of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) along with Iraq, Jordan, 
and Republic of Yemen. The League of Arab States, to which all the Arab states of the 
region belong, has for a long time played an influential role in the economic and political 
spheres. Sudan, which is not represented in these groupings, has strong bilateral 
cooperation with Libya. A treaty was signed in March 1990 between these two countries 
to pave the way for their unification.
The character of cooperation in the region is complicated by the geo-political 
significance of the Middle East. It is an area of continuous tension and strife, and 
achieving stability has proved illusive. On the overall, the economies of North Africa 
region, except for Sudan, are an integral part of the Mediterranean regional economy.
The UMA states are particularly concerned with the creation of a single European 
market in 1992. Europe is their major trading partner, importing the bulk of UMA 
states’ exports. If restrictions were to be imposed by the EC on specific products which 
may constitute UMA’s major exports, the economies in the area could deteriorate. 
Furthermore, Maghreb region exports its surplus labour to Europe. If in the "New 
Europe" restrictions on labour mobility were imposed, again the consequences could be 
severe on most of these economies. UMA as a group can negotiate with the EC from a 
stronger position than individually. These concerns have been catalytic in renewed 
interest in strengthening market integration.
The level of development and resource endowment among members is uneven (see 
Table 9). Although the average GNP per capita is high by African standards - US$1,765, 
the distribution of income among the countries is skewed. Mauritania is poor with GNP 
per capita of US$480, while Libya is rich with a GNP per capita of US$5,420. Similarly, 
the oil rich nations - Algeria and Libya - account for about 70 percent of the Maghreb 
GDP. The region as a whole has abundant resources. Algeria and Libya have substantial 
oil reserves. Mauritania has large iron ore and fish resources, while Morocco has the 
world’s most accessible phosphate reserves, and considerable maritime resources.
In the aftermath of the recent Iraq war with the 
Allied forces including Egypt, ACC may take a 
different shape in the future.
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TART£ 9: NORTH AFRICA - SOME BASIC INDICATORS
Country Pop 
(mil.)
GNP per
Capita
US$
GDP 
US$ 
(mil. )
GDP Average 
Annual Growth 
Rate, 1980-90 
(percent)
Algeria 25 2,060 42,150 3.1
Egypt 52 600 33,210 5.0
Libya 5 • • • • • •
Morocco 25 950 25,220 4.0
Sudan 25 • • • • • •
Tunisia 8 1,440 11,080 3.6
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1992, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992.
Past declarations on integrating the Maghreb economies have failed to take shape. 
Relationships between some of the members became acrimonious, and economic links 
were virtually severed. Labour movement among the countries practically stopped. In 
most of the 1980s, trade among the member states was less than 5 percent.
Efforts to encourage economic integration among the Maghreb states date back to the 
1960s. To coordinate development plans and to harmonize industrial policies, a 
Permanent Advisory Committee for the Maghreb was created in 1964. In 1967 
agreement was reached to prepare a five year programme of cooperation. Its objectives 
were to:
(a) reduce trade restrictions among members;
(b) promote joint investments in the industrial sector;
(c) establish a payment system to facilitate intra-Maghreb trade; and
(d) carry out jointly negotiations with the EC.
Despite its sound basis, the programme was never ratified. Failure to ratify it contributed 
to pursuit of inward-looking development strategies in these countries.
Prolonged armed conflicts over territory set backward the drive toward market 
integration. This was exacerbated by ideological divergences among governments which 
sharply divided the members. Within the Maghreb membership there were two 
ompeting ideological camps - one for an all-Arab union and the other for a Maghreb 
mion - pulling the members apart. Adding to these obstacles, the transport and 
communications links were poorly developed.
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Partly as a result of ideological polarization and conflicts over territory, in the 1970s 
there was a marked shift from broad-based economic integration to bilateral 
cooperation. Although agreements to reduce bilateral tariffs were signed, still trade 
flows were limited. Success with joint ventures was also minimal. For instance, although 
some joint venture projects were proposed between Algeria and Tunisia, only a few 
were implemented. Criteria for project selection was flawed. Even for those 
implemented, several were of questionable economic viability, located in the remote 
areas where the transport systems were inadequate, and were subjected to inappropriate 
pricing policies (ADB, 1989). All this impeded efforts to promote effective integration 
through production.
In the late 1980s there was a revived interest in regional integration. It is in response 
to the regional and global realities. Political tensions among the Maghreb members have 
eased. Reflecting changes in the world, the ideological cleavages have narrowed. 
Economic setbacks of the early 1980s have forced Maghreb leadership into a serious re- 
evaluation of the costs and benefit of a stronger Maghreb. For Morocco and Tunisia 
import substitution, based on the domestic market, may be reaching its limits. Algeria 
and Tunisia, which have invested large sums in prestigious projects and defence, then- 
future prospects will be closely tied to the vicissitudes of oil price fluctuations. With then- 
inadequate supply of agricultural products and industrial consumer goods, but with excess 
capacity in heavy industries, complementarities among other Maghreb states exist. These 
should be exploited.
Opening up of the borders between Libya and Tunisia, and between Algeria and 
Morocco has allowed movement of labour and goods, and there are signs of emerging 
economic complementaries. Most of the Maghreb countries are undertaking economic 
policy reforms. Measures have been taken to transform them into market-based 
economies. Trade has been liberalized, public enterprises have undergone institutional 
reforms or privatized, and incentives to the productive sectors have been put in place, 
including incentives to attract foreign investors to participate in joint ventures.
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
The central question is: what went wrong with Africa’s efforts to integrate its economies, 
and what lessons can be learned from the past to guide future policy making decisions? 
The subject of regional cooperation and integration is complex. There is no simple or 
single explanation for Africa’s poor performance. There are several mutually re-enforcing 
factors and their full impacts need to be fully explored.
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It well recognized that Africa’s efforts to integrate its economies has fallen short of 
expectations.18 There is a broad consensus on the major factors:
(a) to a large extent, economic and trade policies have been inward-looking, and thee 
has been limited political commitment to implement economic policies, designed 
to expand intra-regional trade;
(b) there has been lack of the private sector participation in the integration efforts - 
government official have tended to predominate;
(c) in some cases there has been progress made on reduction of tariff barriers, but 
non-tariff barriers have remained rigid;
(d) colonial patterns of industry location and infrastructure systems, which still persist, 
have not been conducive to promoting intra-regional trade;
(e) the organizations established to integrate the economies have shown weakness in 
their institutional capacities; and
(f) overvalued exchange rates, weak monetary management and inadequate banking 
and financial systems frustrate the flow of trade and capital.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Africa’s poor performance to integrate its 
economies reflects an inadequacy to systematically analyze problems and to come up 
with workable solutions. Even more important, when national economies are ailing, it 
would be unrealistic to expect regional cooperation and integration efforts to succeed. 
Many regional institutions have numerous objectives with less clearly articulated 
instruments, designed to achieve these objectives. For instance, sectoral objectives in such 
areas as industry and agriculture are specific, and yet there are no corresponding 
instruments to ensure that they can be pursued in practical terms. The scope of work 
outstrips the capacity of existing institutions. This has been exacerbated by the 
proliferation of institutions with overlapping mandates.
In some cases, the intent of integration have a set of targeted objectives with time frames 
for their implementation such as the expansion of intra-community trade. And the 
process of achieving them is also clearly identified - schedules of progressive reduction 
of trade barriers, harmonizing of customs nomenclature, policy coordination and 
harmonization. However, trade among members in the regions has remained low. It may 
be insightful to re-examine the economic integration model adopted.
For instance, see Faezeh Forotan, "Regional 
Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past Experience and 
Future Prospects," paper presented at the World Bank 
and CEPR Conference on New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration, Washington, D.C., April, 1992.
54
CEAO, ECOWAS, and PTA are all based on the EC model of integration. When the 
EC was dismantling trade barriers among its members, it had adequately competitive 
productive capacity, convertible currencies, a sound system of trade payment, a high 
degree of labour specialisation and an efficient transport and communications 
infrastructure. In Africa, these are grossly inadequate and in some cases, nonexistent.
In Africa, the industrial sector was dominated by light industries, serving the domestic 
markets. It was not designed as an inter-regional model to promote division of labour 
and specialization. Thus, light industries provided limited basis for an extensive trade 
movement among members in the regions19. Furthermore, the inability to surpluses 
in the agricultural sector, constrain growth of intra-regional trade.
Since independence, there has been little efforts to re-orient the transport systems to 
place greater weight on linking up African economies. The roads and railways connect 
agricultural and mining production areas to the major ports for purposes of exports 
overseas.
PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
There is an emerging consensus that regional cooperation and integration will play an 
important role in improving Africa’s economic outlook.20 Over time, as Africa works 
towards a single market, it is likely to become a relatively uniform modern industrial 
society. It is industrial development that will catapult Africa from primordial into 
modem modes of production. To achieve this, Africa will have to learn to be 
competitive by global standards. Otherwise, it will always stand in the shadows of 
developed and other developing countries.
The very relative size of Africa endangers it. The challenge is for Africa to expand its 
productive base, and thus become a comparatively large economic power. Africa’s 
relative smallness as an economy by world standards has persuaded a body of opinion 
( especially pure trade theorists) which argues that regional integration in Africa will be 
a futile struggle. The argument goes to suggest that African countries will be better off 
if their pattern of production aims at breaking into the world markets, which are 
infinitely larger than regional markets. Through promoting unilateral trade
The thesis that African economies are competitive, not 
complementary, and hence the low level of trade among 
them is not persuasive. Given an appropriate policy 
environment, and if the infrastructural services were 
improved, existing product differentiation could 
encourage trade flows.
See, "Promoting Regional Cooperation and Integration 
in sub-Saharan Africa" in 'The Courier,' no 134, July- 
August, 1992 pp. 77-88.
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liberalization, and gearing its industrial capabilities for the world market, Africa’s 
industrial opportunities would increase.
However, this is a simplified view of the world. Breaking into the export markets can 
be difficult. In many sophisticated markets, meeting product specifications and standards 
can be formidable. Trapped by the scarcity of foreign exchange, faced with irregular 
supply of raw materials, and constrained by inadequate industrial and marketing skills, 
penetrating the overseas markets will not be easy. Regional markets can provide a 
useful learning experience.
The outlook for market integration is daunting. Although broad agreement exists of the 
course of action to be taken - opening up of the regional markets to accelerate industrial 
development and facilitate trade - there are many complexities. Effective coordination 
among African governments, regional and regional institutions, bilateral and multilateral 
agencies, and non­
governmental organization remains difficult. Yet, there is an urgent need for the 
meeting of the minds to move from resolutions to concrete action, if Africa’s economic 
integration is to become a reality.
In defining and implementing joint projects and programmes, there is no place for 
fundamentalism. The regional projects and programmes should be based on sound 
economic analysis, if they have to be credible. They should have a net benefit to the 
regional economies. At a technical level, complex problems remain to be resolved. 
Debates continue on the use of various forms of protection to promote industrial growth 
and the pace of trade liberalization. Such debates are necessary to advance searches for 
solutions.
/
If industrial development, through widening of the regional markets and linking up 
production processes across the countries, has to be an engine of growth, several 
challenges will have to be met. It will be crucial that the political will be strengthened 
and political stability be ensured. Furthermore, human resources and entrepreneurship 
need to be developed. Creating an enabling environment for industrial development, 
enhancing of regional dimensions of structural adjustments, and strengthening regional 
institutions would be crucial. This must be undertaken in parallel with strengthening 
supportive infrastructure, improving the criteria for regional project selection and the 
capacity for coordination and monitoring of regional programmes. The supportive role 
of the donors will be essential. Finding solutions to these challenges will help to 
transform Africa from poverty into prosperity in the 1990s and beyond.
This failure is partly owing to structural characteristics developing countries economies, 
and the incompatibility between inward looking development strategies pursued at 
national level and the requirements of regional liberalization. This has been reinforced 
by the inability to implement across-the-board liberalization of tariff and non-tariff 
b riers and restrictive rules of origin.
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Arguably, economic integration is not a panacea for Africa’s development problems. It 
is not a substitute for sound policy analysis at national level. It, however, holds out 
prospects of significant potential benefits, especially regarding industrial development. 
Future performance will depend on:
(a) development strategies pursued;
(b) equitable formulae to share the costs and benefits;
(c) policies towards foreign investment;
(d) commitment to the integration process; and
(e) paying sufficient attention to measures designed to assist the less developed
member states.
The effectiveness of regional arrangements can be assessed in terms of the extent of the 
increase in intra-regional trade and meeting target dates in implementation of their 
timetables. For instance, the EC has been able to implement agreement on time, and 
sometimes even ahead of schedule. Reducing of barriers among EC member states and 
in other industrial countries has not impeded multilateral liberalization. Evidence shows 
that regional arrangements in industrial countries contributed to increase in intra- 
regional trade (see Table 1). Industrial countries regional arrangements tend to 
increase intra-regional trade and face few implementation problems compared to 
developing countries arrangements because:
(a) trade liberalization is carried out in differentiated manufactured products;
(b) industrial countries can absorb adjustment costs while maintaining steady growth 
more easily; and
(c) industrial countries can postpone adjustment in sensitive industries such as 
agriculture.
There is an important caveat: if North America and Europe develop a "fortress" trade 
policy posture, there could be adverse impacts on world GDP and exports. By imposing 
new regulations on specifications, standards, and overall quality control requirements on 
products to enter these markets, world trade would be restricted and Africa’s growth 
prospects could be dampened.
However, it has been pointed out that market integration should simultaneously be 
implemented with production integration (Adedeji, 1991). For instance, today a 
manufacturer of a car makes an engine in one country, tyres in another country, and 
then assembles the car in a third country. Each of these processes takes advantage of 
the lower costs, specialization and resource endowment. It allows a degree of horizontal
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and vertical integration within a country and across countries for inputs, output, and 
distribution. Where complementaries exist, it also encourages enterprise to enterprise 
cooperation. This integration of production across national borders would increase the 
overall volume of intra-African trade because goods change hands at various stages of 
production, and not just at the final stage.
For production integration to succeed in Africa, laws and regulations on creation of 
subsidiaries and mergers should be less restrictive, and economic policies will have to 
be coordinated. Even more, it will require that goods in the regions are produced at 
competitive costs. Experience suggests that countries are reluctant to purchase high- 
priced goods from their partners when lower-priced goods are available from a third 
country. Faster pace on regional trade liberalization could help. Capital and 
entrepreneurship should be free to cross borders. With open and liberal trading regimes 
in place, integration of the production process will become a central feature of market 
integration.
More specifically, if the prospects for Africa’s economic cooperation and integration have 
to improve, a number of principles will have to be implemented. These are:
(a) The Principle of Sudsidiarity21
For regional cooperation and integration to be successful, it would be important 
to define the responsibilities to be undertaken at national and regional levels. 
The principle of sudsidiarity means that the issues are referred to a higher level 
on condition that they could be handled more effectively at that level. An 
example of this could be cross-border investment. Conversely, the 
implementation of regional common policies could be best managed at the local 
or national levels.
(b) The Principle of Variable Geometry
Policy reforms will not command the same level of attention among the members 
states in a regional group. It is, therefore, impractical to expect all the member 
states to move at the same stride - the core members who can move faster should 
be allowed to do so, while the slow pacer could join later. In such circumstances, 
it is important that the pace towards integration is not determined by the slowest 
member state.
(c) Outward Oriented Policies
Inward looking policies both at national and regional levels have not yielded 
positive results. Successful regional cooperation and integration should be 
perceived as a step towards increasing production and trade, not only with the
See The Courier, op. cit.
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member states in the regional groups, but also with third parties. This would 
encourage competition within the regional groupings. Past efforts to promote 
industrial development through high barriers have been counter productive. More 
open approaches, with selective protection, hold more promise.
(d) Peace, Stability and Growth
Many parts of Africa have been ravaged by fratricidal war and strife. Without 
peace and political stability, regional cooperation and integration can not be 
achieved. Sustainable growth, based on sound national economic policies, is a 
prerequisite for success in integrating the economies.
(e) Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies
There is need to pay increasing attention to coordination of macroeconomic 
policies with respect to regional dimensions of structural adjustment. Focus on 
trade policies alone will not expand trade. Attention should also be focused on 
production side and improvements in productivity.
(f) Broad Participation
Success in regional cooperation and integration will depend on the broad 
participation of the private sector and the ordinary citizens. Ultimately, they are 
the driving force behind regional cooperation and integration.
(g) Equitable Distribution of Benefits
Benefits to be derived from integration are not automatically equitably distributed 
among member states. In the short term, partners with efficient industrial 
structures could benefit disproportionately more than others. It is, therefore, 
important to set up pragmatic compensatory measures.
(h) Strong and Independent Regional Institutions
Without strong and independent regional institutions, progress towards African 
regionalism would likely falter. Strengthening of these institutions will be critical 
to ensure accountability and transparency.
CONCLUSION
For Africa to be integrated into economic community there are many challenges to be 
met. Instead of making progress towards regional cooperation and integration, there has 
been stagnation, even in some cases reversals, were experienced. Having better access 
to regional markets, which are wider than national markets, holds prospects for increased 
industrial capacity utilization and output, and growth in trade.
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For regional cooperation and integration to become a viable development strategy, 
greater attention will have to be paid to galvanizing political will, creating an enabling 
environment for the expansion of the productive sectors, implementing policy reforms 
to place economies on sustainable growth paths.
The task which lies ahead will be daunting. But with perseverance, overtime, Africa as 
an emerging single economy could rise to greater heights in the international community 
and could strengthen its collective bargaining power in the international negotiations. 
Without this collective strength, Africa risks to be marginalized in the 1990s and beyond. 
Averting this risk will depend on its capacity to adjust to the dynamics of global change.
Africa as a region must move progressively to gain a position of economic influence 
overtime. It will only be out its economic strength, generated over time, that Africa will 
assume a position of global recognition.
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Annex 1
MembershiD of Maior African Regional CooDeration and Integration Organisations
WEST AFRICA
CEAO (1974), Renin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and
Senegal
ECOWAS (1975)., Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
MRU (1973), Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone
CENTRAL AFRICA
UDEAC (1964) Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Congo
Brazaville, Chad, Gabon
CEPGL (1976) Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire
CEEAC (1983) Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea,
Congo, Chad, Gabon, Rwanda, and Zaire.
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
SACU (1969) Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
SADCC (1960) Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
PTA (1982) Angola, Burundi, Comoros Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
IOC (1982)
• *
Comores, Reunion (France), Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles
EAC — East Africa Community (now defunct) - Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda.
NORTH AMERICA
Maghreb Union - Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia
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OTHERS
EC
EFTA 
ASEAN 
LAIA (1980)
CARICOM
NAFTA
European Communities -  Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
United Kingdom.
European Free Trade Association -- Austria, Finland, Ireland, 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
Association of South East Asian Nations -- Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Latin American Integration Association --formerly the Latin 
American Free Trade Area (1960) -  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela.
Caribbean Common Market -- Antigua, and Bermuda, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserral, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago.
North America Free Trade Area -- Canada, Mexico, and USA.
/
ADB,
Adedeji, A.,
Baldwin, Richard. 
Bayoumi, T.
Berg, Elliot
Chr. Michelsen Inst. 
Clute, Robert E.
ECA,
ECA,
ECOWAS,
Ezenwe,
Frimpong-Ansah, J.H.
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STRENGTHENING OF REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
POLICY REFORMS AND COORDINATION
Chinyamata Chipeta 
BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
Wide disparities in the level of economic development exist in Southern 
Africa. The average per capita GNP of the SADCC region in 1989 was 
US$328. Three member states (Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania) had per 
capita incomes below the average (see Table I). Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are classified as low-income countries by 
the World Bank. The rest are classified as lower-middle income. In contrast, 
with a per capita GNP of US$2,470, South Africa is classified as an upper- 
middle income country. In the majority of the member states, the share of 
manufacturing in GDP is relatively low. These economic differences do imply 
that the economic potential and interests of different countries are not similar.
A key feature of economic management in the Southern Africa Region (SAR) 
today is the pursuit by Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe of structural adjustment or policy reform programmes supported 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Among 
other things, all policy reform programmes aim at reducing internal and 
external financial imbalances and at improving efficiency in the economy. 
These programmes include trade liberalization, incentives for investors, 
farmers and exporters and so on. The issue to be examined is whether policy 
reforms, conceptualized and coordinated at the regional level, would 
contribute more effectively to economic adjustment and growth than if the 
same reforms were carried out by national authorities. What would be the 
implications of this for national sovereignty? Does regional policy co­
ordination require, of necessity, supranational institutional arrangements?
Other pertinent questions to ask at the beginning are why do regional 
dimensions of policy reforms matter? Why should they be taken into account? 
Why should policy reforms be coordinated?
TABLE I: SOUTHERN AFRICAN: SOME BASIC INDICATORS
C o u n t r y
Population
Millions
1989
GNP Per 
Capita in 
constant US$ 
in 1989
GNP in millions 
of US Dollars 
in 1989
Share of Manu­
facturing in 
GDP in 1989 
(per cent)
Share of 
Agriculture in 
GDP in 1989 
(per cent)
A n g o la 9 .7 610 7,720 31 461
Botswana 1.2 1,600 2,500 4 3
Lesotho 1.7 470 340 14 24
Malawi 8.2 180 1,410 11 35
Mozambique 15.3 80 1,100 - 64
Namibia 1.7 1,030 1,650 5 11
Swaziland 0.8 900 369J 201 24
Tanzania 23 .8 130 2,540 4 66
Zambia 7 .8 390 4,700 24 13
Zimbabwe 9 .5 6 50 5,250 25 13
S. Africa
.
35.0 2,470 80,370 24 6
1987
WORLD BANK: World Development Report 1991 and Sub-Saharan Africa from Crisis to Sustainable Development 1989
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AN ENABLING MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) aims 
at bringing about freer movement of goods and services in the region. 
SADCC would like to see freer movement of capital, labour and enterprise. 
What macroeconomic environment would facilitate the integration of markets 
for goods, services and factors of production? According to conventional 
wisdom, a common set of monetary, fiscal and other economic conditions and 
policies is required to direct, influence and even control the free movement 
of factors of production, goods and services. These conditions and policies are 
explained briefly below.
Key monetary conditions are a liberal supply of the means of payment and 
fixed exchange rates. These conditions are not met by using hard currencies, 
which are in short supply to most Southern African countries and whose 
exchange rates are not fixed in relations to all Southern African currencies. 
Both conditions are met in a single currency system. A single common 
currency model involves an arrangement by which a number of countries are 
grouped in a monetary area with a single currency and a common monetary 
authority. The common monetary authority issues the common currency. It 
also holds and manages the external assets of the member countries in a 
common pool. Substantial economies can be realised from assigning these 
functions to a single central bank. To facilitate monetary stability and full and 
unlimited convertibility of their currency against the external reference 
currency to which it is immutably pegged, the common monetary authority 
manages monetary and some aspects of fiscal policies of member states. 
Existing national central banks become mere branches of the common central 
bank.
This is the model that has been adopted in the West African Monetary Union 
(WAMU) as well as in the Central African Monetary Union (CAMU). A 
major element in the successful function of this system is provided by the link 
with an external convertible currency and the support of the issuing 
government which guarantees unlimited convertibility of the union currency. 
In a complete monetary and economic union (the USA model), a single 
currency is issued, thereby eliminating all exchange risks and payments 
restrictions within the area. All existing autonomous national banks would be 
replaced witb regional banks in a federal reserve-type-system. Other features 
are a common external exchange rate, and common fiscal, monetary and credit 
policies. Since the policy-making freedom of each member country is severely 
restricted, this system works best in a political union.
Apart from low currency administration costs, a single currency would have the 
advantage that it would create commitment to a new cause. The cost of 
setting up the common monetary authority could easily be borne by national 
central banks. Militating against the establishment of a single currency may
be habits and national identities. But these are not likely to be strong 
impediments in the SADCC. Disparities in economic conditions and in stages 
of economic development exist among member states. But these may be taken 
care of through the distribution of credit and development finance.
Where the creation of a single common currency is considered to be a drastic 
step, countries may decide to do no more than create convertibility among 
their separate national currencies. Referred to as limited convertibility, this 
is not as ideal as a single currency system. But it would permit unrestricted 
exchange and use of the currencies of countries within the region vis-a-vis each 
other. In other words, all exchange restrictions vis-a-vis the other currencies 
of the group would be eliminated. National currencies would be made 
convertible at market clearing exchange rates which could subject economic 
transactions to uncertainty and risks among member states.
Alternatively, they could be made convertible at fixed exchange rates, and thus 
doing away with uncertainty and risks. Fixed exchange rates would facilitate 
joining monetary policy to regulate trade between the region and the external 
world. They would also facilitate monetary policies aimed at expanding trade 
between member states. While there would be no central monetary authority 
to manage convertible currencies, member countries would need to consult 
and to act jointly or appropriately on certain matters.
Coordination or harmonisation of monetary policies is required to avoid 
inconsistent and contradictory actions and signals. As Ng^andwe (1987) has 
pointed out, not all SADCC member states are able to use the full range of 
monetary policy instruments. Most depend on varying reserve ratios, interest 
rates, the monetary base and on using direct credit control. They do not use 
open market operations. But when monetary reforms have been carried out, 
all will be able to use open market operations, and hence a common set of 
policy instruments.
In terms of actual operation of monetary policy, it is essential that when one 
country adopts an expansionary policy, other countries should do the same to 
stimulate production and to enable them to purchase any excess output from 
that country, as Ng’andwe (1987) has demonstrated. If expansionary policy in 
one country is accompanied by contractionary policies in other countries, the 
latter will frustrate the former and may lead to inflation, unless that country 
can import goods to satisfy its demand from outside the region (which would 
not promote intra-regional trade).
- Monetary harmonisation is consistent with any form of economic integration. 
A group of countries can have it even before economic integration. As 
Samples, the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had ii before 
-tical and economic union; East Africa had it before the common market 
•fld economic community. The use of a single currency in each group helped
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in saving on foreign exchange, facilitated cross-border investment, and led to 
expansion of intra-regional trade.
As part of the macroeconomic environment, government taxation is a potent 
instrument for influencing resource allocation among producers, resource 
owners and consumers. Taxation affects investment, production and 
consumption. It also influences redistribution of income and wealth in society. 
Similarly, government expenditure can direct the flow of resources, goods and 
services in an economy. In general terms, there is little that one can say about 
the fiscal conditions that are ideal for promoting economic integration. If 
anything at all, one can say that taxation and expenditure in various member 
states should encourage maximum supply of resources, encourage efficient 
allocation of those resources, and promote economic stability. Beyond this 
what becomes desirable as fiscal policy depends to a large extent on the mode 
of economic co-operation.
In a free trade area, such as the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (PTA), tariff barriers would be reduced gradually and 
ultimately eliminated, but each member state would retain its own external 
tariff. (Since non-tariff barriers are important and could offset the effect of 
tariff reductions, the PTA is also paying attention to quota restrictions on 
intra-regional trade, import licensing and foreign exchange allocation). The 
main problem with this type of fiscal policy is that, since each state sets its 
own external tariff, and if one of more members set low external tariffs, 
regional industries will not be given sufficient protection, hence little intra- 
regional trade will develop. To circumvent this problem, in a customs union, 
not only are internal tariffs and other barriers removed, a common external 
tariff is also established. A common market or economic union adopts similar 
fiscal policies in regard to the promotion of regional industries and intra- 
regional trade.
Differences between national and regional goals make these fiscal measures 
difficult to adopt and implement in practice throughout the economic 
grouping. After these policy measures have been adopted, problems usually 
arise over the distribution of costs and benefits. One major cost is the terms- 
of-trade effect which arises from trade diversion whereby some countries pay 
more in buying from within the region at higher prices than the ones they 
would pay ^ outside sources. In the short-run, this represents a necessary costs 
of economic integration. In the long-run it is hoped that regional industries 
would develop those economies that will enable them to sell at competitive 
prices.
Other major costs are the loss in customs duty revenue, that arises from trade, 
diversion: and the unequal distribution of income and excise duty revenue 
arising from an unfair pattern of distribution of industrial projects. To 
compensate for loss of revenue, arrangements can be made to collect customs
and excise duty revenue into a common pool from which each country would 
receive a share based on the value of its trade. An effective remedy for 
dealing with the second problem is to promote equitable distribution of 
industrial plants through deliberate planning or financial incentives.
The specific measures that have been put down above imply harmonisation of 
fiscal policies, aimed at promoting common interests. Expansionary or 
contractionary fiscal measures would also need harmonisation to prevent 
contradictory signals and responses from other member states. Other fiscal 
measures that would need harmonisation are industrial incentives (the likes of 
investment, capital or depreciation allowances, tax holidays, income tax rates, 
profit tax rate and others.) Here too the aim would be to promote common 
interests. But there would be an additional aim to create uniformity in fiscal 
conditions so that industrial location becomes the by-product of comparative 
advantages alone.
Among other desirable elements of a stable macroeconomic environment are 
domestic price stability, balance of payments stability and manageable levels 
of public external debt. Price stability must be maintained so as to permit an 
increase in real income and demand for goods and services; to keep down the 
cost of providing public services, hence facilitate its improvement in quality 
and quantity; keep down the cost of production and hence maintain 
competitiveness of goods in the regional and external markets while reducing 
the attractiveness of external imports; and to encourage savings and 
investment. Domestic price stability will not come about without sustainable 
efforts to improve the supply of goods; to cut down budget deficits and hence 
the need for deficit financing; and to maintain competitive exchange rates to 
avoid huge exchange rate adjustments.
Balance of payments stability and manageable levels of public external debts 
make it unnecessary to borrow for the purpose of supporting the external 
sector; to curtail foreign exchange allocation for essential machinery; 
equipment and raw materials; and to deflate the economy. They also help to 
maintain the credit-worthiness of an economy.
PROBLEMS ON THE ROAD TOWARDS MONETARY UNION 
MONETARY REFORMS
Every country has its own currency (Namibia will issue one soon). Every 
country, except those in the Common Monetary Area (CMA), also determines 
tts own exchange rate regime. Angola pegs its currency to the US dollar; 
tswana, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe peg theirs to trade weighted 
ets of currencies which do not adequately take into account currencies 
ch are the vehicles of international transactions; Mozambique and Zambia 
ermine their exchange rates on the basis of indicators. Along with
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divergencies in economic conditions and policies, differences in exchange rate 
arrangements have resulted in very different nominal exchange rates in these 
countries (Annex 1).
To make matters worse, according to the PTA study (1990), the real effective 
exchange rates of most of the countries have diverged from their equilibrium 
levels for most of the past two and a half decades (Annex 2). Most exchange 
rates have suffered from overvaluation which has introduced a bias against 
exports. Zambia and Tanzania, among the countries from which data is 
available, experienced high degrees of overvaluation and hence suffered most 
from consequent price distortions. Of the countries included in the PTA 
study, only Lesotho and Swaziland escaped from the costs of protracted 
overvaluation. South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, not included in the PTA 
study, also have experienced less overvaluation. In all the four countries, 
membership of the CAM prevented adoption of macroeconomic policies that 
create instability in the exchange rate. Outside of the CAM, only one other 
country, Zimbabwe, has demonstrated reasonable stability in its nominal 
exchange rate, according to the PTA study. Except for a brief period during 
the late 1970s, the nominal exchange rate remained close to the real effective 
rate.
The problem of divergent nominal exchange rates can be minimised by 
pegging all the regional currencies to the same reference currency, for instance 
the SDR or to some other trade weighted basket of currencies. Fixing the 
external value of regional currencies in this way would ensure stability in the 
value of one currency vis-a-vis others. Ideally, currencies should be pegged to 
the external currency or basket of currencies at the same rate. In practice, it 
may be difficult to agree on a common external value.
Considering the advantages of full monetary harmonisation, the PTA decided 
in 1990 to work towards the establishment of a single common currency by the 
year 2000. The long lead time would give member states sufficient time to 
carry out necessary economic adjustments. The process of creating one 
currency would entail adjustment of the exchange rates of the national 
currencies to their equilibrium levels, and eventually replacing them with one 
currency. Two problems would have to be addressed.
The first relates to the degree of exchange rate adjustment that would be 
required. As it has been pointed out above, most of the currencies of the 
region are overvalued. The degree of overvaluation has no doubt declined 
from the excessive levels of the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. 
Under structural adjustment programmes, several countries are making 
exchange rate reforms necessary for harmonisation. For these countries, the 
rate of currency devaluation that would be required is relatively small (Annex 
3). For a few that do not appear to show evidence of results of significant
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exchange rate reforms, the rate of devaluation would be high. Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland would need to revalue their currencies.
The second and serious problem rates to the amount of adjustment in the 
growth of central bank credit to government. This is required to prevent 
excessive creation of money which would undermine the value of the common 
currency by fuelling inflation. As shown in Annex 4, there are differences in 
rates of growth of credit to government, reflecting underlying economic 
structures. All rates, except the actual, assume a 10 per cent rate of inflation. 
Whether a uniform rate of credit expansion were adopted or not, it is clear 
that a cut would be necessary in Zambia, Tanzania, Lesotho, Rwanda, Somalia 
and Uganda. A target rate of inflation below 10 per cent would require a cut 
in a larger number of countries. If South Africa were to join the PTA, it 
would need to cut down the rate of growth of bank credit as well.
In terms of institutional capacity, there should be little difficulty with 
harmonisation of monetary policies as the Common Monetary Authority would 
take care of this. Divergent economic conditions may necessitate different 
policies, and this could be potential cause of conflict. These observations 
relate to fiscal policy as well. With respect to the flow of short-term credit to 
the public and private sectors, the PTA plan envisages arrangements similar 
to the ones in place in West and Central African Monetary Unions. For 
development finance, a new institution will not be set up. Instead, reliance 
will be placed on the PTA Trade and Development Bank (and if South Africa 
joins, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, perhaps).
In the field of domestic resource mobilisation and allocation, the monetary 
harmonisation programme envisages little beyond raising deposit and lending 
rates to their real values to encourage savings and promote efficient allocation 
of resources. Monetary harmonisation will in itself encourage domestic 
resource mobilisation to the extent that capital will become more mobile 
among different countries. To facilitate this, member countries will need to 
set up (primary) capital market institutions such as issuing houses, unit and 
investment trusts, and share underwriters, and secondary or securities markets. 
These institutions are lacking in all countries except South Africa, Swaziland, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. There are many public utility companies that can 
raise finance (bonds) domestically in the region. Financial and non-financial 
private firms can be encouraged to raise resources locally, through fiscal and 
other incentives, if necessary.
At present, commercial banks dominate in the mobilisation of domestic 
financial savings. But following the British model of commercial banking, it 
is not their practice to lend long-term for development purposes, to take up 
part ownership of enterprises and even to appoint directors to enterprises in 
which they have invested capital, a practice which is common in Germany and 
wh cl lelped with German industrialisation. Adoption of the German model
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of commercial banking could change the financial market markedly. This 
model would not be adopted voluntarily by commercial banks in the region. 
What may be required to encourage them are a change in the legal and 
regulatory framework of the practice of banking and specific incentives.
From the standpoint of economic development, another concern is that 
commercial banks and other formal financial institutions rarely extend credit 
to small-scale and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs). The usual explanations 
for this are that it is costly to deal with a large number of SMEs, SMEs 
borrowers are comparatively risky, and that, historically, it is not the mission 
of commercial banks to lend to SMEs. These problems can be addressed by 
lending through groups of SMEs or by lending indirectly through the 
intermediary of informal financial institutions. Risk can be managed through 
similar ways. If the Common Monetary Authority can relate the size of 
central bank credit to commercial banks dependent on how much they lend 
to SMEs, it will be creating a useful incentive.
FISCAL REFORMS
The PTA study observed that the average level of permissible unified credit 
expansion to central governments would be of the order of 15 - 20 per cent of 
previous year’s tax revenue. For some countries, such a limitation of credit 
would be tolerable as already their borrowing requirements are manageable. 
For others, it would lead to a sizeable unfunded budget deficit (Annex 5). In 
this group, there will be need to raise revenue or cut down expenditure or to 
do both over a long period which will slow down progress towards monetary 
harmonisation. The most expeditious approach would be to seek budgetary 
aid or expanded financial support for structural adjustment programmes.
LESSONS FOR SADCC
The above illustrates the problems that would have to be resolved if the PTA 
were to work towards monetary harmonisation. Because of these problems, 
the PTA decided to start with limited currency convertibility of national 
currencies in 1997. Meanwhile member states must work on the necessary 
fiscal and monetary reforms. Unification of exchange rates would be 
attempted in 2000. The creation of a single currency would follow later.
The PTA plan is based on the assumption that convergence of fiscal and 
monetary policies and hence inflation rates is necessary before full monetary 
union. Tliis assumption is believed by some economists to be neither 
necessary nor sufficient for monetary integration. The act of monetary 
integration creates the fiscal and monetary discipline that ultimately produces 
nominal convergence. Thus, SADCC need not wait for nominal convergence 
before embarking on monetary integration.
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The PTA dilemma also reflects the fact that the grouping is not an "optimum 
currency area". Total intra-regional trade in absolute terms has fallen since 
the PTA was created. As a proportion of total trade, it is less than 5 per cent. 
The gain from saving in transaction costs made possible by monetary 
integration would thus be small. A few large exporters to the region, Kenya 
and Zimbabwe, might make significant gains out of it. As presently 
constituted, the gains to SADCC might also be small. When South Africa is 
included in the SADCC the picture changes for the better.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT : POLICY ANALYSIS AND 
FORMULATION
Structural adjustment has been conceived by the World Bank as a national 
rather than a regional programme. As such, the adoption of the programme 
has depended on the willingness and preparedness of individual countries. 
Thus, while many countries in the region have embarked on economic reform, 
some have not. For the same reason that has been put down above, the 
timing of adjustment programmes has not been uniform. Malawi started 
economic reforms in 1983 and has held on to them. Zambia started early too, 
but has not consistently implemented them. Tanzania embarked on economic 
reforms in the mid 1980s while Mozambique adopted economic reforms as late 
as 1987 and Zimbabwe only in 1990.
Having been conceived as national programmes with national goals and using 
national financial policies, structural adjustment programmes have lacked a 
regional dimension. As a result, possible destabilising effects on the 
economies of members of SADCC and PTA have not been taken into 
account. In most of the reform programmes, the emphasis has been on short­
term demand management objectives and policy instruments. By restraining 
demand, this may not encourage intra-regional trade. Progress towards 
regional co-operation depends on trade policies not on financial policies which 
are emphasized in structural adjustment programmes.
In the absence of a federal government and given differences in the time of 
onset of economic problems in different member states as well as in the 
severity of those problems, it would be too much to require them to co­
ordinate all aspects of their policies. Those that impact on other regional 
economies, such as tariff reductions and devaluation, should certainly be 
coordinated by appropriate institutions.
So far SADCC has not been much involved in co-ordinating policy reforms 
among its member states as emphasis within SADCC has been on 
strem ening the physical productive capacity of key sectors. The impending 
torn sation of SADCC by means of a treaty may assist with its co-ordination 
; giving its decisions the force of law. Two other developments would, 
ins ted, assist with this. One is the establishment of a system of incentives
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under which countries that abide by SADCC decisions would be rewarded, 
while those that do not would be punished. The other is closer liaison with 
the World Bank, the IMF and other regional organisations concerned with 
policy reform and development.
The thorny issue for SADCC will be how to proceed with macroeconomic and 
sectoral policy planning and co-ordination given that PTA is developing a 
macroeconomic and sectoral policy programme of its own. Fiscal policy 
harmonisation and the development of appropriate monetary institutions and 
instruments in PTA are well known. As SADCC proceeds, the potential for 
competition and conflict will be real as all members of SADCC (except 
Botswana and Namibia) are also members of PTA But one should not be 
dogmatic about this until SADCC’s programme has been unveiled.
Should SADCC transform itself into another free trade area, then the 
possibility of duplication in tariff policy may arise. The adoption of a customs 
union or common market-type of programme would avoid duplication in the 
field of tariff policy. Otherwise, until the two institutions have rationalised 
their activities or merged, there is need to consult on and, if necessary, co­
ordinate policy on industrial incentives. The two institutions may also have to 
adopt a common approach on the co-ordination of structural adjustment 
programmes.
With regard to monetary harmonisation, if PTA goes ahead with its proposed 
programme, SADCC may wish to work closely with PTA to establish a 
common currency or to ensure convertibility of currencies of SADCC member 
states that are not members of PTA If PTA fails, SADCC may wish to go 
ahead with its own plan to establish a common currency or a system of 
convertible national currencies. With or without monetary harmonisation, 
SADCC may take the initiative to address liberalisation of several aspects of 
the exchange and payments systems which are not being fully addressed now.
PTA does not have a programme to develop the financial markets of member 
states. Thus, SADCC involvement in this field would not be in competition 
with PTA Even the establishment of a SADCC development fund or bank 
would not strictly be in competition with the PTA bank to the extent that 
different projects would be funded and membership in the two institutions is 
not strictly uniform.
Unlike SADCC, the PTA was established in 1982 by means of legal instrument 
which was enacted in 1981. The bureaucratic machinery of PTA is centralised, 
but chairmanship of the PTA Authority rotates among Heads of member 
states. Decisions in the various councils are made by consensus. Given the 
large membership of the organisation, this can lead to delays in taking 
decisions or to no decision at all being made.
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With emphasis on fiscal harmonisation, the development of appropriate 
monetary institutions and instruments, and in future monetary harmonisation, 
the activities of the PTA are seen as complementing those of SADCC. 
Nevertheless, duplication may have occurred in the development of 
agriculture, natural resources, industry and energy, and in certain approaches 
to the development of industry and trade, for instance, the promotion of 
regional business councils.
With respect to trade liberalisation in PTA progress in reducing quantitative 
restrictions on trade has been slight, but reasonable progress has been 
achieved in reducing tariffs. The list of commodities that receives preferential 
treatment now exceeds 700, and on over 400 of which some countries have 
actually reduced customs duties. However, further progress is proving difficult 
to achieve.
Questions have also been raised about the design and structure of tariff 
reductions. The common tariff reductions that have been adopted are 70 per 
cent for capital goods and developmental consumer items; 65 per cent and 60 
per cent for intermediate goods and agricultural raw materials, respectively; 
10 per cent for luxuries and 30 per cent for foodstuffs. Since regional 
preferences are established as a percentage, and not as an absolute amount, 
which would be less expeditious, intra-PTA preference margins decline if a 
country reduces the average level of its most favoured nation (MFN) customs 
tariffs or when it extends to its external partners all or some of the concessions 
reserved for its PTA partners.
The relatively low percentage tariff reduction for luxuries is difficult to explain. 
Considering that normally high tariff rates are imposed on luxury imports, and 
that the region faces stiff competition from overseas suppliers, the 10 per cent 
tariff concession is hardly adequate, as has been argued by Ng’andwe (1987). 
Furthermore, the production of luxuries can reap economies of scale if the 
industry serves the large PTA market rather than the smaller national market.
Equally puzzling is the low tariff reduction on foodstuffs. The motive for 
establishing this seems to have been to discourage intra-PTA trade and 
encourage national self-sufficiency. Many countries in the region certainly 
have the potential to be self-sufficient in food, but it is not all. In any case, 
even those that produce enough foodstuffs do not always do so. They may 
import foodstuffs from the region more cheaply if tariff concessions are 
granted. Here is an area where consultation between PTA and SADCC might 
have assisted.
The establishment of the PTA Clearing House in 1984 and the Trade and 
Development Bank, and the introduction of the Unit of Account of the PTA 
and avellers cheques have so far been the most notable achievements of the 
PTA As of 1988, 41.6 per cent of the total intra-PTA trade was being
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channelled through the Clearing House. Of the total amount, 58.7 per cent 
was settled in local currencies, thus, along with travellers cheques, saving 
foreign exchange and permitting limited convertibility of these currencies. 
Only 41.3 per cent of trade had to be settled in hard currencies. The use of 
the Clearing House should have been higher had it not been:
(a) for the tendency of participating countries to channel imports rather 
than exports through the scheme;
(b) insistence of some on receipt of convertible currencies for their exports; 
and
(c) traditional barriers like licences, and practical problems of opening 
correspondent accounts on the part of commercial banks.
The inability of member countries to subscribe capital to the Trade and 
Development Bank in convertible currencies limited the share capital to US 
$400 million, which is hardly adequate. The use of local currencies could have 
enabled member countries to contribute more to the share capital of the bank. 
But this method of making contributions was not favoured.
IMPACT OF COMPETITIVE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND 
DEVALUATION
Structural adjustment has entailed liberalisation of foreign trade, aimed at 
facilitating imports and stimulating exports. Trade liberalisation is also 
expected to stimulate industrial development which should, other things being 
equal, increase business with neighbouring countries in the long run. Specific 
details of trade liberalisation have varied from country to country. But the 
following have been common features: decontrol of prices, movement away 
from quantitative controls (quotas) on imports to (reduced) tariffs, increasing 
the list of commodities on the Open General Licence, and increasing 
allocation of foreign exchange. Not many countries (perhaps Malawi is the 
only exception) have completed the process of trade liberalisation as detailed 
above. Characteristically, structural adjustment programmes in all countries 
have not addressed other features of restrictive exchange and payments 
systems, which they should, such as prescription of acceptable currencies, the 
requirement' that all foreign currency receipts must be surrendered to 
authorised dealers within a given period, authorization for funds in respect of 
payment for invisible transactions and restrictions on outward capital transfers.
Furthermore, according to Boidin (1988), trade liberalisation measures may 
have reduced the size of preferential margins and hence encouraged trade 
outside the SADCC and PTA rather than within these blocks. At the same 
time, because they have been decided unilaterally, trade liberalisation
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measures may have increased the asymmetry of access systems and missed the 
opportunity of increasing reciprocal trade among member states.
In addition, structural adjustment programmes have involved a reduction in 
the role of the state in economic activity and greater reliance on private 
enterprise in productive investment in PTA and SADCC member states. 
Official planning of industrial development has led to the development of 
industries that are similar and competitive because it has not been properly 
coordinated. Using private enterprise to plan industrial development may lead 
to different choices and, therefore, to production structures that are more 
complementary and more consistent with the development of trade in the long 
term.
Almost all structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes have aimed at 
improving the balance of payments. The result of the measures that have 
been adopted, including currency devaluation, have so far not been very 
satisfactory. Either there has been minimal improvement or there has been 
satisfactory improvement, but not sustained improvement. Competitive edge 
gained by one country has been offset by subsequent devaluations of other 
countries. In addition, given low elasticities of supply of exports, devaluation 
has not had the intended effect. Protectionism, growing competition from 
other developing regions and the emergence of a service economy in 
developed countries have all made it difficult to find markets for exports. 
Import-substitution industrialisation has led to further imports of capita and 
intermediate goods rather than to a reduction in imports. In the long run, 
what will be needed is to reduce the predominance of the commercial and 
trading activities in the regional economies, and to develop intermediate goods 
industries and to raise productivity in raw materials producing sectors.
Lastly, reduction in the rate of inflation, which rarely featured in earlier IMF 
and World Bank supported programmes, now features prominently. In the 
reform programme where currency devaluation is a key policy measure, the 
programme itself generates inflation until it is completed. Nonetheless, the 
inflation expectations that are created in this process can be reduced by taking 
measures to reduce hoarding of goods, price hedging, and others.
t r a d e  d iv e r s io n  a n d  t r a d e  c r e a t io n
SADCC efforts to increase intra-regional trade have been limited to multi-year 
purchase agreements and other bilateral barter deals of which there have not 
been many. Export pre-financing revolving funds in countries that lack such 
funds and an export credit facility have yet to be established, while a sector to 
co-o] iate trade was identified only a few years ago.
Total formal intra-SADCC regional trade has barely increased and remains at 
less than 5 per cent of the total foreign trade of the group. (Since informal
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trade is significant - may be up to 40 per cent of the total foreign trade of 
some member states - the actual level of intra-SADCC regional trade is higher 
and has probably increased due to causes other than SADCC). There is 
evidence of trade diversion and trade creation, but these may have occurred 
less because of SADCC efforts and more because of PTA and SACU policies.
Trade data for the early years of life of PTA indicates that the overall impact 
of trade liberalisation and promoting measures has been limited. Between 
1984 and 1987, the volume and value (at constant UAPTA exchange rate) of 
total intra-PTA trade did not change. However, significant shifts in intra-PTA 
trade shares occurred. Burundi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
experienced gains in their import and export trade shares. Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia and Uganda saw their import and export trade 
shares fall. The rest had export and import shares moving in opposite 
directions or not moving at all.
The countries that have experienced gains in their exports to the region are 
generally those with comparatively large manufacturing sectors. Mauritius 
should have been in this group, but non-tariff barriers to its exports have been 
erected. Those that did not experience gains in their exports to the region 
either had small, uncompetitive manufacturing sectors or faced non-tariff 
barriers from other countries in the region.
These shifts in trade illustrate the familiar costs of economic integration that 
are bound to occur as SADCC starts co-ordinating fiscal policies to promote 
intra-regional trade. One major economic cost is the terms-of-trade effect 
whereby some member countries pay more in buying from within the region 
at higher prices than the ones they would pay external sources. Other major 
economic costs are the loss in customs duty revenue that arises from trade 
diversion, and the unequal distribution of income and excise duty revenue 
arising from an unfair pattern of distribution of manufacturing industries. To 
compensate for loss of revenue, it is necessary to institute arrangements to 
collect customs and excise duty revenue into a common pool from which each 
country should receive a share based on the volume of its trade. To deal with 
uneven industrial development, policies should be adopted to enable each raw 
material producing member country carry out beneficiation within its 
boundaries, to allow for the imposition of specific protective tariffs on goods 
originating outside the region, and to allow member countries to impose 
protective duties against goods originating within the region. Sales taxes might 
be designed by individual member countries in such a way as to serve the 
same purpose. In addition, the establishment of financial institutions to fund 
the industrial development of the least developed member states, a common 
means of approaching this problem, must be pursued by SADCC.
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SACU, (made up of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland) represents a more advanced form of economic integration 
compared to PTA. The common external tariff and the absence of tariff 
barriers within the union have facilitated trade diversion and trade creation. 
But the benefits of this process have been uneven. The smaller member states 
obtain almost all their imports from South Africa, where most of the industrial 
plants are located. When South Africa was under sanctions, a number of 
industries were established in the smaller member countries, but as a result of 
the changing socio-political conditions, they are now closing down.
South Africa compensates the other member states for the loss in revenue. 
Although substantial tax revenue flows from the arrangement, there is a 
substantial opportunity cost involved. This includes the payment of higher 
than world prices for goods from South African sources, and a loss of ability 
to develop manufacturing industries. During the first half of the last decade, 
the opportunity cost to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland may have been 
estimated to be US$340 million, according to SADCC Survey (1986). In 
addition, there is a loss in fiscal discretion, which is not readily quantifiable. 
The net fiscal gain is not necessarily large because the arrangements provide 
for payment in arrears after the revenue has been eroded by inflation and (in 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) by rand depreciation.
HARMONISATION OF MACROECONOMIC AND SECTORAL 
POLICIES
Around 1986 SADCC decided to give more emphasis directly to productive 
sectors. Raising production in these sectors would, if production structures 
were complementary, lead to an increase in intra-regional trade. At the same 
time, it would lead to more effective use of the transport infrastructure that 
was being rehabilitated.
Following the above decision, seminars were held with businessmen (Victoria 
Falls 1986, Gaborone 1987 and Harare 1988) as a means of obtaining the 
support of the business community for the Programme of Action. As a result, 
a SADCC business council has been established at regional level. 
Furthermore, meetings with the region’s businessmen have been held at 
sectoral levels to determine how they could become more actively involved in 
the implementation of the regional programme.
The 1987 Gaborone identified the following as major impediments to 
^vestment and production in the region:
foreign exchange shortages which discourage investment by limiting the 
ability of businessmen to import inputs, and hence leading to capacity 
under-utilization;
(b) over-valued exchange rates which distort relative prices and encourage 
consumption rather than production;
(c) unfavourable attitudes towards local and foreign business enterprises 
whose profit motive is frowned upon;
(d) bureaucratic red tape which delays or frustrates the implementation of 
business projects;
(e) high import duties for capital goods which undermine financial viability;
(f) restrictions on repatriation of dividends which are a major disincentive 
in high risk and long gestation projects;
(g) lack of realistic pricing policies in agriculture that would favour 
produced and lack of suitable finance for agriculture;
(h) heavy foreign debt obligations that make many countries unattractive 
to investors; and
(i) lack of good transport and communications systems, educated and 
trained manpower.
With regard to policies, the seminar recommended that member states should:
(a) revise and harmonise their investment codes to make them realistic and 
uniform;
(b) improve investment incentives especially for long gestation projects; 
and
(c) fix realistic exchange rates and commodity prices.
While with respect to mobilisation of resources, the seminar proposed, among
other things that:
(a) a mechanism should be established for making equity capital available 
to investors;
(b) more resources should be channelled into the productive sector; and
(c) member states should facilitate the free movement of capital and 
management skills within the region (SADCC, 1987).
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REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES
SADCC has taken steps to harmonise the investment policies of member 
states with a view to ensuring that:
(a) appropriate incentives are being offered to potential investors;
(b) competition among member states is minimised; and
(c) uniformity in incentives to ensure that ultimately investment decisions 
on where to locate should be based on comparative advantage, even 
though fiscal incentives would play in important role in attracting 
investors to the region. SADCC has also taken steps to facilitate the 
freer movement of business in the region and to promote cross-border 
investment.
The process of improving investment incentives and harmonisation of those 
incentives has started, but is far from complete. Of the SADCC member 
states, Botswana and Malawi have the lowest company income tax rate of 35 
per cent as compared to 45 per cent in Zimbabwe and 40 per cent in Zambia. 
Under structural adjustment programmes, these tax rates are subject to review. 
Botswana has an additional branch tax set at 15 per cent of net profit. Of the 
other countries, Lesotho and Swaziland have done the most to come close to 
Botswana, while Tanzania is similar to Zambia. Malawi has introduced further 
generous tax concessions for Export Processing Zones and for manufacturing 
under bond.
Several countries discriminate against foreign investment by maintaining 
withholding taxes on remittances of dividends or interest. In Botswana, these 
taxes vary from 10 per cent to 25 per cent. Zambia has higher withholding tax 
rates of 20 per cent on dividends and 30 per cent on interest and other 
remittances. Other countries have lower rates of 15 per cent, for instance 
Malawi, and 10 - 15 per cent for Lesotho and Swaziland. Such discriminatory 
treatment of foreign investment must surely act as a disincentive to investors.
Almost all the member states offer tax and capital allowances. However, the 
application of these allowances is, in number of cases, discriminatory. The 
recent investment act in Zambia extends these benefits to small-scale 
enterprises, but existing large-scale enterprises were originally excluded. In 
other countries, it is not clear that these incentives will apply to small-scale 
enterprises. In Lesotho, these incentives apply mainly to foreign enterprises. 
To have the maximum effect, member countries should ensure that they apply 
to all enterprises, irrespective of size and age of the business and of the 
residential status of investors.
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Tax holidays are used only by Zambia (7 years for dividend and 5 years for 
profit taxation), Malawi and Swaziland (5 years). Also rarely used are export 
subsidies (Zimbabwe), foreign exchange retention schemes (Angola, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and an export guarantee 
scheme (Zimbabwe). Also not applied throughout the region are double 
taxation agreements, investment insurance and investment guarantee.
In support of economic reform programmes, both bilateral and multilateral 
donors have made more foreign exchange available to most of the countries 
in the region. But this falls short of demand. In an attempt to generate more 
foreign exchange for themselves, a number of countries have introduced 
foreign exchange retention schemes as stated above. While in an attempt to 
provide more foreign exchange for export-oriented activity, export pre­
financing funds have been set up. But these programmes are not meeting the 
whole demand for foreign exchange. Besides, they are confined to a few 
countries, as mentioned above.
With regard to overvaluation of exchange rates, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia 
and South Africa have avoided overvaluation of their exchange rates. 
Zimbabwe corrected the overvaluation of its exchange rate through a 40 per 
cent downward adjustment later in 1991. Zambia has just carried out a 30 per 
cent adjustment of its exchange rate which also reduces overvaluation. 
Tanzania and Mozambique also pursue an active exchange rate policy. The 
rest of the countries in the region need to reduce the overvaluation of their 
currencies through depreciation.
Attitudes towards a free enterprise economy have improved in all the 
countries. Private enterprise is welcome and its sought after. The profit 
motive is not frowned upon. Along with this, bureaucratic red tape which used 
to delay the implementation of business projects has been reduced. One-stop 
investment centres have been established in several countries, including 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Those that have not done so, are in the 
process of setting up such centres.
On the taxation of imported producer goods, the narrow tax base forces many 
countries to tax them. Admittedly, such taxation may jeopardise the financial 
viability of enterprises, especially those with long gestation periods. Import 
duties on capital goods and raw materials have been reduced in a number of 
countries. Others may do well to follow their lead.
Concerning exchange control regulation, normally there are no restrictions on 
inward transfers of capital. However, in a few countries, Angola and 
Tanzania, there are restrictions on the type of investment that foreign 
enterprises can undertake. Outward transfers of capital are restricted, except 
where capital is being repatriated to its country of origin. There are several 
degrees of restriction. Within CMA, there are virtually no restrictions. But
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only South Africa is fairly liberal even in terms of movement of capital to 
countries outside the CMA.
Member countries of the CMA are quite liberal with regard to foreign 
exchange allowances for business and tourist travel, and for remittance of 
dividends and expatriate salaries. Outside of the CMA, Zambia is fairly 
generous with regard to allowances for business travel, Malawi and Zimbabwe 
are generous with allowances for the remittance of dividends. Only 
Mozambique and Malawi are generous with allowances for remittance of 
expatriate salaries. On the whole then, the region has restrictive exchange 
control regimes.
As indicated in Table 2, levels of foreign debt are onerous in Angola, Zambia, 
Mozambique and Tanzania, high in Zimbabwe and Malawi, and modest in the 
rest of the SADCC. In absolute terms, South Africa’s foreign debt is large, 
amounting to US $21 billion, which is about 66 percent of SADCC’s total 
external debt. A large proportion of foreign exchange earnings continued to 
be absorbed in debt servicing. The debt service ratios are particularly large 
for Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania. The debt service ratios 
are comparable low for Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and probably 
South Africa.
Table 2: DEBT INDICATORS 1990
86
Count ry Total Debt 
(US$ Mi 11 ion
EDT/GNP TDS/XGS
Angola 7,710 115.2-j 7 • 51Bo t swana 516 20.6 4 *
Lesotho 390 43.9 2 * ;i
Ma 1awi 1,544 85.6 2/ .3
Mozamb ique 4,718 384.5 14.4
Swaz i1 and 272 40.1 5.9
Tanzani a 5,866 264.2 25.8
Zamb i a 7,223 216 .2 12.8
Zimbabwe 3,199 54.8 24.4
South Af r ica 20,597 22.7
------------- -— a
l Refers to 1989 date
Notes: EDT/GNP - Total External Debt to Gross National Product.
TDS/XGS - Total Debt Service to Exports of Goods and 
Services, also called the debt service ratio.
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables. 1991-92
A number of debt-relief measures have been proposed and some have even 
implemented. But it is widely agreed now that these measures are inadequate 
for the poorest member countries. Under the so-called Toronto Terms, up to 
one-third of the value of debt may be written-ott, with two-tnrrds rescheduled 
at commercial rates of interest over 14 years. So far, only a handful of low- 
income countries have rescheduled their debts under these terms. The 
multiple options are criticised for creating discrepancies in the level of 
sacrifice among creditors, and for the time consuming and the costly annual 
rescheduling. More significantly, although debt servicing has been made 
easier, the stock of debt and the interest bill have continued to rise as more 
arrears of built-up interest are capitalised m subsequent rescheduling. No 
wonder that the annual benefit to Sub-Saharan Africa has been a meagre 
US$100 million. For this reason, the Paris Club has been urged to extend 
concessionality beyond Toronto Terms. The alternative to the Toronto Pact 
may be the Trinidad Terms under which two-thirds of the debt would be 
written off and the balance rescheduled over 25 years. The entire eligible 
stock of debt would be reschedule at once.
The criteria for rescheduling, which included qualification under Toronto 
Terms, pursuit of IMF policies, GNP per capita of less than US$610, and a 
debt-service ratio of 25 per cent or more imply that several indebted Southern 
African countries may not qualify. For some, such as Mozambique, the
87
foreign debt burden is so onerous that even the Trinidad Terms would not 
solve the problem. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the debt is owed 
to multilateral institutions, mainly the IMF and World Bank. Under their 
rules, this debt cannot be rescheduled. Debt owing to private institutions 
would also not be affected by the Trinidad Terms. A World Bank scheme for 
countries to buy back their debt has had limited impact. The IMF has a 
scheme of assist borrowers in arrears only, not those that are servicing their 
debt to it. Concern has also been expressed that Trinidad rescheduling may 
be lead to a reduction in the flow of new aid.
In view of what has been expressed above, there is need for other measures 
to solve the debt crisis. One such measure is the cancellation of all official 
bilateral and semi-official debt, and the writing down of commercial debt at 
rates that are commensurate with the discounted level of these debts in 
secondary markets. The other is that multilateral debt should be reduced 
through means that the international community should find.
On the issue of agricultural pricing and credit, most member states have taken 
steps to adjust producer prices upward, the most recent being those that have 
been taken in Zambia and Zimbabwe. The provision of agricultural credit, 
especially to smallholder farmers, continues to be inadequate. Foreign funding 
of agricultural credit scheme is inadequate. Recovery of loans is unsatisfactory 
except where group credit schemes are in place. There may be need to 
involve more financial institutions, formal, semi-formal and informal, in the 
delivery of farm credit and to place more reliance on the use of locally 
mobilised resources.
Lastly, as regards lack of good transport and communications, the SADCC 
programme in transport has largely entailed rehabilitation of existing harbours 
and railways rather than creation of new facilities. Several countries in the 
region have also been concerned with the maintenance of the existing stock 
of roads and other transport infrastructure rather than with improving or 
creating new ones. In other sectors, such as telecommunications and energy, 
new assets have been created under the auspices of SADCC, but these are not 
necessarily operated efficiently.
f r e e  m o v e m e n t  o f  f a c t o r s  o f  p r o d u c t io n
The movement of factors of production across national frontiers substitutes for 
the movement of goods. To the receiving country, the receipt of factors of 
production from other countries enable it to raise production and income as 
this does not displace local factors of production. To the sending country, 
there can be a net increase in income (from remittances) if it has a surplus of 
factors of production. If it is short of factors of production, the net benefit 
from the exodus of factors of production may not be significant. Otherwise, 
the intra-regional movement of factors of production should, in theory, help
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to promote efficient allocation of resources and to reduce inequality in factor 
earnings.
Nevertheless, there are good arguments against allowing completely free 
movement of certain factors of production, especially labour. First, given high 
rates of unemployment in the region, it is desirable to safeguard employment 
for nationals, on which the social stability of the host country may depend. 
Second, uncontrolled migration of labour may exacerbate an already high rate 
of unemployment in the host country, which represents a waste of human 
resources. Third, labour migration may worsen existing problem of shortages 
of urban housing and other urban facilities. Should the rate of unemployment 
decline to the bare minimum in the future, then it will be the time to liberalise 
the movement of labour.
The movement of capital, which is not subject to the same problems as the 
movement of labour, can be liberalised much earlier. The movement of 
capital within the C o mmon (now Multilateral) Monetary Area is relatively 
free. Elsewhere in the region, restrictive exchange control regulations and the 
absence of a com m on currency rule out free movement of capital. These 
problems must be addressed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, all member states of SADCC suffer from inflation. With a few 
exceptions for instance Botswana, member states also suffer from internal and 
external financial imbalances. These problems are partly rooted in the 
structural and institutional weaknesses of the economies of member states.
A number of these countries have adopted structural adjustment programmes 
to address their economic problems. In the absence of a federal-type political 
entity, and given differences in the nature, time and severity of the economic 
problems, the programmes have been formulated and implemented as national 
programmes.
Various policy reforms have attempted to improve the competitiveness of the 
member states. But without compensatory policy reforms in the other states, 
they have had the effect of reducing the overall competitiveness of the region 
or of encouraging competitive reforms which can be costly. In these particular 
cases, co-ordination of policy reforms is necessary, even though, because of the 
competitive nature of the regional economies, North-South relations and 
dependence on the North and the benefits from this will, in the short-term, be 
small. Some loss of national sovereignty cannot be avoided in attempting to 
coordinate policy reforms. What does all this imply for regional relations in 
post-apartheid?
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For historical, geographical and other reasons, several national economies in 
Southern Africa are integrated with the South African economy. The SADCC 
region is the market for 10 per cent of South Africa’s exports (40 per cent of 
gold is excluded). Trade between the SADCC region and South Africa is 
unbalanced to the extent that the latter is a market for only 7 per cent of the 
former’s exports which is much smaller in volume terms. In terms of trade, 
the degree of integration among SADCC member countries is more limited, 
represented by less than 5 per cent of total external trade.
To further the integration of their economies, member states formed SADCC 
in 1980 and 8 out of 10 are members of PTA formed in 1982. Both 
organisations have not been in existence long enough to have a marked impact 
on economic integration. Besides, PTA tariff and non-tariff policies a direct 
involvement in the development of trade and key productive sectors have been 
inadequate. Total trade among PTA member states has not increased and 
remains at less than 5 per cent of their external trade. SADCC has been 
successful in rehabilitating railway lines and harbours, developing 
telecommunications and interconnecting national electricity grids. The effort 
to develop industry and trade has been inadequate. In addition, droughts, 
destabilisation and unfavourable regional and world economic conditions have 
all frustrated the efforts of SADCC. The decision taken in 1991 by SADCC 
to get involved in macroeconomic and sectoral policy planning and co­
ordination reflects the realisation that stronger measures must be taken to 
increase regional economic integration.
Several problems he ahead for SADCC. Structural and institutions features 
of Southern African Economies will pose problems if one of the free market 
approaches to economic integration is adopted. Several countries, for 
example, depend on taxes on international trade for a significant proportion 
of government revenue. For countries for which recent (1989) data has been 
made available by the World Bank (1991), the degree of dependence is 55.7 
per cent in Lesotho, 15.8 per cent in Malawi and Zambia, 12.1 per cent in 
Botswana, 17.1 per cent in Zimbabwe and 3.8 per cent in South Africa. Thus, 
for the majority, the degree of dependence on trade taxes would make them 
reluctant to cut customs duties.
The weak balance of payments and foreign reserve position of most of the 
countries in the region would constrain intra-regional trade, unless 
mTangements that increase the availability of foreign exchange or save foreign 
exchange for promoting such trade were boosted. Based on the World Bank 
(1991), with the exception of South Africa and Botswana, all countries in the 
egion incurred current account deficits on their balance of payments in 1989.
Historical relations with Europe, as Mandaza (1987) has explained, pose a 
1 rious constraint to regional economic integration as well. Southern African 
e onomies were from the 19th century developed as colonial economies to
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supply the mother European countries with raw materials and to provide 
markets for European goods. They were developed with European capital and 
expertise. Transport and communications were developed to link them with 
Europe, while financial institutions were established to finance colonial trade. 
These relations have been maintained after independence. For most of the 
SADCC member states, more than 50 per cent of total imports originate in the 
OECD member countries and more than 60 per cent of exports are sold to the 
same.
This historical pattern of trade has a number of adverse implications. First, 
it does imply that most of the Southern African countries produce similar raw 
materials. Several industrial products are also similar. Thus, to a significant 
extent they are competitive rather than complementary. Second, it is easier 
to trade with the OECD than with neighbouring countries because the physical 
and financial infrastructures have been developed to facilitate this rather than 
intra-regional trade. Third, Southern African consumers are more attached 
culturally to goods originating in the OECD member countries than to those 
that originating within the region.
North-South historical relations are reinforced by dependence created by 
foreign aid and technology. Most bilateral aid is tied to goods supplied by the 
donor countries. Recently, the value of imports of Southern African countries 
that originate in the OECD has increased significantly because of increased 
aid flows that represent structural adjustment co-financing with multilateral 
lending institutions.
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Annex 1: Exchange Rates and Exchange Arrangements in Southern
Africa.
December 28. 1990.
Member (currency)
Currency
Pegged
to
Exchange
Rate
Exchange Rate
Otherwise
Determined
Angola (Kwanza) US$ 29.99
Botswana (Pula) basket 1.87
Lesotho (Loti) rand 1.00
Malawi (Kwacha) basket 2.65
Mozambique (Metical)1 
Namibia (Rand) 
Swaziland (Lilangeni) rand 1.00
Tanzania (Shilling) basket 196.60
Zambia (Kwacha) 1 60.97 43.14
Zimbabwe (Dollar) basket 2.64
South Africa (Rand)2 basket 2.56
Adjusted according to a set of indicators 
Floating
Source: IMF Survey, April 1, 1991, p.96
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Annex 2 : Comparative Exchange Rate Performance
in SADCC Member States, 1965 - 1990
(Over 100 denotes overvaluation, under 100 denotes under devaluation)
Year Iesotho Malawi Swazi land 'Tanzania Zanbla Zimbabwe
1965 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1966 98.83 101.61 100.20 90.90 138.85 99.7
1967 96.31 101.89 98.64 105.04 150.26 102.37
1968 96.82 114.69 100.37 111.27 196.37 100.5
1969 96.29 110.69 99.86 139.32 208.15 100.9
1970 93.53 127.90 97.83 128.87 205.01 101.5
1971 103.89 131.93 109.09 141.41 197.72 114.8
1972 88.72 127.06 92.50 152.66 176.44 96.9
1973 80.50 141.25 92.04 169.07 243.83 112.3
1974 85.76 175.64 102.99 173.97 202.08 121.1
1975 95.75 164.59 113.94 183.14 266.06 141.3
1976 84.17 153.15 94.31 211.26 245.23 140.2
1977 91.39 194.27 105.93 223.47 225.31 135.3
1978 93.12 164.38 103.12 215.28 180.11 125.9
1979 91.73 145.72 102.28 273.56 217.93 112.0
1980 87.38 127.60 99.90 307.83 165.85 114.2
1981 99.23 160.58 118.43 377.16 165.31 110.3
1982 85.81 142.04 104.35 398.79 228.57 116.7
1983 102.84 121.24 118.71 402.55 206.31 • 93.9
1984 122.45 167.57 143.39 314.78 161.96 102.5
1985 119.70 160.39 146.22 319.07 80.14 100.7
1986 103.66 139.72 120.79 195.55 55.46 90.6
1987 108.37 144.34 126.53 113.56 98.77 80.6
1988 113.02 146.33 135.71 96.03 135.25 99.6
1989 77.88 162.96 92.51 97.09 128.50 114.9
1990 80.02 175.51 90.91 104.03 113.46 124.6
Source: PTA (1990), p. 29.
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Annex 3: State of Exchanfie Rate Disparities Between Member States and
Adjustments Back of Equilibrium " *------
Country
Index of 
Under valu­
ation.
Adjustment
(%)
Country
Index of 
Over valu­
ation.
Adjustment
(%)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Burundi 92.23 8.42 Ethiopia 168.62 -40.56
Lesotho 80.02 24.97 Kenya 123.62 -19.11
Somalia 50.74 97.08 Malawi 175.51 -43.02
Swaziland 90.91 10.00 Mauritius 102.25 -02.20
Rwanda 291.63 -65.71
Tanzania 104.03 -03.87
Uganda 111.50 -10.31
Zambia 113.46 -11.86
Zimbabwe 124.61 -19.65
Source: PTA (1990), p.65
Annex 4: Estimated Levels of Stable Central Bank Credit to Central Government
(Based on 1970-1988 data, Inflation is assumed at 10%) 
Simulated Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP
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Country 1% 2%
Compare
3%
Present rate of 
credit expansion
Burundi 18.3% 18.4% 18.4% 8.6%
Ethiopia 16.3% 16.4% 16.5% 11.7%
Kenya 22.2% 22.4% 22.6% 20.8%
Lesotho 7.1% 7.3% 7.4% 22.1%
Malawi 20.7% 20.8% 20.9% 14.8%
Mauritius 14.6% 14.6% 14.7% -56.3%
Rwanda 9.5% 9.5% 9.6% 21.7%
Somalia 18.4% 18.8% 19.0% 55.9%
Swaziland 21.3% 21.4% 21.5% -19.8%
Tanzania 22.0% 22.1% 22.3% 27.3%
Uganda 21.2% 22.8% 24.1% 88.4%
Zambia 17.8% 17.8% 17.9% 27.8%
Zimbabwe 10.2% 10.4% 10.6% 10.6%
Source: PTA (1990), p.69
y D
-Annex 5: Central Bank Credit: to Central Government
(Simulated at 15% of Previous Year's Fiscal Revenue) 
Values in millions of National Currencies
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Burundi
1. 15V of Previous
Year's Revenue 1657 1716 1848 2107 1928 2453 2887 3470 30092. Actual Credit 5808 7959 9299 12355 14588 17119 16414 17161 158373. Difference 
Swazi land
-4150 -6243 -7451 -10248 -12660 -14666 -13527 -13691 -12828
1. 15V of Previous
Year's Revenue 19 22 20 27 27 32 35 37 492. Actual Credit 5 6 7 7 20 26 32 12 43. Difference 
Uqanda
14 16 13 20 7 6 3 25 45
1. 15V of Previous
Year's Revenue 4 6 4 37 79 135 243 427 7512. Actual Credit 127 232 328 866 334 2814 4736 6044 176053. Difference 
Zambia
1. 15V of Previous
-123 -226 -324 -829 -255 -2679 -4493 -5617 16845
Year's Revenue 89 115 121 126 152 164 234 454 6232. Actual Credit 1183 1394 1657 2009 2419 5327 6699 3966 64573. Difference -1094 -1279 -1536 -1883 -2267 -5163 -6465 -3912 -5834
92 124 169 227 280 305 320 378 441
122 197 336 290 165 52 92 308 275
-30
73
- 167 -63 115 268 228 70 166
Source; PTA (1990), p.70
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PROMOTING INTRA-SADC TRADE, FOOD SECURITY AND THE 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
GJL Kayira
INTRODUCTION
The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is entering the 
1990s with mixed blessings. It is in the grip of one of the worst drought of this century 
with crops withering, livestock dying, and human life threatened. Moreover, many 
SADCC countries are in the midst of economic policy reforms to place their economies 
on sustainable growth paths and to reverse declining trends experienced in the 1980s. At 
the same time, if the process of change in South Africa is not to be marred by prolonged 
violence and instability and if durable peace can be attained in Angola and Mozambique, 
the Southern Africa region will be on the verge of unprecedented peace and stability. 
Without peace and stability in the region, trade flows will be hampered, the confidence 
of the investors will be undermined, and the full potential of the peoples of the region to 
carry out their economic activities will remain unfulfilled. These mixed blessings call for 
a re-evaluation of three important areas: trade and investment, agricultural production 
and food security, and the transfer of technology which form the focus of this paper.
When SADCC was established in 1980, one of its main objectives was the reduction of 
economic dependency on South Africa (SA). Its dependence on SA, particularly in terms 
of trade, has increased rather than declined. Achieving this objective may no longer be 
relevant in the medium to long term with change of winds sweeping the region. 
Increasingly, primacy will have to be given to strengthening regional cooperation and 
integration. This is in line with the second original objective of SADCC aimed at forging 
of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration. There are wide disparities 
in economic development among member states. For instance, GNP per capita in 
Mozambique is only US$80 (1990) while that of Botswana is US$2,040 (1990) and that 
of SA is US$2,530 (1990). Equitable integration will not be achieved if market forces 
alone are allowed to determine the outcome. Market-led cooperation and integration will 
need to be complemented by selective governmental interventions designed, among other 
things, to create enabling environments and to transfer resources from the rich to the 
poor member states. Experience shows that if the perception of some member states is 
that they are major losers, then efforts to integrate the economies will tend to falter.
Increasing intra-SADCC trade has so far proven to be fraught with problems. Attracting 
investment has proved difficult, and achieving food security has been intractable. The 
central questions are: what has been the pattern of trade and investment? Are SADCC 
economies competitive or complementary? What are prospects for achieving food 
sea This paper intends to reflect on some of the issues behind these questions and 
to provide some perspectives.
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The rest of the structure of the paper is as follows: section II analyses trade and 
investment issues. Trade and Technology issues are also discussed. Section El analyses 
issues on agricultural production and food security. Section IV draws some conclusions.
PROMOTING INTRA-SADCC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
In the late 1980s, SADCC made a policy decision to encourage promotion of trade 
among the member states. Despite the efforts to increase intra-SADCC trade, it has 
remained dismally low, not exceeding 5 percent of the total external trade. A large 
proportion of this intra-SADCC trade is attributable to Zimbabwe, which has a relatively 
broader industrial base compared with other SADCC countries. This allows Zimbabwe 
to have comparative advantage over other SADCC countries.
While formal trade statistics indicate that there trade among SADCC countries is very 
low, qualitative observations would suggest that unrecorded transborder trade (UTT) is 
vibrant and probably modestly high. It could be a very large proportion of total foreign 
trade of some of the SADCC countries. Growth in UTT could be linked directly to policy 
distortions. Among these the major ones are overvalued exchange rates, lower prices paid 
to farmers which encourage diversion of production across borders, wide price 
differentials induced by inflation, and impediments to lawful international trade.
The volume of trade between South Africa and SADCC countries is larger than intra- 
SADCC trade. South Africa’s export to SADCC region amount to about US$2 billion 
per annum, while its imports from the region are about US$350 million. At present, 
South Africa represents about 25-30 percent of total SADCC imports and 7 percent of 
SADCC’s exports. The balance of trade has been in favour of South Africa.
Moreover, economies of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland have strong trade 
links with South Africa through the South Africa Customs Union created in 1910 (see 
Table 1). For Botswana, about 90 percent of imports come from South Africa, for 
Lesotho, at least 90 percent of total trade (imports and exports) is with South Africa, and 
for Swaziland around 85 percent of imports come from South Africa. And in terms of 
foreign investment - another indicator of the degree of dependence — South African 
corporations are the largest investors in these three countries as well as in Namibia.
TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF BLS TRADE WITH
RSA
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BOTSWANA LESOTHO SWAZILAND
Year Import Export Import Export Import Export
1980
1981 87 7 99 64 77 24
1982 92 17 99 62 83 32
1983 91 12 99 64 83 35
1984 84 8 99 99 84 31
1985 88 10 99 99 91 31
1986 87 7 99 91 80 28
1987 93 7 99 92 90 36
Ave. 96 5 98 91 90 36
90 9 99 83 85 32
Source : Hoohlo, 1991
Although the trade statistics are weak, the structure of SADCCs exports and imports 
suggests that there is a certain degree of diversity in among the economies. For Angola, 
crude oil and coffee account for close to 70 percent of total exports, with crude oil being 
the major commodity. For Botswana, diamonds, copper/nickel, and beef account for 
around 90 percent of total exports, with diamond being the leading export. For Lesotho, 
diamonds, mohair, and wool are the main exports accounting for around 45 percent of 
total exports with mohair being the major export. For Malawi tobacco, tea, and sugar are 
the main exports accounting for around 80 percent of total exports with tobacco being the 
major export. For Mozambique shell fish, base metal ores, and cashew nuts are the main 
exports. Namibia’s leading exports are diamonds together with uranium and 
copper/lead/zinc accounting for over 80 percent of exports. For Tanzania coffee, cotton 
and tea are the main exports accounting for close to 60 percent of total export. Copper 
domains Zambia’s export, accounting over 80 percent of exports while Zimbabwe’s major 
exports are tobacco, asbestos and gold. Most of these commodities are exported to the 
world markets unprocessed or semi-processed, and thus they have low value added.
Table 2 below shows the commodity structure of imports. It is evident that machinery 
and transport equipment are the major category of imports for many of the SADCC 
countries. Food imports are also important for Angola, Botswana and Mozambique. 
Many of the SADCC economies do not have the capacity to produce machinery and 
trail art equipment. These are imported from outside the SADCC region.
TABLE 2: STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS (% of Merchandise Imports), 1989
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Country Pood Fuels
Other
Primary
Commodities
Mach & 
Trans. 
Equipment
Other
Manufacture
Angola 29 3 1 39 28
Botswana 14 6 4 38 38
Lesotho • • • • • • • • • •
Malawi 10 12 1 43 35
Mozambique 35 1 3 34 26
Namibia • • • • • • • • • •
Swaziland • • • • • • • • • •
Zambia • • • • • • • • • •
Zimbabwe 3 1 5 55 36
Source : World Bank, World Development Report. 1991 
.. Data not available
REGIONAL TRADE IN POST-APARTHEID ERA
For the post-apartheid era, the assumption in this paper is that SADCC and South 
Africa wall enter into a regional integration arrangement that would lead to the 
creation of a common market. In this common market, to contribute towards a 
competitive environment, tariff levels should be lower than the ones presently 
existing in SACU. In parallel, no-tariff barriers to trade should also be reduced. 
The central question is whether there will be more trade creation or trade diversion 
in the regional economy.
Trade creation would imply that SADCC countries would increase their imports 
from South Africa and reduce their imports from other SADCC countries. The 
assumption would be that goods from South Africa would be cheaper than those 
produced in SADCC countries because of: (a) reduction of tariffs; (b) unit cost of 
production in South Africa may be lower than in SADCC countries; and (c) opening 
trade links as a result of lifting of sanctions.
Trade diversion would imply that SADCC countries would reduce their imports 
from a low cost supplier from the rest of the world and increase their imports from 
South Africa or other SADCC member countries, even though the cost of 
production could be higher in South Africa or in SADCC than the rest of the world. 
This could be primarily due to imposing high tariffs on imports.
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In practice, there would be both trade-creating effects and trade diversion effects. 
It is generally presumed that if trade creation dominates, efficiency will be 
increased; and if trade diversion dominates, efficiency would fall. However, judging 
the performance of a regional integration by this criterion would be an 
oversimplification as Paul Wonnacott and Marl Lutz (1989, p 28) suggest. They 
point out, "The idea that trade diversion is economically undesirable is based on the 
assumption that tariffs constitute the prevailing barrier to trade. However, as 
quotas and voluntary export restraints (and other non-tariff barriers) become more 
prominent feature of the protective framework, it is no longer clear that trade 
diversion will reduce efficiency."
Flow of trade within the region has been hampered by both tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. The tendency to replace tariff with non-tariff barriers (such as cumbersome 
licensing requirements, work and residence permits, administrative foreign 
exchange allocation, police road blocks, and others) have frustrated trade.
Economies of large scale in production provides a powerful reason why there may 
be improvements in efficiency, even if initially trade diversion may predominate. 
With South Africa and SADCC markets integrated, firms will be able to achieve 
higher levels of capacity utilization or expand their productive capacity and will be 
able to exploit economies of scale, and, thus, become cost competitive by 
international standards. Initially, production costs of these firms may be relatively 
higher than world standards, but over time they could come down -- these are the 
dynamic aspects of integration.
It is also important to note that exchange rate misalignments and balance of 
payments disequilibria may suggest that imports from low cost supplier in monetary 
terms may not reflect the economic costs. It is well known that overvalued 
exchange rates distort relative prices and stifle efforts to increase intra-regional 
trade. Exporters in countries with overvalued currencies tend to get penalized. 
Policies to move towards market determined exchange rates will be critical to 
increase mtra-regional trade in post-apartheid era.
Many SADCC member states are undertaking trade liberalization policies. In 
South Africa, however, in the short to medium term, there appears to be resistance 
to deepening of trade liberalization.22 For instance, in South Africa’s textile 
industry there is a growing apprehension of the industry getting marginalized in the 
face of competition from the East. In the past 18 months, the industry had to 
retrench 20,000 workers. The industry employed 5000,000 workers from growing 
cotton through spinning, weaving, knitting, to making textiles and retailing of 
clothes. With a deep recession and prospects for more job losses, employers and
In support of this proposition, see Trevor Bell, 
"Should South Africa Further Liberalize Its Foreign 
Trade?" Economic Trends Research Group, Working Paper 
no 16, Rhodes University.
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the South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU) reached an 
agreement on limiting the damaging impact of the cheap textiles from the East by 
means of a tariff-quota system. The approach would be in phases. The first phase 
would permit imports at the current rates of duty in quantities agreed by various 
sectors. Imports above the agreed quantities would be subject to higher duties. In 
the second phase, the industry will formulate long term growth plans to make it 
internationally competitive.
CONSTRAINTS TO INTER-SADCC TRADE
The central question is: what are the constraints to intra-SADCC trade? 
Identification of these constraints is critical to formulation and coordination of 
those policies designed to promote regional trade. So far there has been no 
coordination of trade policies among SADCC countries. Each country has pursued 
independent trade policies.
There are many constraints to intra-SADCC trade. A few are highlighted here, and 
these are:
(a) inappropriate macroeconomic policies - overvalued exchange rates are 
probably the most important inhibition to increased trade. It becomes 
difficult to price exports at the official rate from the country with great 
overvaluation;
(b) unwillingness to reduce barriers - both high tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
constrain expansion of trade;
(c) barriers to cross border investment - allowing free movement of investment 
is important to facilitating regional trade;
(d) fear of economic domination - mercantilists trade practices (export more 
and import less) get pursued for fear of economic dom ination. Fear of 
economic domination retards integration;
(e) market access - information about the market opportunities tends to lack 
among the business community, although the SADCC Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry are making commendable efforts to correct the 
weakness; and
(f) lack of currency convertibility - many local businesses have a lot of local 
liquidity, but to import goods they must wait for the central banks to allocate 
them foreign exchange.
DIRECT f o r e ig n  in v e s t m e n t
In many SADCC countries, gross domestic savings have declined, even in certain 
cases they have become negative. To bridge resource gaps, foreign direct 
investment could play a useful role. However, in the 1980s, direct foreign 
investment in SADCC declined. On the average it fell by about 6 percent from an 
aggregate of US$907 million in 1980-84 period to 678 million in 1985-89 period. 
In this latter period, Angola and Zimbabwe experienced severe disinvestments. 
Despite policy efforts by many SADCC governments to offer attractive terms to 
investors, little or no new investment took place. (See Table 3).
TABLE 3: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
(Total for the period, in $mn)
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Country 1980-84 1985 - 89
Angola 373.6 -27.5
Botswana 307.1 354.2
Lesotho 19.4 37.5
Malawi 13.2 1.0
Mozambique 6.3 1.7
Namibia M ,,
Swaziland 47.7 192.3
Tanzania 33.9 10.1
Zambia 106.0 128.8
Zimbabwe -0.2 -20.1
SADCC Total 907.0 678.0
South Africa
944.0 -453.0
Source : C. Stoneman and C. B. Thompson "Southern Africa After Apartheid"
in UN ‘Africa Recover/, Vol. 6 No 1 December, 1991, p 6.
t r a d e  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y
OVERVIEW
inhere are important links between trade, production and technology. Technology 
etermines the production process and the range of products to be produced, 
ese in turn determine the composition of trade and the nature of comparative
advantages.
A SIMPLE MODEL
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TECHNOLOGY --------- »--------  PRODUCTION --
MARKET SIGNALS -------- <-----  TRADE «-----
Within the regional context, trade in technology between South Africa and the 
SADCC economies will be critical in narrowing the gap in economic development. 
The importance of technology to the process of economic development, and 
especially to industrial growth, is universally recognised.
The manufacturing industry offers a wide array of applications of new technology 
to production. Technological development is central to increases in productivity. 
This can be achieved through shifts from low-productivity, traditional activities to 
high productivity modem, dynamic activities, and thus, leading to structural 
transformation. Although the precise workings of the technological forces in the 
development process are not clearly comprehended, some studies have shown that 
about 40-90 percent of economic growth in developed countries is directly 
attributable to application of science and technology.23 It should be pointed out 
that major innovations have been one source of increases in productivity in 
manufacturing, however, ‘minor’ innovations, defined as efforts to gain complete 
mastery of given technologies, adapting them and making incremental 
improvements have been equally important.
Investment in research and development (R & D), leading to innovations (shifts in 
the production possibility curve), is considered the main determinant in 
technological progress. Since SADCC countries spend very little on indigenous R 
& D, they lag dismally behind the international technological frontiers in many 
productive activities. To the extent that in SADCC there is dearth of technology 
innovators, technological progress will depend increasingly on the transfer of 
existing and new technologies in the form of equipment ( disembodied technology), 
know-how and skills (embodied technology) from industrialized and the newly 
industrialized countries. The capacity to absorb technology will determine the 
choice of the technology to be imported. Technological absorption will in turn 
require the recipients to allocate adequate resources in acquiring new skills and 
knowledge, and in building new institutional structures which will rapidly respond 
to new global innovations. Irrespective of the level of development, application of 
science and technology (whether in industry, agriculture, transport, communication, 
and others) constitutes a major driving force behind long term economic growth and 
development.
J.B Clark, "The Intra-regional Transfer 
Technology," in Africa Insight Vol 21 no 1 1991 p
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The process of technological assimilation, which generally leads to adaptations and 
improvements, is by necessity a firm-level process. Technology transfer will not 
take place if firms lack the capacity to select the technologies they need; if they lack 
the technical and managerial capabilities to implement the technology that has been 
transferred; if they lack the knowledge of the right combinations of the technical 
packages; and even worse, they may not even pay the right price for the technology 
due to ignorance. It is useful for analytical and policy purposes to focus at the firm 
level.
When the new technologies ( i.e. new products, processes or scale of operations) 
will be transferred from the new South Africa to the SADCC region, gaining of 
mastery of that technology will be critical. It will require enterprises to develop 
new skills technical as well as managerial and organizational skills. In many cases, 
the formal bases for skills acquisition will be human resources development ( say, 
graduate engineers in relevant fields) in parallel with a great deal of on-the-job or 
formal training, research, experimentation, design, standardization of components 
and other related functions. Dynamic efficiency implies continuous adaptations to 
the technology to cope with changing conditions in the product and factor markets. 
This, in turn, requires improvements and additions to new product lines, applying 
different process technologies or raw materials, diversifying the scope of the 
operations all in the quest to increase efficiency and productivity.
SPENDING ON R & D
Spending on R & D is a measure of the efforts to innovate and shift the 
production frontiers. Industrialized countries spend close to 3 percent of their gross 
domestic product (GDP) on research and development. While South Africa spends 
close to 1 percent of its GDP on R & D, qualitative estimates seem to suggest that 
SADCC countries spend much less. In contrast, South Korea spends more on 
R & D than the USA, in relative terms. By the turn of the century, South Korea 
plans to spend in excess of 4.5 percent of its GDP on R & D. The central issue is 
the capacity to increase expenditure on R & D to accelerate industrial 
development.
In SADCC countries a large share of expenditure on R & D is undertaken by the 
public sector; the private sector plays a very insignificant role. Even, in South 
Africa, government spending on R & D is 72 percent of the total expenditure, 
while the private sector spends only 28 percent. In contrast, countries such as 
Japan, USA, UK and Germany, the private sector accounts for 60 to 80 percent 
of the expenditure, and the government makes up the balance. It is important to 
note that at present South Africa spends about 60 percent of the total research and 
development money spent on the African continent. The dominance of investment 
in R & D in South Africa implies that there is a large potential intra-regional 
technology transfer in the Southern Africa region (Clark, p 20).
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TRADE BASED ON TECHNOLOGICAL INTENSITIES
Trade in technology between South Africa and the SADCC countries will also take 
place as an integral part of goods traded within the region and foreign investment 
It is useful to classify the goods traded by the level of technology intensities. The 
high technology part of industry comprise aerospace, office equipment and 
machines, electronic components, instruments, electrical machinery and others, 
Medium technology part of industry refers to automobile industry, chemicals, non­
electrical machinery, rubber, plastics, and non-ferrous metals. Low technology pan 
of industry refers to stone, clay, and glass industries, and food, beverages, and 
tobacco processing, textiles, shipbuilding and petroleum refining, and assembly type 
of activities.
Intra-regional trading patterns, based on technology intensities, reflect the level of 
technological development (see Table 4). South Africa’s exports to the SADCC 
region have predominantly fallen in the medium technology category, with some 
activity on the low technology, and little in the high technology category. As a 
reflection of the low level of technological capabilities existing in SADCC, its 
exports to South Africa have been mostly in the low level category.
TABLE 4: PATTERNS OF SOUTH AFRICA EXPORTS TO SELECTED
SADCC Countries Based On Technological Intensities. 1985
A
Tech
Low Tech. Medium Tech. High
Zimbabwe 70% 25% 5%
Zambia 32% 86% 0%
Malawi 40% 55% 5%
Swaziland 85% 15% 0%
*
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PATTERNS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S IMPORTS FROM SELECTED 
COUNTRIES BASED ON TECHNOLOGICAL INTENSITIES, 1985
B.
Tech
Low Tech. Medium Tech. High
Zimbabwe 87% 12% 1%
Zambia 100% 0% 0%
Malawi 100% 0% 0%
Swaziland 85% 5% 0%
Source: J.P. Clark, "Intra-regional Transfer of Technology" in Africa Insight
vol. 21 no 1, 1991 p.23-24.
THE CHALLENGE TO IMPROVING FOOD SECURITY
Increasing SADCC’s capacity to feed itself has been one of the highest priorities. 
Yet the crisis in SADCC’s agricultural production continues. In many SADCC 
countries food production has either stagnated or declined, resulting in cereal 
imports. For many SADCC countries cereal imports have increased by more than 
four fold between 1974 and 1989. This has contributed to diversion of valuable 
foreign exchange from investment and other expenditures which are critical to long­
term development. For instance, in Angola cereal imports rose from 149,000 
metric tons in 1974 to 248,000 metric tonnes in 1989, Correspondingly. Angola’s 
food aid cereals imports rose from zero in 1974 to 79,00 metric tonnes in 1989. (See 
Table 5).
The rate of population has been growing faster than that of food production. As 
a result the index of food production per capita in all SADCC countries has 
declined. If this trend is not reversed, the food plight of SADCC will likely worsen. 
In the early 1980s, SADCC focused on food self-sufficiency. It became apparent 
that this objective could not be achieved - witness the growth in cereal imports. In 
the late 1980s, SADCC policy shifted to food security, which can be defined as 
access by all people at all times to sufficient food for an active and healthy 
population. T ie  essential elements of the programmes of food security include 
increasing in food production and distribution, and raising of incomes in both rural 
and urban areas. SADCC has yet to achieve food security.
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The current drought has placed food security on high priority and has demonstrated 
the need for efficient food security coordination. It has put the SADCC early 
warning system to an acid test. There is an open question on the effectiveness of 
this early warning system.
According to UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates, the region’s 
total food input requirements could exceed 8 million tonnes of grain over the 
coming year, which is four times than normal (see Table 6). Part of these imports 
will come from commercial purchases. But given the limited financial capabilities 
of most countries, they will be forced to appeal to donors for more food aid. This 
is coming at the time when traditional source of aid are overburdened by 
commitments to other regions such as the Horn of Africa and former Soviet Union.
TABLE 5: SADCC AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
Value added in Cereal imparts Pood Aid in Average index of
agriculture (metric tens cereal ('000s food production
Country (millions OS$) '000s) of metric per capita
tons) (1979 - 81=100)
1970 - 1989 1987 - 89
Angola _ _ 149.00 248.00 0.00 79.00 94.00
Botswana+ 28.00 75.00 21.00 77.00 5.00 33.00 68.00
Lesotho 23.00 83.00* 45.00 140.00 14.00 34.00 80.00
Malawi 119.00 498.00 17.00 86.00 0.00 217.00 85.00
Mozambique - 704.00 62.00 400.00 34.00 424.00 83.00
Namibia - 187.00 - 0.00 - - 95.00
Swaziland - - - - - - -
Tanzania 473.00 1795.00* 431.00 83.00 148.00 76.00 90.00
Zambia+ 191.00 617.00 93.00 123.00 5.00 66.00 97.00
Zimbat**2 214.00 664.00 56.00 52.00 0.00 0.00 90.00
Source : World Bank, World Deve lotxnent Report 1991, pp 210 - 211
Note : + Value added in agriculture data are at purchaser values
* Figures are for years other than those specified.
TABLE 6: SOUTHERN AFRICA'S FOOD GAP
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Angola 270
Botswana 200
Lesotho 230
Malawi 500*
Mozambique 1,000
Namibia 100
South Africa 4,000
Swaziland 100
Zambia 6,800
Zimbabwe 1,250
* Does not include food aid for Mozambique refugees.
Note: Based on FAO estimates as of March 1992.
Source: United Nations, Africa Recovery. Vol. 6 No 1 April, 1992.
Hardest hit by drought are Zimbabwe and South Africa, which traditionally are the largest 
grain exporters. Large parts of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, and Mozambique have also been 
affected by drought. All these countries are expected to incur serious crop losses. President 
Nujoma of Namibia has warned that his country faces a crisis of unprecedented proportions, 
and declared a national drought emergency.
Although other regions have experienced crop failure, Tanzania has recently benefited from 
widespread rains in the major crop producing areas. Tanzania’s estimates of possible import 
requirements over the next year are not yet available. On the overall, rainfall has been 
favourable in Angola. But the efforts to resettle more than one million Angolans displaced 
by the war will contribute to 270,000 tonnes of food import requirements.
As a result of the exceptionally larger volume of food imports into the region, there is a 
serious congestion on the region’s transport routes and bottlenecks at the ports. Regional 
cooperation and coordination within SADCC itself and with South Africa will be absolutely 
essential. A recent meeting of Ministers of Agriculture and Transport and Communication 
held in Lusaka attests to this need.
An important agricultural policy with significant implications on food security is the balance 
between cash crop production and food crop production. It has been asserted that shift from 
ood crop production to cash crop production may be contributing to food insecurity. For 
instance, in some SADCC countries there has been a shift from maize production used to 
eed the local population to growing of exotic flowers for the European market.
110
Agricultural pricing policies have also contributed to poor crop production. In most SADCC 
countries marketing boards extracted large surpluses from the farmers the differentials 
between producer prices and selling prices. There is hardly any coordination of agricultural 
production policies at regional level. But regional efforts on agricultural research have been 
commendable (such as Southern Africa Coordinating Council for Agricultural Research . 
SACCAR). However, it appears that the linkages between research findings and field 
application are weak. SADCC needs a Green Revolution to quadruple food production.
In conclusion, concerted efforts is required to increase agricultural production and improve 
food security. This calls for:
(a) better pricing policies to stimulate production in parallel with free marketing of 
agricultural products;
(b) private sector investment in the production, processing of agricultural products, and 
supplying of farm inputs should be encouraged rather stifled by excessive regulation 
and controls;
(c) efforts should be made to achieve an appropriate balance between food and cash 
crops; and
(d) dissemination of research findings should be intensified, and linkages between research 
institutions and extensions services, both at regional and national levels, should be 
strengthened.
CONCLUSION
SADCC should move boldly and quickly to work out a regional arrangement with South 
Africa, which should form a basis for increasing intra-regional trade. Intra-SADCC trade is 
currently less than 5 percent of total trade. However, if unrecorded UTT were included, the 
volume of intra-SADCC trade could be much higher. Greater efforts in mobilizing domestic 
savings and attracting foreign investment will be needed to finance development and growth.
The current drought has placed in sharp focus food security issues. It has put into question 
the effectiveness of the SADCC early warning system. The gap in food imports for 1992 - 93 
will be about 8 million tonnes, four times than the normal. Die challenge for SADCC is to 
improve its capacity to feed itself through increases in production or through increase in the 
aggregate level of incomes so that SADCC will have the financial capacity to import food 
rather than depending on food aid.
The transfer of technology and the acquisition of technological capabilities would be crucial 
to increasing SADCC’s activity in agricultural and industrial sectors. There is a large 
potential for the transfer of technology between SADCC member states and South Africa. 
It should however, be noted that there has been little expenditure on R & D in SADCC 
compared to South Africa. SADCC member states will need to design and coordinate 
technological policies if technology has to play a critical role in regional integration.
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ENHANCING THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN ACITVTnES 
G.K. Kayira and AG . Luhanga 
OVERVIEW
In the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), the role of women 
in productive activities has increasingly received attention. This is in part to address the 
problems of deepening economic crisis which have deepened. In general, women in SADCC 
make significant contribution towards the process of socio-economic transformation and 
development. It would be difficult to implement programmes for economic transformation 
and improvement without the participation of women. In many SADCC countries over 60 
percent of households are headed by women. (The World’s Women : Trends and Statistics 
1970 - 90 UN, 1991). Women are involved in the mainstream of agricultural production as 
well as commercial activities. Upliftment of women through better access to credit, farm 
inputs, marketing systems, and secure land tenure systems will be central to sustainable rural 
development. Based on social and cultural values prevailing within SADCC, women should 
increasingly be involved in all the critical stages in designing and formulating policies and 
programmes that are intended to benefit them. Women have significant potential for 
accepting new concepts, techniques and technological changes. In view of this participation 
of women in decision-making is critical to changes in attitudes and to increasing their 
productivity. (SAFICIOS - ROTHSHILD).
Women are the major food producers. They manage the environment, and they also generate 
a large part of cash income through commercial activities. Most women are involved in 
unpaid work which is a vital contribution to the economy of most households and also to the 
economy as a whole. In effect, women’s unpaid work compensates for inadequate services 
to the community. However, it does not figure in national accounts. (Women - Challenges 
to the Year 2000, 1991. Women in the Work Places in Developing countries - World Bank 
Finance and Development Journal - June 1992). It is perceived that unpaid non-working 
women are primarily consumers of social welfare, which is a gross misconception - they are 
in fact unpaid producers of social welfare.
This misconception is a child of cultural attitudes. It creates discrimination against women, 
relating them to a status of inferiority submissiveness and weakness vis-a-vis the status of 
males. Indeed, in the face of such indomitable hurdles, the role of the women in 
development is severely frustrated and restricted.
If women’s contribution to development is to be meaningful at all, they should increasingly 
be involved in all the critical stages in designing and formulating policies and programmes 
that are intended to benefit not only them but also their families, communities, nations and 
the region.
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There is a need to reconsider and eliminate any factors which militate against women’s 
involvement in development, if they are expected to play a vital role. The underlining factor 
for women contribution to development, is their status as perceived by the mankind.
THE STATUS OF WOMEN
Generally, the status of women is determined by attitudes in the respective communities. 
Attitudes may be reflected legislatively, administratively and by the behaviour of the people. 
Traditionally, in the SADC region, a woman is inferior to a man. That is, she is discriminated 
upon Discrimination means "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status". (The United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979).
The status of women is one of the factors that contributes to economic growth. The status 
of women can be assessed by the performance of women in the following fields:
(a) education;
(b) employment opportunities and labour practices;
(c) health and fertility control;
(d) legal capacity and access to resources; and
(f) leadership and decision making.
EDUCATION
Education is key to women empowerment. In today’s technological word, skills and education 
are much more important to economic growth than the sheer quantity of labour power. The 
World Bank (1991) examined some of the reasons behind differences in economic 
performance in developing countries. One of the factors that proved significant to economic 
growth is education. Where an average adult had more than 3.33 years schooling, the 
country’s GDP grew at 5.5 percent a year between 1965 and 1987. Where the schooling 
average was about 3.50 years, GDP grew at 3.8 percent. Overall increasing the average level 
of schooling by 3 years was associated with 27 percent increase in the country’s rate of 
economic growth in the countries. Similarly, increasing education by 6 years lifted economic 
growth rates by 39 percent.
Education begins its economic impact at the level of individual families and enterprises. It 
broadens horizons beyond habit and tradition, encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship. 
For example, literate people can read information and instructions. They can calculate doses 
of fertilisers and pesticides, and keep of expenses and income. It has been observed that one 
extra year of schooling has been found to increase wages by orders of magnitude from 7 to 
25 percent. It can even boost farm output by orders of magnitude from 2 to 5 percent (World 
Bank 1992b). And again, education for women is associated with lower fertility. It is the link 
between economic growth and slower population growth (World Bank Report, 1991a).
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Indeed, it is clear that there is a direct correlation between literacy, health, and economic 
growth. Education decisively determined everyone’s access to paid employment, earning 
capacity and the overall health. Also it helps one to take control of ones life and assume a 
status and identity . As for an education women, the status and identity go beyond child 
bearing thereby allowing them to participate fully in the public life of their communities. 
Education, also plays a crucial role in child survival. It opens up wider horizons, and creates 
new opportunities, especially with regard the study of science which enables one to take an 
active role in technological development.
However, according to the 1990 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) statistics, 50% of adult women in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding 
South Africa) were illiterate. For these women, illiteracy compounds their other problems, 
contributing to their marginalization within their families, the workplace and public life. They 
have not benefited from socio-economic and technological progress. They are invariably 
caught in a vicious circle of poverty, repeated child bearing, ill health and powerlessness.
At independence most governments in the region adopted education policies which did not 
discriminate on the basis of sex. However, female education is not a priority among families 
in most countries especially in the rural areas.
The financially hard-pressed parents tend to take their girls out of school to help them with 
domestic work. They have to work in order to ensure the survival of the family or else they 
get married for a profit. This is aggravated by some of the social customs which dictate that 
girls do not need education since they will marry and raise children rather than work outside 
the home. However, this is increasingly changing.
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND LABOUR PRACTICES
The equality of access between men and women to employment opportunities is crucial for 
realising women’s full productive potential. Labour practices which are discriminatory against 
women contribute towards reducing the output of women. As Table I shows, as a percentage 
of formal employment, women are in minority in all SADC countries. However, in countries 
such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania, at least 40% of the labour 
force is represented by females.
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TABLE 1: EMPLOYMENT IN SADC
Country
labour Farce 
(as % of 
Total Pqp.) 
1988-90
Wcmen in
Labour
Farce (as %
of Total
Labour
Farce)
1988-90
Agric.
1986-89
Ind.
1986-89
Ser.
86-89
Angola 41 34 74 9 17
Botswana 35 36 43 5 52
Lesotho 46 44 23 33 44
Malawi 42 42 82 3 15
Mozambique 55 48 85 7 8
Namibia 29 24 43 22 35
Swaziland 36 40 74 9 17
Tanzania 47 48 86 4 10
Zambia 32 29 38 8 55
Zimbabwe 41 35 65 5 30
South Africa 36 33 14 24 62
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1991, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992, P.158 and 159.
In the majority of SADC countries, the agricultural sector employees over 70 percent of the 
labour force. This is a reflection of the dominance of this section in the structures of these 
economies. As a result of agricultural policy distortions, weak linkages between agriculture 
and other sectors, and the under-developed nature of the technological applications, incomes 
in the agricultural sector are relatively smaller than in other sectors, and in many SADC 
countries have declined. Women are predominantly engaged in the agricultural sector. 
Women who are in the formal sector, mostly are not paid the same wages and benefits as 
their male counterparts. From a gender perspective and for cultural reasons, income 
distribution is skewed in favour of males.
h e a l t h  a n d  f e r t il it y  c o n t r o l
Family planning and health services help women in improving their overall health status and 
that of children, and increasing their opportunities to take an expanded role in society. 
Throughout life, women’s concerns about their health differ from men’s, and they face 
different threats. Child bearing exposes women to a particular array of health risks, and in 
SADC region the complications from pregnancy and childbirth are a major cause of death for 
women.
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However, such complications may be avoided if good health and family planning services are 
made readily available. Women are given opportunities to choose whether they will have 
children, when and how many. It has been recognised that access to family planning services 
opens the way to many other benefits, to such an extent that a woman’s control over her own 
fertility has been called "the freedom from which other freedoms flow."
LEGAL CAPACITY AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES
Women have limited legal capacity and access to resources. This limitation makes it difficult 
for women to enter into contracts particularly under customary law and the Roman-Dutch 
common law. Consequently, women have limited access to financial resources which are 
critical determinants for overall development, equitable income distribution and social 
upliftment of women.
Access limitations to financial credit, which adversely affect women are:
(a) lack of equity or collateral;
(b) poor identification and appraisal of bankable projects;
(c) lack of appropriate skills;
(d) lack of proper business guidance and advisory services tailored to meet the needs of
women entrepreneurs; and
(e) lack of confidence and trust by financial institutions in local women entrepreneurs.
LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING
Limited participation of women in labour unions, political parties and decision-making 
positions reduces their ability to influence decisions affecting their living conditions. This lack 
of participation arises from traditional attitudes, customs, lifestyles, and social structures. 
Changes in these mitigating factors will be important in enhancing the leadership roles of 
women.
PROGRESS TOWARDS WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT 
GLOBAL
Since 1945, the United Nations has been instrumental in improving the status of women. This 
has been through spearheading change and raising awareness of women situation throughout 
the world. Unfortunately, discrimination against women, still is deep-rooted in cultural beliefs 
and traditional practices throughout out of the world. To draw attention to these obstacles, 
the UN declared 1975 as the International Women’s Year. And also, in the same year, the 
first World Conference of the International Women Year was convened in Mexico City. The 
Conference produced the first World Plan of Action for the Advancement of Women to be 
implemented by Governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It identified 
key areas of national action, including political participation, education and training, 
employment, health, the family and population.
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Appreciating the growing global importance of women’s issues, the UN General Assembly 
proclaimed 1976 - 1985 as "the United Nations Decade for Women Equality, Development 
and Peace." It marked the start of an international effort to right the wrongs of history. The 
combination of the Year and the Decade succeeded in putting women’s concerns, in 
particular gender equality, and full integration of women in the development process into 
global perspective.
Furthermore, in 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the "Convention On The 
Elimination Of All Forms Of Discrimination Against Women." This is sometimes referred 
to as the Women’s BILL OF RIGHTS". The Convention commits governments to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the full development and advancement of women.
Again in 1985, in Nairobi, Kenya, the UN held a World Conference to Review and Appraise 
the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. The Conference adopted "The 
Nairobi Forward - Looking Strategies For The Advancement Of Women To The Year 2000", 
a blueprint which identified areas for action by Governments and NGOs to improve the status 
of women by the year 2000.
In 1990, "the Commission on the Status of Women" undertook a five-year review and 
appraisal of the implementation of the Nairobi blueprint. However, the results were 
discouraging. The Commission found that "the situation of women had deteriorated in many 
parts of the world, especially in developing countries where economic stagnation or negative 
growth, continued population increases, the growing burden of debt and the reduction of 
public expenditures for social programmes had further constrained opportunities for women 
to improve their situation. There was evidence of an alarming regression in the status of 
women in the spheres of education, employment and health. Too often the issue of the 
advancement of women had received only low priority".
t
The Commission warned that the cost to societies of failure to achieve true gender equality 
would be high in terms of slowed economic and social development, misuse of human 
resources and reduced progress for society as a whole. (Women : Challenges to the Year 
2000, UN, 1991 P2. Another review will take place around 1995.
AFRICA REGION
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights was adopted in 1981. It provides for the 
improvement of the status of women in Africa. This theme has been debated in several 
forums by leaders who have expressed the need to improve the status of women as a vehicle 
to the improvement of the economies of the continent. Prior to this in 1975, the Economic 
I Commission for Africa (ECA) Human Resources Development Division established the 
African Training and Research Centre for women even before the UN Decade for Women 
' declared. One of the primary objectives was to promote the full use of the combined 
mnan resources - male and female - for development in the countries of Africa by the year 
' 2000.
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Focus was on integrating African women more effectively into the development efforts by 
offering them more extensive education and training facilities, and by involving them more 
actively in the planning and execution of national development projects.
The former Executive Secretary of the ECA, Adebayo Adedeji, when addressing the issue of 
Africa’s progress into self-sufficiency through coordinated development, said:
"We have come rather late to a realisation of how effective women could be in re­
shaping our society to bring immeasurably greater benefits to vastly bigger numbers 
of our people. (Underline is the authors) We have had occasion in recent years to 
re-think our values, and recast our traditional approaches to the problems we face, and 
the outcome has been the recognition that our women, given the training and 
incentives, can lead and achieve in all areas as skilfully, if not better than men. Now, 
the door has been thrown wide open to them in the interests of a better life for all of 
us in Africa - and elsewhere.
Under the United Nations Decade for Women, the worldwide call is for men and 
women to devote their considerable reservoir of talents towards, creating, - if not a 
new heaven, then certainly, a new earth!"
(ECA/ATRCW WOMEN IN AFRICA - United Nations Decade for Women 1976 - 1985 by 
United Nations Information Service ECA).
THE SADC REGION
There are several indicators which show sharp divides between females and males in the 
SADC society (see Table 2). It is not a society that is based on principles of discrimination 
enshrined in the constitutions but on cultural and social beliefs. By divine design, women 
tend on the average to live longer than men. Longer life expectancy for women suggests that 
they have potentially longer productive lives than men.
Access to better employment opportunities depends primarily on the level of literacy and 
overall educational capabilities. In most SADC countries men achieve higher levels of 
literacy mean years of schooling primary secondary and tertiary enrolment. It is important 
to note that while the gap between females and males is narrow at primary school level, it 
tends to widen progressively at tertiary level. However, it must be pointed out that in 
Lesotho and Swaziland, women have made major strides into high level management.
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TABLE 2:_____SADC COUNTRIES: FEMALE-MALE GAPS
FEMALES AS A PERCENTAGE OF MALES
Country Life
Expectancy
1990
Pep.1990
Literacy 
1970 90
Mean 
years of 
schooling
Primary 
Enrolment 
1960 88-89
Secondary
Enmfent
1988-89
Tertiary
Enrolment
1988-89
Parliament
1990
Angola 107 103 44 51 52 « ... 82 17Botswana 111 109 119 78 97 137 107 Ill 76 5Lesotho 117 108 151 — 147 162 119 148 — —
Malawi 103 103 43 — 46 — 96 60 27 11Mozambique 107 103 48 47 54 60 84 67 33 19Namibia 104 101 — — 95 — — — — 7Swaziland 107 103 — — 82 — 105 96 70 —Tanzania 107 102 38 — 45 55 100 100 33 12Zambia 104 103 56 81 45 67 98 54 38 5Zimbabwe 106 102 75 82 40 ------ 100 68 60 14
S. Africa 110 101 — — 90 90 — — — 3
Note: All figures are expressed in relation to the male average which is indexed to equal 100. The smaller the
figure the bigger the gap, the closer the figure to 100 the smaller the gap, and a figure above 100 
indicates that the female average is higher than the male.
Source: U.N., Human Development Report. 1992 pp 144-145
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The world of politics has remained the domain of men. Women are grossly under 
represented in parliaments. The lowest representations are in Botswana and Zambia where 
females members of parliament account for 5 percent of the male counterpart. The highest 
representations are in Mozambique and Zimbabwe where female members of parliament 
account for 17 percent and 14 percent of the male counterpart, respectively. This is a 
reflection of the role of women played in the liberation wars of political independence. Even 
then these representations are small, and the implications are that women may not be able 
to form effective pressure groups to promote their interests.
WOMEN AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
In the 1980s, which have been characterized as "the lost decade", many SADC countries 
experienced economic turbulence, shocks, and disequilibria. This resulted in decline in per 
capita incomes and deepening of poverty. With fiscal deficits widening and balance of 
payments becoming unsustainable, it became imperative to cut expenditures. Experience has 
shown that in the quest to reduce these deficits, cost in expenditure for social services, 
particularly health education, have aggregated the welfare of the most vulnerable groups in 
the social strata - women and children. And yet, as pointed above, in many SADC countries 
about 60 percent of households are headed by women. Reduction in social spending has 
direct impact on the welfare of women and children.
Participation of women in design and formulation of structural adjustment and stabilization 
policies and programmes should be encouraged. There should be a growing sensitivity, both 
by the donors and aid recipient countries, to implications of social dimension of adjustment, 
particularly their impact on the welfare of children and women. As United Nations Children 
Fund (UNICEF) appropriately observed, structural adjustment programmes should have "a 
human face". In the design of structural adjustment programmes, reducing poverty among the 
most vulnerable group women and children should be given priority.
THE CHALLENGE TO ENHANCING THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF 
WOMEN
The major challenge is a better global understanding of the importance of women in the 
socio-economic development of the SADC society. It is increasingly recognised that women 
have a critical role to play in the dynamic changes in the fabric of society. Particularly in the 
rural areas, programmes on poverty alleviation can only succeed with active participation of 
women.
Increasing access of women to resources is a challenge that must be overcome. It will require 
innovative approaches to be championed by women. For instance, there may be need to 
create banking institutions which will lend exclusively to women. Or formation of professional 
associations to enhance the knowledge based capabilities of women, since knowledge is 
power. This would enhance access to productive resources. These kinds of changes will not 
take place if women remain passive. Women will need to assert their powers to ensure there 
is an increased access to financial and real resources on equitable terms.
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It becomes imperative that specific policies and programmes be directed towards women.
These include:
(a) placing issues of women as priority at the SADC level of consultations;
(b) creating a SADC-wide awareness of the rural women’s economic constraints, 
contribution and potential, and bringing into sharp focus the links between gender, 
rural poverty, family welfare and national development; and
(c) mobilising action and financial and technical resources at national and regional levels 
that will help improve rural women’s socio-economic position.
Collective action on all these fronts will be critical to improve the welfare of women and their
productive capacity.
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POST-APARTHEID IMPLICATIONS FOR SADC AND THE DRIVE 
TOWARDS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
By DOMINIC Mulaisho 
INTRODUCTION
To anyone coming fresh to it, the subject of African Economic Integration and 
Cooperation, whether at a pan-African, sub-regional or lower level, can easily seem 
bewildering. For at least thirty years there has been widespread agreement that most of 
the continent’s national economies and markets are too small and that all countries could 
gain benefits if they could somehow integrate or at least cooperate effectively in the 
economic sphere. Such benefits would most obviously take the form of economies of 
scale, which could often make the difference between a market large enough to justify the 
establishment of a particular industry and one that was just too small for it ever to be 
viable. Another kind of benefit could be greater market power in dealing with third 
parties. The list of potential gains is a long one.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The attractions of possibilities like these are so strong that since the very beginning of the 
independence era and even earlier, a wide variety of proposals for market integration and 
other forms of cross-border economic cooperation have been discussed at international 
gatherings. They have ranged, in descending order of ambition and difficulty, from a full 
integration pan-African economic union to the setting up of bodies for very specific 
functional cooperation such as locust control, and river basin development which might 
involve as few as two countries. There are over 200 international organizations of one 
kind or another in Africa, of which about 160 are intergovernmental. In addition, certain 
organizations were already in existence during the colonial period, and of these some that 
once seemed very important, such as the East African Community or the Central African 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (currently Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe), 
turned out to be unworkable for one reason or another, usually political, and were 
dismantled.
There has thus been no absence of two conditions commonly regarded as necessary - 
although clearly not sufficient - for successful cooperation. One of these is high-level 
political goodwill, at least as signalled by the number of presidential issued at the end of 
summit meetings. The other is the existence of international bodies, most of them with 
their own staff, and entailing as stately (and expensive) a procession of ministerial and 
official meetings, drafting of treaties, protocols, principles and memorandum of 
association, commissioning of reports and expert studies, holding of seminars and 
workshops, recording of decisions, and preparing and duplicating a vast quantity of 
documentation. Indeed, it seems likely that there are too many bodies rather than too
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few, and it would be surprising if there is anyone who could list them all without doing 
a substantial amount of research.
Two other factors, however, have been in shorter supply. The first is the kind of political 
will that is expressed not so much in speech making about the beauties of cooperation as 
in implementing agreed decisions, promptly and effectively - deeds rather than words. 
The second is evidence of concrete benefits generated by the massive apparatus of 
international cooperation machinery.
Despite signs of progress in certain well-defined areas - telecommunications in most of 
the SADC region, to take one example - the general impression is not, as in Europe, of 
national boundaries steadily becoming less important and less of a hindrance to travel, 
to business, to the transfer of money, but rather of a continent which remains strikingly 
unintegrated.
Ministers and officials may be able to fly freely to other countries to attend 
intergovernmental meetings. But the ordinary businessman finds it no easier than he used 
to, to buy and sell goods across frontiers, to transport them reliably, cheaply and without 
burdensome paperwork, to pay and be paid in a currency accessible and acceptable to 
both sides, and to obtain credit. The same applies to the average citizen who might wish 
to travel to a neighbouring country for a holiday, to visit a friend or relatives, to study, 
or even - Heaven forbid - to take up a job. All along the line he is likely to have 
difficulties in obtaining a visa or work permit, in paying for his tickets with a currency he 
is allowed to possess, and in taking any useful money with him to keep himself alive. Yet 
all this, surely, is what cooperation must be about.
Barriers such as these may be impossible to measure statistically, but most people find 
from bitter experience that they are getting tougher, not easier. What can be measured 
is the volume of trade, or at least the trade that passes through customs, and this shows 
that little or no progress has been made towards market integration, with intra-African 
trade accounting for much the same low share to total trade as it did twenty years ago.
Within the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African (PTA), the volume 
of intra-PTA trade as a proportion of the sub-region’s total world trade actually decreased 
between 1982 and 1989, from 5.6 per cent to 4.6 per cent. There was a significant growth 
in total world exports by the PTA countries during this period, from US $11.7 billion in 
1982 to US $14.2 billion in 1989, but exports within the group failed to increase, only just 
maintaining their level at US $579 million in 1989 against US $552 million in 1982.
It is very important to qualify this by noting that all such figures refer only to official 
trade. The volume of unofficial or unrecorded or illegal trade, which by definition cannot 
be measured, is undoubtedly large, with some studies suggesting that it may well equal or
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exceed that of official trade.24 Whatever its precise extent, it clearly indicates that in 
reality African economies are more integrated than the official figures suggest. The 
question is ho far this trade reflects genuine comparative advantage between producers 
on different sides of a given border, and how far it simply reflects market distortions 
caused by factors such as overvalued exchange rates - more so on one side of a border 
than on the other - or other artificially manipulated prices.
Clearly both factors are involved in different cases. The existence of this large under-the- 
counter trade carries two implications. First, the scope for an increase in trade and 
production based on an international division of labour and specialisation is greater than 
might be implied by the official figures. Second, the removal of policy distortions will be 
crucial if that scope is to be realised. What would be wrong would be to regard this 
phenomenon as a simple problem of smuggling that needs to be stamped out by tougher 
police action. As well as being ineffective, that would be to ignore the causes that have 
brought it into existence. It is these that must be addressed.
Around the late 1970s events such as the collapse of the East African Community and the 
lack of progress in reducing tariffs and other trade barriers in the economic community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) led to some disillusionment with the market- 
integration approach. Many felt in the fight of such experiences that the degree of 
effective political will was not such that the well-known problems of economic integration 
between states at different levels of development could be resolved. These problems 
include the fears of the less-developed parts that a disproportionate share of the benefits 
will go to the areas already most developed, and that any arrangements for compensation 
will be inadequate to offset this. They also include a reluctance on the part of member 
state to implement agreed decisions aimed at generating long-term benefits for the group 
as a whole, if such decisions involve short-term costs, for example the possible closure of 
an uneconomic state-owned industry.
In terms of political institutions, genuine market integration almost certainly requires a 
supranational body or bodies with a power to enforce common policies that is recognised 
as binding by the government of member states. Experience, particularly in East Africa 
where common institutions were most highly developed, seemed to suggest that it might 
be unrealistic to think that any such system could be made to work. It might be better 
to aim at a form of cooperation that did not involve any surrender of sovereignty.
See for instance "Unrecorded Transborder Trade in Sub- 
Saharan Africa and its implications for Regional 
Economic Integration" by R. Ballad - Background Paper 
Series for the Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub- 
Saharan Africa Vol. 4 Proceedings of a Workshop on 
Regional Integration and Cooperation, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 1990.
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All this was part of the background against which the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADC) was created in 1980. Its founders deliberately 
eschewed setting up a supranational organization with powers of its own. Instead they 
created a structure for cooperation focused on specific functional sectors. All projects for 
inclusion on the SADC list would require the specific approval of each member state 
involved, while the brunt of the implementation would fall not on the small SADC 
Secretariat but on the member state with functional responsibility for the sector. The 
advantage of this approach included not just the avoidance of an expensive new 
bureaucracy, but a reduction in the danger that decisions taken by the SADC Council of 
Ministers would be repudiated or quietly shelved by national governments. Its 
disadvantages, if they can be called that, arise simply from the fact that it was never 
intended as a mechanism for integrating markets, which has meant that it has not had the 
capacity nor the authority to tackle many of the barriers to trade.
More recent developments, both in Africa and in the world as a whole, have generated 
a renewed interest in regional cooperation and integration. The failure of African 
economies in the 1980s has lent new urgency to the search for ways of overcoming market 
fragmentation. The growing division of the world into a few powerful trading blocs raises 
the fear that without new initiatives Africa will become increasingly marginalised.
The renewed vigour of the drive towards European integration, highlighted by the 
development of the European Community into a single market, has focused attention on 
the need for Africa to draw what lessons it can from the European experience. The end 
of the Cold War and the radical changes underway in Eastern, Europe and the former 
Soviet Union have reduced Africa’s strategic significance for the West. It has also 
increased the competition for scarce aid funds, making it clearer than ever that Africa 
must look to trade than aid if imminent end of another Cold Water in Africa itself poses 
a specific challenge: the irreversible political changes now going on in South Africa mean 
that although it is not yet possible to say what policies the next government there will 
follow in regard to regional economic relations, the old habit of seeking to isolate South 
Africa and excluding it from all African initiatives will no longer make sense and a new 
relationship will need to be defined.
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
How then can Africa learn from its own past and largely unsuccessful record, as well as 
from the experience of others, and start out afresh on the road to regional cooperation 
with a greater chance of success this time round?
The need, it seems clear, is not so much for any grand new blueprint as for the step-by- 
step implementation of measures that have largely been agreed. Looking at the European 
experience, there are many divergences between the situation of Western Europe after 
the Second World War, when the foundations of the present European community were 
first laid and that of Africa today. Both the level of pre-existing development and the 
extent of intra-regional trade were far greater in Europe then than they are in African
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now. But three elements of the European experience may be worth singling out as 
relevant lessons in the African context.
First, the basic political will towards integration has been matched by the willingness of 
governments to set specific and manageable targets and stick to them. The pace of the 
deepening of integration has varied from time to time, but there has never been any 
backsliding. That is in sharp contrast with Africa, where ambitious targets have been set 
but have not been achieved. The difference is that in Europe, success in reaching agreed, 
even ambitious targets can be met. In Africa the reverse has occurred: failure to meet 
targets has created a sense of unreality and reinforced the doomsday feeling that it is not 
worth trying.
The implication is clear: there is no point in setting new and more ambitious targets and 
timetables - indeed it will be confusing, demoralising and, therefore, counter-productive 
to do so-until the reasons why existing, less ambitious targets have not been met, have not 
been properly identified and measures taken to deal with them. It is fine to sign a treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community, as the Organization of Africa Unity 
(OAU) did in Abuja last year(1991). However, this is not likely to make much practical 
difference until the reasons why sub-regional cooperation has not worked as it was 
supposed to have been tackled.
Already there are more than enough such reasons to be getting on with. Within the PTA, 
for example, it was originally thought that there would be free trade between members 
within ten years after the treaty came into force, that is by September this year, (1992), 
but this deadline has now been put forward to the year 2000. The need, therefore, is to 
examine why there has been this slippage.
In fact, many of the chief constraints are fairly obvious. One is simply that some member 
states have not implemented the successive preferential tariff reductions on selected 
commodities that were agreed under the treaty.
Another reason is that some countries still operate highly restrictive import licensing 
regimes, together with foreign exchange allocation procedures that are incompatible with 
the scheduled for preferential treatment must be placed on Open General Import Licence 
(OGEL) and importers must be able to pay for imports of these commodities. Unless this 
is done, there is no chance that targets can be met. A third basic constraint is that more 
currencies in the PTA sub-region are unrealistically high and importers will prefer to buy 
from countries with more realistic exchange rates.
There are only three of the more obvious and serious inhibitions to free - or freer - trade 
within PTA. They point to a second basic lesson to be learnt from the European 
experience, namely that market integration requires that all member states pursue 
reasonably liberal trade regimes, at least towards a fellow members, with correspondingly 
liberal payments arrangements for current transactions. Leaving aside the question of a 
possible common external tariff, which was a major feature of the original trade 
arrangements in europe but which is evidently a good way down the road in the PTA,
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there is no point in talking about preferences for member states if import licensing or 
foreign exchange regimes make it impossible or too expensive to trade.
In Europe, countries are only eligible for membership of the Community if their 
economies function on market lines. The logical of integration is then such that countries 
find it increasingly necessary to pursue convergent economic policies, including monetary 
and fiscal policies, in order to remain competitive within the system. Circumstances in 
Africa are different, but the same fundamental logic applies for any level of integration 
that is aimed at the alternative of a fully managed trade system of the kind that used to 
be operated through Comencon in the former Soviet block is no longer an option.
If divergent political systems, such as those represented by the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia and the rest of majority - ruled black Africa, brought 
any trade and other economic relations with Rhodesia to a halt during the UDI, is there 
any reason why irreconcilable economic systems should someway or other not have the 
same effect of stultifying the development of trade between countries with divergent 
economic policies?
It is important to note that countries that do not find it possible to liberalise to a 
sufficient degree are not going to be able to play their part as full members of any free 
trade area. Since there is no likelihood for political and diplomatic reasons that such 
couniries will be expelled, and since for the same reasons there is little prospect of the 
introduction of a formal two- speed arrangement under which countries are excluded from 
reciprocal concessions unless they met certain minimum criteria in their own policies, it 
appears inescapable that if countries persist in applying restrictive policies they will slow 
down the movement of the whole group towards integration.
It may well be that of all the reasons why Africa’s experience of integration and 
cooperation has so far been disappointing, the most fundamental has been the prevalence 
of highly restrictive inward-looking policies. The political will, however sincere it may 
have been when leaders attended international gatherings, has not in itself been sufficient 
to change the whole thrust of economic policy. Thus, at the same time as governments 
entered into treaty obligations to reduce trade barriers, they have continued with policies 
that have worked in the opposite direction.
Fortunately, there are now clear signs that for their own internal reasons - the only ones 
that in the final analysis determine the actions of national governments - most, if not all 
countries, are changing their policies in the right direction, towards greater openness and 
liberalisation. In considering the prospects for a renewed integration drive, this is by far 
the most promising factor on the scene. Since the aim is to integrate and, thereby, 
expand markets, the spread of market-friendly policies is a necessary precondition.
Looking again at the European experience - and this is the third lesson - it is notable that 
success in integration has been achieved against a background of generally rising 
prosperity, and many observers believe it would not have been possible otherwise. 
Economic growth provides resources that can be used to compensate those who lose out
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from the integration process. It also creates confidence in the individual member states 
that the process is beneficial to them,; it creates conditions in which there are more 
winners than iosers.
Unfortunately, integrative efforts of Africa, over the last 30 years, have been pursued 
against a background of diminishing, rather than growing economies. The 1970s and 
1980s were not only wasted decades in the "Adedejian" sense of deepening misery: they 
were also wasted decades in as far as they were, on that account, an inhospitable 
environment for regional cooperation. This has been despite the high - profile efforts of 
Africa’s statesmen represented by such milestones as the launching of the East African 
Economic Community; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the 
Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos; the PTA for Eastern and Southern 
Africa; SADC and, latterly, the formal launching of the African Common Market to be 
achieved by 2034.
In Africa, it is the domestic failure of inward - looking policies rather than any 
international obligations, that has led governments to begin changing those policies. 
Whether they came to their own conclusion that change was necessary or whether they 
were forced to it by outside circumstances such as debt, the fact remains that they are 
doing it. And by doing it, whether they intended this consequence or not, they are setting 
conditions under which, for the first time, steps towards closer integration have a genuine 
change of success and are not going to be short-circuited by basic cases, but they are 
much less prevalent that they were, and there is every reason to think that this beneficent 
process will continue.
Given this change in the overall policy environment, the task ahead is, in principle, quite 
straightforward. It is to tackle, step by step, the specific barriers and constraints for 
market integration. As already mentioned above, three of the most important of these 
are:
(a) the failure to implement already agreed preferential tariff reductions;
(b) the continuation of highly restrictive import licensing arrangements; and
(c) the largely over-valued currencies. There are a great many more.
It is very important that governments pay close attention to the messages they receive 
from the private sector. The problems of doing business across borders are best identified 
by those who are actually trying to do the business, and the things that businessmen 
complain about most frequently are likely to provide the most reliable guide to the 
priorities among the various constraints.
In shifting the thrust of their policies towards the market, governments are acknowledging 
the central role of the private sector, which will actually create the growth that the 
governments hope for. The job of governments is not to tell the private sector what to 
do, but to facilitate their doing it. This requires a change of attitude on the part of
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ministers and officials towards private sector business. In many countries the habit of 
regarding private business as a somewhat inconvenient and not full respectable element 
is deeply entrenched. Some have actually seen the private sector as a transitional feature 
that would fade away in due course, as scientific socialism progressively took over its 
functions. They now have to see it not just as a permanent development but also as the 
central economic agent. All this constitutes a true test of political will - and a stiff one.
The ever - growing volume of literature on African economic integration suggests that the 
private sector can be an integrative catalyst and therefore, urgent reforms are needed to 
restore its vibrant role. The private sector is not necessarily created by simply 
decontrolling prices of all types and by the government withdrawing from the face of the 
earth: it will be created by establishing the institutional framework so often absent in the 
economies of countries, which have endured decades of centralised control, for such 
economies, the tendency has been for one man, usually the president or chairman, to be 
the moving parliament, judiciary, chief executive of the banking system and indeed of 
every business in the land, including also the allocation of land. In short a kind of 
Poobah of Gilbert and Sullivan - the sole descendant of the protoplasmic primordial 
atomic globule.
To strengthen the private sector and promote regional economic cooperation, it will be 
important to take several policy initiatives. Governments should curtail their monopoly 
in the use of resources in order to make more of them available to the private sector. 
Old laws should be replaced with new ones which are market-friendly. Financial services 
systems should be streamlined so that they can serve the ever growing diversity of needs 
inherent in a free economy. Opportunities for the collateralisation of assets should be 
created so that the ability to borrow comes within the reach of an increasing number of 
people.
As mentioned above, the relative failure of earlier integration efforts contributed to some 
degree to disillusionment. There may also have been a pessimistic feeling that African 
integration raised an intractable problem of the chicken-and-egg variety. On the one 
hand, it was agreed that the economic prospects of individual African countries were 
blighted by their existing poverty, as well as other hand, it seemed that all attempts at 
integration feel foul of the very factors - particularly the inward-looking policies - that 
were responsible in large part for perpetuating the poverty.
This vicious circle no. longer exists. The way out of it is be to found in policy changes that 
are desirable both for domestic and for integrationist reasons. As more and more 
countries turn to outward looking policies that favour markets, and as they accept the 
financial disciplines that this new approach requires, they will automatically be tackling 
the most important distortions that have inhibited the growth of trade. This gives the key 
to steady, incremental progress in removing constraints. By analogy, having unlocked the 
door, success will depend on pushing it open and walking through it in the desired 
direction.
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Some policy makers see a conflict between the type of functional cooperation for which 
SADC was designed, and the market integration approach of the PTA and ultimately of 
the African Economic Community. There is no need for any such conflict, provided 
neither organisation tries to encroach on the territory of the other. The fact that 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland belong to SADC and are also partners with 
South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has not caused any serious 
difficulty.
This does not apply in the case of the countries - currently Lesotho and Swaziland - that 
are members of both the PTA and SACU, since the rules of SACU do not allow them 
to implement the tariff reductions required by the PTA. So far the PTA has accepted this 
position on a temporary basis and has granted them derogations that expire at the end 
of this year (1992). What happens then will form part of the much wider question about 
South Africa’s future economic relations with the rest of Africa.
POST - APARTHEID SADC
On that subject, the ball is currently in the South African court and will remain there for 
some time, until a democratic government has taken office and formulated its economic 
strategies. Both SADC and the PTA have said that South Africa will be welcome to join 
once there is a government that is truly representative of the people. In the case of 
SADC, there would appear to be no great difficulty, in principle, given the flexibility of 
the SADC structure and particularly the built-in safety factor that cooperative projects 
only go ahead with the specific approval of each member state affected. SADC would 
presumably redraft its objectives, as there would no longer be any political motive for 
reducing dependence on South Africa. All members would want to ensure that the 
benefits of cooperation would be shared round and would not flow only to South Africa 
as by far the largest, most developed and most powerful member.
So far, the benefits of that cooperation have been the aid which SADC member states 
have collectively and individually enjoyed from the West, making SADC an exclusively 
aid-driven development agency. Will this programme and project aid continue much 
beyond the end of apartheid? This is a pertinent question. Given current trends, the 
likelihood is that while initially aid to SADC may even increase as a result of a special 
donor effect beamed at post-apartheid South Africa, it will tail off sooner than later as 
the major reason for the West coming to the aid of SADC in the first instance - the anti­
apartheid sentiment - ceases to apply.
This fact - that the aid tap will gradually but surely be turned off - is what must influence 
SADC’s thinking about its future as much as considerations of the impact of the post­
apartheid South Africa. For as presently constituted - being wholly dependent on aid - 
a SADC without aid is a contradiction in terms. And SADC is actively re-thinking its
future.
At its Maputo Consultative Meeting early this year 1992, SADC launched its theme for 
1992 - Economic Integration, and since then its Executive Secretary has been hopping to
SADC capitals to explain the significance of the new strategy which has, apparently, the 
blessing of the African National Congress (ANC).
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Whatever the sentiments of an individual political party in South Africa may be, it is clear 
that ultimately South Africa will only joint SADC either if it is so economically innocuous 
that it does not harm to do so for good neighbourliness’ sake or because it is genuinely 
useful. In its newly declared goal of regional (meaning SADC and South Africa) 
integration, SADC planners clearly intend it to be useful to all its members. If that is so, 
then it becomes important to take the South Africa situation fully into account. That 
situation is that:
(a) the larger part of the Gross Domestic Project (GDP) of Southern Africa (SADC 
plus South Africa) is generated within SACU whose member states have no trade 
barriers between them and who enjoy a common tariff to the rest of the world;
(b) for all intents and purposes, the whole SACU area has a single currency - the 
Rand - with the Rand enjoying as free convertibility in Botswana, a non-member 
of the rand monetary area (RMA) as in Swaziland for example; and
(c) taken together, the SACU and RMA have already progressed beyond the 
preferential tariff stage, and are in fact at a more advanced stage in as far as the 
single currency state and as far as the implied, more appropriately enforced, 
synchronisation of macro-economic policies goes, more than even the EC.
Taking South Africa on board as SADC intends doing, implies taking note of this 
situation and, at least, meeting with South Africa, a country whose economy is already at 
least three times larger than the SADC states, some way. To cause the present SADC 
member states to lower quantitative restrictions to trade and tariffs among themselves in 
an orderly manner until they are completely eliminated, to cause them, thereafter, to 
become a kind of customs union which adopts a common external tariff; to get them to 
move towards the free convertibility of their currencies and ultimately to a de facto one 
currency which the Rand is for SACU and the RMA, assumes that parallel policy 
developments can take place in SADC. This would ensure that each market achieves real 
growth at a desirable rate.
The incorporation of the SADC economy with the South African by fiat - which was the 
case with SACU and RMA and the BLS countries - can only be a prescription for 
disaster. The whole SADC would become merely the backyard squatter economy of 
South Africa. The challenge for SADC is whether it can systematically induce more 
positive policies among its members as it seeks economic integration for the region and 
this implies meeting South Africa some way.
Under present arrangements in which trade is the domain of the PTA, SADC would be 
precluded from responding to the challenge of incorporating South Africa in this way. 
The question is whether it would be at all still realistic to expect a SADC which with 
South Africa would account for more than 70 per cent of Sub-Sahara Africa’s output - not 
just of the PTA - to continue to be passive on trade matters. Is the PTA, in fact, not 
already much too large, (18 countries) and inchoate to function properly? It can benefit
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from a break-up into two PTA’s - SADC with South Africa as one, and the rest as the 
other - which would both be concerned with trade and development. There is no reason 
why these two could not be separate pillars or sub-regional groups to the eventual African 
Economic Community.
South Africa’s membership of the PTA raises much more complex issues, since PTA 
members commit themselves in advance to binding treaty obligations of a general nature. 
If South Africa joins, it will completely transform the nature of the PTA region. South 
Africa’s GDP is about 60 per cent greater than that of all the present members combined, 
while its exports to the PTA would be likely to exceed the intra-PTA exports of all the 
other members by an even greater margin. The trade would be highly unbalanced in 
South Africa’s favour.
It is clear that if South Africa applied to join, the other members would have to reassess 
their positions before entering into what would effectively be a very different commitment. 
Since the trade benefits would accrue disproportionably to South Africa, it would be 
necessary to set up compensatory arrangements. These already apply within SACU, 
where the smaller members receive more than their pro rata share of the common pool 
of customs revenues to compensate for the fact that South Africa is better placed to reap 
the developmental benefits of the union. To work out a formula that would be fair to all 
the members of the PTA would be a formidable undertaking.
CONCLUSION
What all this suggests is that when the time comes to negotiate the precise form of South 
Africa’s future association with the rest of the sub-region, this will have to be done in a 
flexible frame of mind. Existing institutions will need modification to receive this massive 
new presence. There will certainly be a great deal of political goodwill on both sides, and 
a warm welcome for South Africa as it comes in from the cold. Equally certainly, a 
democratic South Africa can bring new economic strength to the region and to Africa as 
a whole, provided that its relations with the other countries are established on a sensible 
and sustainable basis.
It is important finally to remember that South Africa, for all the strength and diversity of 
its economy, is far from being a rich country. The standard of living of most of its people 
is far from comfortable. The overriding priority of the government will be to raise 
standards for the many in its own country who are poor. This will not be at all easy and 
will absorb all available resources. South Africa can be an immensely valuable new 
partner for the present members of SADC and the PTA: it will, however, not be a fairy 
godmother.
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF SADC IN RELATION TO OTHER 
REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS WITHIN THE POST APARTHEID 
SOUTH AFRICA
David M. Zamchiya
INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the legal framework of SADC in relation to other regional 
organisations within the post-apartheid South Africa.
In the preparation of this paper, various assumptions have been made, the most important 
of which are:
(a) the participants to this seminar are top executives who have more than a working 
knowledge of the history, essential characteristics and operational problems 
experienced by recent African attempts at regional cooperation through 
organisations (both defunct and existing); and
(b) what is of the greatest value is to raise questions for discussions to promote 
thought towards the search for a fast way towards an Africa Economic Community.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
SADC
NAME OF THE ORGANISATION
The Lusaka Declaration of 1 April, 1980, "Southern Africa, Toward Economic Liberation", 
did not name the organisation which the nine leaders were creating. By the time the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which set it up was adopted in Harare in July, 
1981, the leaders were already calling themselves "Heads of State of Government of the 
member states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference". The 
MOU does not, otherwise, name the organisation and doubt exists as to when, where and 
how the name was decided upon . Yet it may be asked, what is in a name?. Traditionally 
this may not have much but, in this case, it has a great deal of implications. First, why 
call the organisation a "conference". Was it to be limited to a forum for discussion and 
leaving the action somewhere else? Second, the name suggests that the thrust of the 
organisation is the "co-ordination" of development. SADC’s role, seen in this light, is to 
co-ordinate development which is initiated and carried out by other agencies within the 
region, the governments of members states. Third, the choice of "development" as part 
of the name of the organisation raises considerable debate as to the essential character 
of SADC. In particular, the question arises whether trade is at the centre of the 
organisation or only one of the facets implied in development. In any event, what is the 
direction and target of the development? Fourth, the name carries an undefined
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geographical restriction to the membership of the organisation. What constitutes 
"Southern Africa"?
The choice of the present name, SADC for this Africa regional organisation, gave rise to 
conceptual, institutional and operational questions regarding the mission of the 
organisation. What is SADC about, where is it going, is it an end in itself or a step 
towards a continental body? What are its legal or structural relationships with the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or other organisations in Africa?
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF SADC
SADC operated with no treaty, charter, convention, or other formal legal instrument 
governing the relationships of its member countries. The nearest to a treaty was the 
MOU OF 1981 but this document was short, sketchy and inexhaustive. Among some of 
the more serious issues which were not adequately covered are:
(a) the MOU does not formally establish the organisation nor define its aims and 
objectives:
(b) the legal status of the organisation was conditional upon the laws of each member 
state;
(c) the legal capacity, privileges and immunities of SADC as an organisation and that 
of its main institutions and functionaries were very much a matter for conjecture;
(d) no judicial body was set up to deal with conflict resolution at an operational as 
opposed to a policy or political level or to interpret the MOU or other SADC 
instruments;
(e) provisions for the funding of the organisation and its institutions, and how 
resources were to be mobilised and husbander were left out, and budgetary, audit 
and other financial arrangements received a bare mention.
(f) no sanctions were indicated for the breach of any obligations under, or failure to 
comply with, the MOU;
(g) the structural relationships with organs of the member states were not clearly 
defined; and
(h) there were no provisions on new members or withdrawal from membership.
SADC has operated since 1980 on the basis of its being a loose association of countries, 
led by leaders who know and understand each other and whose personal friendships and 
goodwill towards one another have provided the necessary bonds among them. Basically, 
it was the voluntary willingness of the member states to support the organisation, for 
whatever reason, which has kept SADC going. However, as the volume of work increased
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over the years and as some of the founding fathers left the scene, it became clear that 
SADC needed a more formal basis with a legally binding instrument and a firm legal
status to govern its relationships, not only with member states but also with other
organisations and countries throughout the world. Further, the organisation’s 
functionaries, spearheaded by the SADC Secretariat, were advising their leaders that the 
organisation could no longer function satisfactorily. It was a highly decentralised body 
which has no rigid rules and regulations to bring to bear on those responsible for 
translating policy statements into concrete action.
It was against this background that the SADC Council of Ministers was instructed by the 
Harare Summit of August 1989
".... to formalise SADC and give an appropriate legal status, taking into account the need 
to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an Agreement, Charter or Treaty."
STRUCTURE OF SADC
The MOU provided the following structure of SADC:
a) The Summit of Heads of State or Government;
b) The Council of Ministers;
c) Sectoral Commissions;
d) The Standing Committee of Officials; and
e) The Secretariat
In addition to the above, the organisation developed linkages with member countries 
through a national contact point in each member state. The work of developing the 
region was carried out in and by each country, with every member state being allocated 
an area of sectoral developmental responsibility. Ministers responsible for the sector (say, 
energy) meet as a Committee under the chairmanship of the Minister of the country 
responsible for co-ordinating the sector (Angola).
The ground work in the sector was carried out for the region by the Angolan Government 
through a special unit, the Sector Co-ordinating Unit (SCU). Angola paid for this work 
and provided the manpower, infrastructure and control of the SCU. There were no 
minimum requirements or guidelines by SADC to each of the member States. Each 
country did its bets!
Below the Council of Ministers, lines of responsibility to and communications with the 
Secretariat were unclear and weak. Ministerial Committees serviced by the Standing 
Committee of Officials, report to the Council, while at the sharp end of co-ordination, at 
the SCU, functional responsibility was to the Council through home governments while 
close administrative liaison was maintained with the Secretariat.
LESSONS FROM LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN OTHER AFRICAN REGIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS
Criticism of how SADC was structured by reference to other organisations such as 
the now defunct East African Community (EAC), the Preferential Trade Africa for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) or the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) would be unhelpful unless two questions were first addressed. 
These are:
(a) was SADC a regional organisation as now understood within the context of 
the OAU?; and
(b) was SADC intended to lead the region into an economic community?
Recent debate within the PTA, culminating in the decision taken by PTA Heads in 
Lusaka in January 1992 to absorb SADC into the PTA, appeared to pay little attention 
to the five regions of Africa according to the OAU, namely Northern Africa, Western 
Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa.26 Likewise, SADC could 
not legitimately call itself a Southern Africa regional organisation while Angola and 
Tanzania were part of it.
As regards the second question, one has to look at the Lusaka Declaration to find 
references to the main objectives of SADC. These were the co-ordination of economic 
development, which was stressed as a primary mandate, and the equitable integration of 
the economies of the countries of the region. However, was it possible to achieve 
equitable integration through mere co-ordination? Added to that, could a legal 
framework primarily intended to facilitate co-ordination promote integration?
The authors of both the Lusaka Declaration and the MOU did not address these 
questions at the time, perhaps because the need to do so was not apparent.
A further complication was that while the Lusaka Declaration was being made, the EAC 
was still being dismantled. Memories, sad ones, of regional co-operation under a treaty 
were still very fresh. Africa and, particularly, the Frontline States of Southern Africa were 
being pushed to find a solution for avoiding being swallowed by a South African 
sponsored constellation of Southern African States.27
It could be concluded that the legal framework of SADC then reflected an uneasy balance 
between the political pressures of the early 1980s, and the then not so pressing long-term 
need for economic integration of the region and the continent.
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These are the regions in the June,1991 Abuja Treaty 
for the creation of the African Economic Community.
The bantustans of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and 
Venda were part of this concept.
143
However, the past twelve years since SADC was formed, many changes have taken place, 
which have dictated the need for the organisation to take a fresh look at its constitutions.
political successes, notably the attainment of independence by Namibia in 1990 and the 
current developments in South Africa towards the democratization and international 
recognition of that country, mean that Frontline States were no longer threatened by 
South African destabilization. Examples from such areas as trade agreements between 
Canada, the United States of America and Mexico; the cooperation efforts in countries 
of Asia and between Australia and New Zealand have impacted on SADC. The collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union also 
helped in SADC by reducing the disparity in the political and economic ideologies which 
member states pursued. Agreements become easier to reach on common goals for the 
region in specific terms.
Flexibility of SADC arrangements, necessary and promotive of success over the last twelve 
years, needed to be adjusted or replaced to focus closely on economic integration under 
tighter rules and regulations through a treaty.
Since SADC changed its main mandate to the economic integration of the region, it 
become vital for the organisation to adopt a new legal framework, a treaty, which would 
bring about the achievement of that new purpose on a firmer footing. As the 1992 SADC 
Theme Document states" ... the real question is not whether some form of regional 
integration arrangements will be attempted in Southern Africa, but rather on what 
principles and terms". In the search for these "principles and terms" the EAC Treaty and 
the ECOWAS Treaty would be instructive.
The East African Community was created by the Treaty for East African Co-operation 
signed at Kampala, Uganda on June 6, 1967. The treaty had its history in the British 
colonial administration Orders In Council which sought to administer these three High 
Commission territories as one economic unit. The treaty, interestingly, created a 
community and a common market - clearly to highlight the stages to be travelled on the 
route to an economic community. Other parts of the Treaty provided for aims of the 
community, an East African Development Bank, co-operation in such areas as tax matters 
through a tax board, legal services under a counsel to the community and specialised 
councils such as the common market Council and the Economic Consultative and 
Planning Council. Specific corporations to regulate such areas of co-operation as railways, 
harbours, post and telecommunications and airway travel were created as instruments of 
the community.
Judicial organs to adjudicate over trade and industrial disputes were provided for as well 
as the Court of Appeal for East Africa to hear appeals from courts of the member states 
as might be provided for by the laws of each such state. There was also a chapter 
detailing financial matters and procedures. Noteworthy also was Article 4 of the Treaty 
which gave a general undertaking as to implementation and read as follows, "The Partner 
^ates shall make every effdrt to plan and direct their policies with a view to creating 
conditions favourable for the development of the Common Market and the achievement
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of the aims of the Community and shall co-ordinate, through the institutions of the 
Community, their economic policies to the extent necessary to achieve such aims and shall 
abstain from any measure likely to jeopardize the achievement thereof."
External trade and intra East African trade were extensively and separately covered under 
articles dealing with the East African Common Market.
The EAC collapsed in 1977 for a number of reasons, which illustrate the need for 
something more than a legal document to keep institutions intact. There were perceived 
inequalities in the distribution of benefits among the three countries, pressures from 
outside the region on Kenya to go it alone and, towards the end, political differences 
between the governments of the partner states. However, the underlying cause for the 
collapse of the East African Community was that the leaders of the newly independent 
member states saw Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania as the first priority and the community 
as a second best. C.K. Nkulu observed in an article titled "The East African Experience 
in Integration", and published in the African Economic Digest 1991 suggested that "The 
major weakness of the Community treaty was that, while it established adjudicative 
mechanisms to resolve disputes, their legal competence was rendered almost impotent by 
the reluctance of the signatories to surrender the necessary degree of sovereignty." It was 
perhaps a case of the leaders community, their own creations, the authority needed to 
keep the regional organisation going. This, notwithstanding their undertaking in Article 
4 of the Treaty! There are here many lessons for SADC and all other regional 
organisations in Africa.
THE WEST AFRICAN EXAMPLE
The most comprehensive African regional co-operation agreement, so far, has been the 
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of 1975 which 
was signed by fifteen countries of that region. The treaty covers the same areas as 
outlines above in relation to the EAC treaty but the following aspects attract attention.
(a) Membership of other regional or sub-regional associations and relations with non- 
ECOWAS countries are specifically allowed (Article 59). Within the context of 
the OAU, allowing any African State to belong to more than one regional 
organisation raises difficulties. Apart from issues of loyalty, it would be 
questionable whether some African States could shoulder the economic burden of 
fully supporting two or more such organisations.
(b) Under Chapter III dealing with trade, provisions for compensating member states 
which suffer loss of revenue because of the operations of the Treaty were made. 
Similarly, the South African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement of 1969, provides 
for South Africa to compensate, according to an agreed formula, any of the other 
SACU countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) for loss of customs 
revenue.
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(c) There are very welcome provisions granting citizens of member States the 
citizenship of the ECOWAS Community, with freedom of residence and 
movement, including freedom from work permits, visas and others. In SADC, 
citizens of Angola and Mozambique still need visas to enter the other countries. 
Entry, residence and work permit requirements apply to SADC and non - SADC 
personnel alike, and there are no "SADC Citizens" entry points at the national 
borders.
(d) Provisions for industrial development and harmonisation of the region were clearly 
stated and areas of co-operation specified. These included economic matters, 
agriculture and natural resources, transport and communications, monetary and 
financial policies, energy and social and cultural matters. SADC’s Lusaka 
Declaration and MOU dealt specifically with only two areas of priority: transport 
and communications under the Southern Africa Transport and Communications 
Commission (SATCC), and agriculture through the Southern African Centre for 
Co-operation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR). For some unclear reason the 
Maputo-based SATCC was established by a Convention, while SACCAR in 
Gaborone was set up under a less formal memorandum of understanding.
(e) Articles regarding the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development 
also provided better scope for own-fund generation and security than the case in 
SADC.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DIMENSION
SADC, therefore, needed a treaty in place sooner than later, which would accommodate 
South Africa as a member with SACU as a sub-regional organisation within SADC. What 
would avoid placing South Africa into the situation Southern Rhodesia was in the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland or Kenya was in the East African Community is 
to have in place and running a SADC Community Treaty which learns from the EAC and 
ECOWAS experiences - well before South African membership of SADC is finalised.
OAU TREATY ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY
The above Treaty, referred to here as the Abuja Treaty, benefitted from experience 
elsewhere in Africa and beyond and represented a very comprehensive document in 
proper legal form. It incorporated all the positive provisions of the EAC and ECOWAS, 
and covered additional areas such as customs union, women and development, and 
relations with other organisations within and outside Africa both state and non­
governmental. These provisions were very sound and welcome and, given the 
determination by member states to implement them faithfully, should lead to an African 
Economic Community eventually.
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The immediate question should be when and how. Article 6 of the Abuja Treaty 
envisaged that this could be done in s l x stages covering a total period of not more that 
34 years (ie not beyond the year 2025). The stages could overlap. Yet by requiring the 
formation of new regional economic communities (as opposed to requiring member states 
to join and strengthen the existing ones), Africa, through the Abuja Treaty, risked 
proliferating structures which would be reluctant to dissolve or merge into larger ones. 
Mechanisms for policing the stage by stage development towards the African Economic 
Community, including the proposed Pan African Parliament, could be of doubtful efficacy.
What would determine Africa’s pace toward continental development would be the 
commitment of the national leaders of the day, of make every regional community strong 
and lasting, thus ensuring large and durable building blocks for the continental 
com m unity. African leaders must be prepared to surrender part of their sovereignty in 
favour of a wider platform than national boundaries on which to found their efforts to 
improve the standard of life of the ordinary African by implementing regional integration.
Regrettably, the Abuja Treaty did not define the regions of Africa in order to limit the 
number of regional organisations. It would have been better to see the Treaty requiring 
each African State to belong to only one regional community. Some states cannot afford, 
politically or economically, to belong to more than one region and each state has to make 
a choice.
REFLECTIONS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FUTURE 
SADC
One of the major obstacles to change in SADC was that SADC existed. It had succeeded 
in attracting a great deal of attention to itself - from its citizens, the international 
community, and other African regional organisations. It had an existing structure with 
organs and people in positions within those organs - people who would not take too kindly 
to being asked to make substantial changes. Yet change to the constitution of SADC was 
inevitable, and had been ordered by the Summit. The change would have been easier had 
SADC’s original framework been designed with the mind to create a regional economic 
community rather than a conference for development co-ordination. To service the future 
SADC better, a legal framework should be a treaty along the lines of the Abuja Treaty. 
In particular, having regard to experiences over the past 12 years, SADC’s new treaty 
should provide for:
• #
(a) definitions of SADC’s relationship with the African Economic Community;
(b) a requirement that member states may not belong to more than one African 
regional economic organisation;
(c) regional councils or corporations to carry out the work of implementing the SADC 
programme of action to replace the existing complex, irregular, non uniform and 
cumbersome arrangements such as the Sector Co-ordinating Units and sectoral 
committees;
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(d) emphasis of the new SADC to be not an organisation of governments, but rather
on the people of the member states, whose business, professional, social, cultural 
and political self-expression should be at the centre of the organisation - with 
governments as facilitators rather than chief actors; and
(e) the need for national laws to take into account the regional statute.
Attitudes in SADC member states have changed towards greater political accountability 
and democratic government, and towards economic ideologies which recognise that 
governments could not and should not try to provide everything. There has been a better 
realization that the struggle for political freedom for the states of the region was based 
on the desire to achieve the freedom of the individuals whose human rights and freedoms 
governments should be duty- bound to uphold, protect and improve. Progress should be 
in the direction of transcending the pettiness of limiting the African stature to these 
national boundaries which, after all, were the legacy of the colonial rulers.
In view of its history and drawing on the experiences from other regional groupings, 
SADC has been poised to become a large building block for the African economic unity. 
A treaty should facilitate this process. The key to success, however, would lie in the 
commitment of the leadership, governments, and peoples of the member states to ensure 
that regional economic integration becomes a reality.
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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS AND CONCLUDING 
OBSERVATIONS 
- SADC FROM RESOLUTIONS TO ACTION
AG. Luhanga, P.NJL Walakira
The scope of topics covered was diverse in nature and hence many different opinions 
were expressed. However, it should be underscored that there was a large degree of 
convergence on substantive issues than divergence among the delegates’ deliberations. 
On a number of important issues apparent agreement was reached and recommendations 
made which could provide a solid basis for further building of consensus and action. The 
main theme of the seminar was strengthening regional cooperation and integration among 
SADC member states.
The sub-themes identified were:
(a) Balanced and Equitable Development within the community; and Enhancing the 
Role of the Private Sector;
(b) Modalities for Implementing Economic Integration with focus on:
(i) Barriers to intra-regional trade,
(ii) Role of Women in Development in SADC,
(iii) Food Security; and
(iv) Transfer of Technology;
(c) Mechanisms for Financing the Programme of the Community; and
(d) Legal Framework for the Community.
The major issues that were discussed and observations made under each sub-theme are 
summarised below.
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MEASURES TO ENSURE BALANCED AND EQUITABLE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND ENHANCING THE 
ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The present inadequacy of the private sector full participation in the integration effort was 
recognised and noted. It was underscored that the existing unbalanced and inequitable 
economic development among the member states frustrate progress towards market 
integration. Often, the perception that some member states benefit disproportionately 
more than others from integration has contributed to failures in regional integration.
First, there was consensus among the delegate, that commitments to ensure balanced and 
equitable economic development be undertaken. There should be harmonisation of 
economic policies and decisions taken at national and regional levels to allow convergence 
in the pace of development. In this context, it should be emphasised that structural 
adjustment policies and programmes should take a broader regional rather than the 
narrow national dimension. Furthermore, equitable distribution of programmes and net 
benefits should be encouraged, mechanisms to compensate less developed member states 
should be devised and policy harmonisation on fiscal, investment, monetary and trade 
should be undertaken.
Second, expanding the role of the private sector through creating an enabling environment 
for foreign, local and cross-border investment and trade should be catalytic to 
strengthening efforts towards economic integration. The would entail freer movement of 
capita, goods and labour through the SADC region than is the current practice. To this 
effect, transport and communication systems need to be improved to promote efficient 
regional movement of goods and services.
Third, top-down approach to integration should be avoided and instead bottom-up 
approach should be encouraged, involving the common SADC citizenry.
MODALITIES FOR IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Recognising SADC’s shift in emphasis from projects and programmes coordination in the 
last four years to accord priority to issues relating to promotion of trade, investment and 
production, the delegates turned their attention to modalities for implementing economic 
integration. There was general agreement that SADC is posed to move rapidly towards 
an integrated market. Its strategy is based on a "development integration" approach. 
However, there were serious concerns that SADC has not reached even the rudimental 
level of market integration - preferential trade area. Yet, four members of SADC are 
also members of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), which is a relatively 
advanced level of economic integration. To complicate the picture, eight members of 
SADC are also members of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(PTA) - which is at a rudimental level of market integration. All these factors combined 
raise the problem of how SADC should progress towards an economically integrated
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market. It was further considered imperative that SADC should move rapidly towards a 
common market. Failuruld be supported in each member state.
MECHANISMS FOR FINANCING THE PROGRAMMES OF THE 
COMMUNITY
It was noted, with great concern, that SADC has been over-dependent on external 
financial resources for its projects and programmes. SADC has been donor-driven. Its 
capacity to mobilise resources within the region has so far been limited. In view of global 
competition for resources, the external generosity to the Sub-Saharan regions, and SADC 
in particular, would be running out. The delegates considered that it would be imperative 
to find creating means of mobilizing regional resources to finance programmes of a SADC 
economic community. In this regard Governments should urgently consider establishing 
a Regional Development Bank. Furthermore, resources available to SADC members 
from regional and international lending institutions should be used to complement the 
efforts of the SADC Regional Bank once created.
In view of the scarcity of financial resources, the delegates suggested that priorities should 
be re-ordered in favour of:
(a) Ensuring food security;
(b) Proper maintenance of existing infra-structure;
(c) Enhancing of human resources development; and
(d) Development of integrated regional infrastructure.
In this respect, it was agreed that, as the security situation in the regional continues to 
improve, there should be peace dividends, Governments spending on defence should 
correspondingly be reduced, thus making more resources available for development.
From policy and strategy perspectives, the consensus was that, first, the current economic 
reforms being undertaken in SADC member states should be continued and strengthened 
to improve the pre-conditions for regional integration. Second, Governments should 
devise financial policies that increase domestic savings. Measures, therefore, should be 
considered to establish a regional stock exchange as well as money and capital markets. 
Third, long-term development strategies should be based on investment and trade with 
export-oriented production for the regional and world markets.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FUTURE SADC
The delegates gave considerable time on the legal entity of the future SADC, which 
formed into "The Southern Africa Development Community". Nothing both SADC’s shift 
in emphasis from project and programme coordination to economic integration and also 
the inadequacy of the then existing SADC legal framework, and being aware that there 
were already efforts to formalise SADC, the delegates suggested that the new legal 
framework of the entity to be created should be based on a TREATY. The treaty of the
Southern Africa Development Community", concluded in August, 1992 in Windhoek, 
Namibia, the delegates suggested, among others, that the Treaty should be specific in its 
provisions in addressing the following crucial areas:
(a) Formal relationships between the organisation and its member states;
(b) Definition of the main institutions and the relationships towards each other and 
member states;
(c) Provisions for the institutions of the organisation to be responsible for the 
implementation of the programme of action instead of the individual member 
states;
(d) Provision for judicial mechanism for conflict resolution and its main institutions;
(e) Definition of the relationships of the organisation with the African Economic 
Community and other regional organisations;
(f) Provisions to facilitate freedom of movement of persons, labour, goods, services 
and capital;
(g) Provisions for national lows to take into account regional legal instruments;
(h) Provisions for ensuring balanced and equitable economic development among
member states; and• #
(i) The undertaking to create conditions favourable for the implementation for the 
programmes of the organisation and attainment of its aims and objectives.
All in all, the delegates agreed that progress towards an economic development 
community would, to a great extent, depend on the pace of implementing the legal 
instruments enshrined in the Treaty and various protocols.
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